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INTRODUCTION
After twelve years of violent conflict, the bloody civil war in El Salvador
came to an end in January 1992 with the signing of peace agreements and,
ultimately, comprehensive Peace Accords.' During the conflict between the
Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN) [Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front]2 and the government, at least seventy-five thousand
1. See EL SALVADOR AGREEMENTS: THE PATH TO PEACE, Dep't of Pub. Info., U.N. Doc. DPI/1208-
92614 (1992) [hereinafter "Peace Accords"]. The Peace Accords consist of a series of agreements
negotiated between 1989 and 1992. Two of these agreements, published in the aforementioned
volume and cited in this article, are: 1) the Mexico Agreements, April 27, 1991, at 13-31 [hereinafter
"Mexico Agreements"]; and 2) the Peace Agreement, Jan. 16, 1992, at 46-145 [hereinafter "Peace
Agreement" or "Chapultepec Agreement"]. See also The United Nations Truth Commission for El
Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 498-99 (1994) (describing the Peace Accords). For an
abbreviated overview of the civil war and the role of the United States in the Peace Accords, see
Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a Regional Refugee Crisis: Lessons
from the Summer 2014 "Surge" of Central American Women and Children at the US-Mexico
Border, S J. MIGRATION AND HUM. SECURITY 137, 154-55 (2017).
2. The Farabundo Martf National Liberation Front [hereinafter FMLN] was formed in October 1980
as an umbrella group for five left-wing constituent groups: Fuerzas Populares de Liberaci6n (FPL)
[Popular Liberation Front], Ej6rcito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) [People's Revolutionary
Army], Resistencia Nacional (RN) [National Resistance], Partido Comunista Salvadoreflo (PCS)
[Salvadoran Communist Party], and Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos
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people were killed, seven thousand were "disappeared,"3 and five hundred
thousand were displaced.4 The great majority of these abuses were committed by
the Salvadoran government, which received more than $5 billion in assistance
from the United States.
The civil war in El Salvador was fought in response to decades of "economic
inequality and exploitation suffered by the majority of the population at the
hands of an elite oligarchy whose will was enforced by state security forces."6
Hardline factions in alliance with the oligarchy met any attempts at reform, even
by moderate military factions, with repression. The conflict ended in a stalemate
between the FMLN and the military with a negotiated peace accord that, though
it led to significant political reforms,7 for the most part failed to address the
inequalities and marginalization that had led to the conflict. Following the end
of the conflict, powerful elite interests and United States pressure led to the
adoption of neoliberal economic policies that only worsened conditions for
ordinary Salvadorans.8
In the years since the civil war ended, El Salvador has experienced levels of
violence that rank among the highest in the world. In 2009, El Salvador had the
highest homicide rate in the world, and although the rate subsequently decreased,
in 2015 and 2016 it was once again ranked number one.9 The violence in El
(PRTC) [Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers]. ELLEN MOODIE, EL SALVADOR IN
THE AFTERMATH OF PEACE: CRIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 33
(2010).
3. Argentine sociologist Elizabeth Jelin describes the term "disappeared" in this context as "those who
were clandestinely abducted, their fate never disclosed nor their bodies recovered." ELIZABETH
JELIN, STATE REPRESSION AND THE STRUGGLES FOR MEMORY 34 (2003). "Enforced
disappearance," its full name in the legal context, is used as a fear tactic that creates insecurity.
Disappearances, AMNESTY INT'L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/disappearances/
[https://perma.cc/4PUC-PRC4]. This strategy was widely used by military regimes to repress
political opposition during Latin America's conflicts in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. AMNESTY
INT'L, ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN THE AMERICAS ARE A CRIME OF THE PRESENT (2012),
available at https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/enforced-disappearances-americas-are-crime-
present [https://perma.ccl6RJP-JWNT].
4. See MOODIE, supra note 2, at 1; From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report
of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, U.N. Doc. S/25500, Annexes (1993) [hereinafter
"Truth Commission Report"]. See also Musalo & Lee, supra note 1, at 154.
5. ELISABETH J. WOOD, FORGING DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW: INSURGENT TRANSITIONS IN SOUTH
AFRICA AND EL SALVADOR 50 (2000).
6. Musalo & Lee, supra note 1, at 154. See also ELISABETH J. WOOD, INSURGENT COLLECTIVE ACTION
AND CIvIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR 20-24 (2003).
7. Musalo & Lee, supra note 1, at 154-55. WOOD, supra note 5, at 106-07 (referring to the "remarkable
changes" brought about by the Peace Accords, including the transformation of the FMLN into a
political party that participated in the general elections of March 1994).
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 on economic inequalities and social exclusion.
9. U.N. Office of Drugs and Crimes, Intentional Homicide Statistics Database, Intentional Homicides
(Per 100,000 People), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 (showing 2009
homicide rate); The World's Most Dangerous Cities, ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www
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Salvador has led some to comment that the peace is worse than the war,10 with
recent homicide rates often exceeding those during wartime."
El Salvador has also distinguished itself as having extremely high levels of
gender-based violence. Multiple forms of violence against women and girls are
pervasive, including intrafamilial or domestic violence, sexual violence,
trafficking for sexual exploitation, and incest. Salvadorans readily admit that
gender-based violence is so common that not only is it tolerated, it is considered
normal, as is impunity for those who perpetrate these acts.1 2 The incidence of
femicidel3-the gender-motivated killing of women-has increased, and
although more men than women are killed in El Salvador, the rate at which
women are killed has risen more rapidly in recent years than that of men.14 From
2007 to 2012 El Salvador had the highest reported femicide rate in the world.15
.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/daily-chart-23 (listing El Salvador as top murder
capital in 2015 and 2016).
10. MOODIE, supra note 2, at 2, 21.
11. INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE OPINION PUBLICA (IUDOP), UNIVERSIDAD CENTROAMERICANA
"JOSe SIMEON CARtAS" (UCA) [UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION, JoSe SIMEON CA1AS
CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY], LA SITUACION DE LA SEGURIDAD Y LA JUSTICIA 2009-2014
[THE SITUATION OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE 2009-2014], at 3 (Jeannette Aguilar ed., 2014),
http://www.uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-content/uploads/libro_1a_situaci6nde-la-seguridad.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LUB9-8SB6].
12. See discussion infra Part I.C. In this article, I use the terms "gender-based violence," "gender
violence," and "violence against women and girls" interchangeably, consistent with the definition
of gender-based violence adopted by the Committee on the Convention for the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women [hereinafter CEDAW]. CEDAW, through its adoption of General
Recommendation No. 19 on Violence against Women, defined gender-based violence as "violence
that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.
It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion
and other deprivations of liberty." CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19, A/47/38 (1992),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm [https://
perma.cc/V453-AY7D].
13. The term "femicide" is generally understood to denote the gender-motivated killing of a woman.
The term "feminicide" adds an additional element of state complicity, demonstrated by the fact that
the killings are carried out in a context of virtually total impunity. See Karen Musalo et al., Crimes
Without Punishment: Violence Against Women in Guatemala, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 161, 172
(2010). There is no internationally accepted definition of these terms; however, a number of
countries have enacted laws classifying femicides or feminicides as crimes. In these cases, the terms
would have the specific definitions set forth in each country's laws. GENEVA DECLARATION ON
ARMED VIOLENCE AND DEV., GLOBAL BURDEN OF ARMED VIOLENCE 2015: EVERY BODY COUNTS
89 (May 8, 2015), http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-
violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence-2015.html [https://perma.cc/2UER-UYWY].
Throughout this article, I use the more inclusive term "femicide," rather than the narrower term
"feminicide," which includes proof of the additional element of government complicity. I use the
term "feminicide" only when quoting from or referring to a law or primary source that uses it.
14. Hannah Stone, El Salvador Sees Epidemic of Violence Against Women, INSIGHT CRIME (May 23,
2011), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/el-salvador-sees-epidemic-of-violence-against-
women [https://perma.cc/G3Q5-7HNA].
15. GLOBAL BURDEN OF ARMED VIOLENCE 2015: EVERY BODY COUNTS, supra note 13.
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Laws to address domestic violence,16 violence against women, gender
inequality,18 and trafficking, 9 much of which is for sexual exploitation, have
been enacted, and governmental bodies have been created pursuant to these new
laws.2 0 Most recently, the government created specialized courts21 with limited
jurisdiction22 over matters involving violence against women. Notwithstanding
these developments, with the exception of a short period when there was a dip in
the number of women murdered,23 there has been no reduction in gender violence
in El Salvador or in the impunity enjoyed by its perpetrators.2 4
This article explores explanations for the high levels of violence, including
gender violence and femicides, in El Salvador. It examines how the conditions
that preceded, accompanied, and have followed the civil war may explain the
violence that has engulfed contemporary El Salvador. Within that context, this
article focuses particularly on violence against women; it looks at the response
to gendered violence in the forms of laws and governmental institutions and
evaluates their impact - if any - in reducing the multiple types of violence against
women, including gender-motivated killings. The article draws not only on an
extensive review of the literature analyzing the situation in El Salvador prior to
and following the armed conflict, but also on information gathered from in-depth
interviews of Salvadoran experts.25 Given the dearth and unreliability of
16. Ley contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar [LVI] [Law against Intrafamilial Violence] Decreto [Decree]
902, Diario Oficial [D.O.] No. 241, Tomo [Vol.] 333, Dec. 20, 1996 (El Sal.).
17. Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres [LEIV] [Special Integral
Law for a Life Free of Violence against Women] Decree 520, D.O. No. 2, Vol. 390, Jan. 4,2011 (El
Sal.).
18. Ley de Igualdad, Equidad y Erradicaci6n de la Discriminaci6n contra las Mujeres [LIE] [Law of
Equality, Equity, and the Eradication of Discrimination against Women] Decree 645, D.O. No. 70,
Vol. 391, Jan. 4, 2011 (El Sal.).
19. Ley Especial contra la Trata de Personas [Law Against Human Trafficking] Decree 824, D.O. No.
213, Vol. 405, Nov. 14, 2014 (El Sal.).
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. Decreto para la Creaci6n de los Tribunales Especializados para una Vida Libre de Violencia y
Discriminaci6n para las Mujeres [Decree 286] [Decree for the Creation of Special Courts for a Life
Free of Violence and Discrimination against Women] Decree 286, D.O. No. 60, Vol. 411, Apr. 4,
2016 (El Sal.).
22. Paradoxically, the jurisdiction did not include the most pervasive crimes of violence against women,
namely sexual violence and intrafamilal violence. See discussion infra Part III.D.
23. See discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
24. Id.
25. The in-country fact-finding, which was a collaborative initiative undertaken by the author and her
colleagues and students at he CGRS and at the RHRC at UC Hastings, took place in April and
October 2010, October 2012, October 2013, and November 2016. (Two interviews were also
conducted telephonically in summer 2014.) We met with and interviewed a range of individuals-
representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially those working on women's
rights, government officials charged with relevant responsibility for addressing violence and
impunity, and personnel of United Nations bodies, such as the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Although the questions we
asked varied over time, we consistently asked these sources their opinions as to the levels and root
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published information regarding violence against women in El Salvador,
discussed infra, the insights and analyses from in-country experts are essential
to presenting a fuller picture of the reality.
Part I provides an overview of the historical context relevant to the current
situation in El Salvador, looking principally at significant events in the twentieth
century. It examines how a confluence of factors - including structural violence,
economic inequalities, social exclusion, the proliferation of gangs and organized
crime, and a culture of patriarchy dating from the Spanish Conquest - have given
rise to contemporary levels of violence, including gender-based violence. Part II
presents information on the societal levels of violence, including violence against
women and girls, drawing connections between historical and socio-political
factors and the contemporary explosion of violence. Part III discusses the legal
framework addressing violence against women that has been under development
in El Salvador since 1996. It details the inadequacy of the laws, as well as the
significant barriers to implementation arising from deeply entrenched
institutional resistance to gender equality, which has led to, among other
problems, insufficient funding for the laws' implementation and virtual impunity
for the failure of governmental officials to carry out their responsibilities under
the laws. An objective and key contribution of this article is to substantiate the
links between the historical origins of violence and the magnitude of gender
violence in El Salvador today. Finally, the Conclusion offers some overarching
observations and recommendations drawn from the many Salvadoran activists
who have committed themselves to a long struggle to achieve justice and equality
for women.
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO EL SALVADOR'S CIVIL WAR AND ITS
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
Numerous scholars have detailed the conditions of inequality, exploitation,
and brutal repression that preceded El Salvador's civil war.2 6 In her seminal book
Forging Democracy from Below, Elisabeth Wood writes that, beginning in the
colonial period, "cacao merchants, then indigo growers, and later the coffee
planters"27 sought ways to coerce indigenous communities into becoming a
pliant, low-wage source of labor. One of the most significant measures toward
causes of violence, the measures they were familiar with in combating violence, their assessment of
the efficacy of these measures, and their recommendations for an improved approach. Over the
course of the five visits, we carried out 74 interviews, interviewing some individuals more than once.
(See Appendix B for a list of the individuals interviewed during each visit.)
26. See generally WOOD, supra note 5, at 25-51; MOODIE, supra note 2, at 23-30; IRINA C. SILBER,
EVERYDAY REVOLUTIONARIES: GENDER, VIOLENCE, AND DISILLUSIONMENT IN POSTWAR EL
SALVADOR 33-37 (2011).
27. WOOD, supra note 5, at 27.
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that end was the abolition of communal land tenure in 1881 and 1882. This
resulted in increased land ownership by those with "the contact, the cash, and the
knowledge,"28 and the effective dispossession from their land of indigenous
communities, forcing many into a poorly paid labor force. The rural police, and
then the National Guard, formed in 1912, protected landowner interests. They
could be summoned to "evict squatters or to jail workers who were seen as
troublemakers."29
This repressive environment temporarily lifted with the election of Pio
Romero Bosque in 1927, which allowed workers to organize in the countryside
and in the cities. Bosque's presidency was followed by the election of Arturo
Araujo, who also shared "progressive ideals."30 However, the Wall Street crash
and subsequent collapse of coffee prices set off a chain of events that led to even
greater repression. As coffee prices dropped, coffee growers drastically cut back
on wages and employment. Workers organized in response, with some ultimately
engaging in armed attacks against the government.3 1 The loosely organized
group of workers, who were mostly indigenous, with some "leadership and
support". from the Communist party, declared a "general insurrection."32 As
described by Wood, the response to this insurrection, which was disproportionate
by any measure, is infamous in Salvadoran history:
[T]he National Guard (and to a lesser extent, the regular army)
responded with great brutality, killing some 17,000 people in the
rebellion area [the western highlands] and desisting only when several
landlords complained that there would be no labor left to cultivate the
local estates. According to a number of recent historical studies, racism
contributed to the ferocious response by the state.33
According to Wood, there were a number of long-lasting "legac[ies] of the
Matanza (slaughter),"3 4 including the consolidation of "a model of development
... that combined direct repression of labor, preemptive militarization, and
policing by the state of the terms of the labor market," as well as "a fifty-year
political arrangement in which the military ruled directly, while economic elites
directed economic policy,"3 5 protecting their own interests at the expense of the
28. Id. at 28.
29. WOOD, supra note 5, at 29 (quoting ROBERT G. WILLIAMS, STATES AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION:
COFFEE AND THE RISE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1994)).
30. MOODIE, supra note 2, at 24.
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growing number of landless and poor Salvadorans. This explains why, though
elites' power and wealth continued to increase in periods of economic growth,
there was no benefit to the majority of Salvadorans. To the contrary, their
situation worsened: the number of landless peasants grew "from 12 percent of
the rural population in 1961 to 41 percent by 1975,"36 and by the end of that same
period, 50 percent of the population was unemployed or underemployed.37
When efforts at modest land reform were defeated by "hardline elements"
in the 1970s, and electoral fraud was committed during the 197238 and 1977
elections, organizing and active resistance by urban and rural Salvadorans
began to take root. Non-violent popular organizations, such as the Bloque
Popular Revolucionario (BPR) [Popular Revolutionary Block] and the Frente de
Acci6n Popular Unificada (FAPU) [United Popular Action Front], helped bring
together peasant, student, and union groups in nationwide mobilizations.40
Liberation theology called attention to social injustices in contemporary
Salvadoran society and encouraged ordinary people to take action. It "awoke in
them a vision that a more just social landscape was possible because it was God's
will, and that bringing it about required their own efforts."4 1 Some church-based
organizations, such as the Federaci6n Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreflos
(FECCAS) [Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants], were "overtly
political ... demanding land and better working conditions."42 All of this was
met with increasing repression by the Salvadoran government. With their
teaching of liberation theology, priests were a particular target; "[b]etween 1976
and 1977 more.than twenty-five Catholic priests were imprisoned, tortured, or
murdered.43
36. Kenneth E. Sharpe & Martin Diskin, Facing Facts in El Salvador: Reconciliation or War, 1 WORLD
POL'Y J. 517, 521 (1984).
37. Id.
38. The Partido de Conciliaci6n Nacional (PCN) [Party of National Reconciliation] represented the
interests of the landed oligarchy and their military allies. The PCN used "patronage, fraud and
coercion" to assure its electoral victories. Id. at 521-22. The Partido Dem6crata Cristiano (PDC)
[Christian Democratic Party], in alliance with the Partido Social Democrata (PSD) [Social
Democratic Party] and the Partido Comunista (PC) [Communist Party], won the 1972 presidential
elections against the PCN. However, the "military intervened in the vote counting and declared the
PCN candidate the victor." Id. at 522.
39. In the February 1977 elections, the PCN claimed that its candidate, General Carlos Humberto
Romero Mena, had won 67 percent of the votes cast. Claims of fraud and mass protests erupted, and
the government responded by firing on and killing protestors as well as calling a state of siege.
MOODIE, supra note 2, at 31.
40. WOOD, supra note 5, at 44.
41. WOOD, supra note 6, at 119.
42. Id. at 43. Wood also points to the organizing carried out by the Christian Democratic Party in rural
areas and notes that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contributed
funding for organizing in this period. Id.
43. MOODIE, supra note 2, at 31.
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A group of reformist military officers opposed the violent repression and
successfully carried out a coup in 1979.44 Although this led to the beginnings of
reform, and the incorporation of the opposition Partido Dem6crata Cristiano
(PDC) [Christian Democratic Party] into the government, the hardliners esisted
the changes and ultimately prevailed. The "extreme right, under the leadership
of Roberto d'Aubuisson[,] rapidly built up a network of death squads within the
security forces and the intelligence divisions of the army to carry out a deadly
mixture of targeted assassinations, interrogations, and generalized violence."45
By the beginning of 1980, then-United States Ambassador Frank Devine
reported to his State Department that "mutilated bodies [were] appearing on
roadsides just as they had during the worst days" of former military ruler Carlos
Humberto Romero's reign.46 Among the many atrocities committed by military
or paramilitary forces that year was the assassination of Archbishop Oscar
Romero,4 7 the murder of 300 peasants from Chalatenango who were suspected
of being guerrillas,48 and the kidnapping, rape, and murder of four American
churchwomen.4 9 In late 1980, the violence "claimed about 200 lives a week,"50
and in early 1981, "300 to 500 people were [being] killed each week."51
The United States funded the Salvadoran military, first with the Carter
Administration and at a higher level under the Reagan Administration,
notwithstanding this ever-growing evidence of its commission of atrocities.52
The United States finally ended its support in 1989 following a campaign led by
Senator Joseph Moakley that protested human rights abuses in El Salvador.53
44. WOOD, supra note 5, at 45.
45. Id. at 46.
46. El Salvador: Chronology, KELLOGG INST. CHRONOLOGY ONLINE, https://kellogg.nd.edu
/archbishop-oscar-romero#tab-1491 [https://perma.cc/XV7U-HCFK].
47. Truth Commission Report, supra note 4, at 172-80.
48. Truth Commission Report, supra note 4.
49. Raymond Bonner, Bringing El Salvador Nun Killers to Justice, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 9, 2014, 8:30
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/09/bringing-el-salavador-nun-killers-to-
justice.html [https://perma.cc/QZ6B-CJJV]; Truth Commission Report, supra note 4, at 81-88.
50. Sharpe & Diskin, supra note 36, at 526.
51. Id. at 535.
52. Juan de Onis, US. Giving Salvador Combat Equipment, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 1981), http://www
.nytimes.com/1981/01/19/world/us-giving-salvador-combat-equipment.html (last visited July 8,
2017); Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, In Central America, Reagan Remains a Polarizing Figure,
WASH. POST (June 10, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29546-2004Jun9
.html [https://perma.cc/9KND-S2GF].
53. LISE M. HOWARD, UN PEACEKEEPING IN CIVIL WARS 93-94 (2007). It should be noted that the
Salvadoran government had the ability to control and reduce the violence, and did so for a short
period of time after a December 1983 visit by United States Vice President Bush, who "warned of
decreases in US aid if murders continued and death squad leaders were left unpunished." World
Peace Foundation, El Salvador, MASS ATROCITY ENDINGS (Aug. 7, 2015), https://sites.tufts.edu
/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/el-salvador/ [https://perma.cc/P6JB-Q23P].
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It was in this context of extreme repression that El Salvador's five previously
"inconsequential"54 guerrilla groups55 decided to unify as the FMLN 5 6 and that
many who had been active in non-violent, popular organizations opted to support
or join the guerrillas.57 Although some were pressured to join the FMLN,
coercion "played a distinctly minor role compared with repression by the
state."5 8
At the beginning of 1981, the FMLN launched what it called a "Final
Offensive," named after the 1979 Sandinista offensive in neighboring Nicaragua,
which had brought about the overthrow of that country's long-ruling dictator,
Anastasio Somoza. As detailed by Alberto Martin Alvarez in his paper "From
Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution," the FMLN's strategy was "to
combine a military offensive with a general strike and urban insurgency."5 9 But
the FMLN Final Offensive did not achieve the overthrow of the government as
had the offensive in Nicaragua. The FMLN's failure has been attributed to a
54. WOOD, supra note 5, at 47.
55. Five "political military" organizations consolidated to become the FMLN. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
56. The FMLN took its name from Agustin Farabundo Marti, a leader in the Communist party killed
during the 1932 Matanza. WOOD, supra note 5, at 24.
57. Id. at 47.
58. Id. at 48.
59. Alberto Martin Alvarez, From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution: The Farabundo Marti
Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, in BERGHOF TRANSITIONS SERIES: RESISTANCE/
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND TRANSITION TO POLITICS 7 n.1 (Vdronique Dudouet & Hans J.
Giessmann eds. 2010), http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers
/TransitionsSeries/transitions9_elsalvador.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB9Q-VKGZ]. Martin Alvarez
described the guerrillas' strategy as follows:
[O]n January 10, 1981, the FMLN launched a "final" national-scale offensive with the
aim of defeating the armed forces and taking power. The Front intended to do so before
Republican candidate Ronald Reagan took office, as guerilla commanders anticipated
that this would bring greater US support for the Salvadoran government and, eventually,
a US military occupation. The Front was now around 2,500 men strong, all armed and
trained. There was also an indeterminate number of militia who would protect the local
population and take part in local actions. The offensive was launched from safe camp
sites in the rural area, and two thirds of the country witnessed a series of severe clashes.
Id. at 18. Martin Alvarez's article also describes the guerrillas' failure:
However, the lack of arms and training, as well as the lack of coordination among the
different organisations, stopped the FMLN from reaching its strategic goal. Also, the
mass popular insurgency that the guerilla groups had expected did not take place. The
very severe repression implemented by the regime had a demobilising effect on the
population. One week after the launch of the offensive, the FMLN began a tactical
retreat.
From that moment on, the guerilla organisations retreated to the rural north and
northeast areas of the country, and the conflict turned into a grand-scale civil war.
Id. at 18.
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"lack of arms and training" and to the severe state repression of the civilian
population, which kept many people away from joining the insurrection.6 0
The strategy of the FMLN evolved over time in response to the
circumstances. In its early years, the FMLN sought a military win.6 1 It forced the
Salvadoran military from some territories and was able to control a number of
towns and cities. It engaged in acts of economic sabotage. After years of fighting,
it ultimately became clear that the FMLN was unable to defeat the Salvadoran
military outright. However, it had developed a "significant military capacity,"62
which the Salvadoran military was unable to defeat notwithstanding "the more
than $5 billion of United States assistance to the government."63 The conflict had
reached a "military stalemate in which neither of the two parties had a real shot
at winning the war."64
There were other pressures toward bringing the conflict to an end. The right-
wing governing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) [Nationalist
Republican Alliance] party, "dominated by ... financial elites," was more
concerned with making money and with "getting on with business in a
globalizing economy than with fighting."65 The United States was threatening to
cut off military assistance in response to the November 16, 1989, assassination
of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and the housekeeper's 16-year-old
daughter at the Universidad Centroamericana "Jos6 Sime6n Cafias" (UCA) [Josd
Sime6n Cafias Central American University].66 In this context, the government
and the FMLN agreed to engage in negotiations that could end the conflict.
Over the course of.two years, the FMLN and the government entered into a
series of Peace Accords that laid the groundwork for the signing of a Peace
Agreement in Mexico on January 16, 1992. It is not surprising- given the
massive human rights violations that were committed during the conflict - that
much of the Accords focused on preventing such violations in the future.
However, as discussed infra Part II.B. 1, amnesty laws enacted in the wake of the
conflict - only found unconstitutional 25 years later, in 2016 - greatly undercut
the construction of a state committed to the full and effective protection of human
rights. And although 100 of the worst human rights violators were purged from
60. Id.
61. Id. at 19-20.
62. WOOD, supra note 5, at 50.
63. Id.
64. Martin Alvarez, supra note 59, at 21.
65. MOODIE, supra note 2, at 39. By this point the core business interest of the elites had moved from
agricultural export to commerce and services. WOOD, supra note 5, at 62-67.
66. MOODIE, supra note 2, at 38. The UCA had often been classified as a "refuge of subversives" by
some in the Salvadoran Armed Forces. Truth Commission Report, supra note 4, at 49. According to
the country's Truth Commission, this idea of the Jesuits being linked to the FMLN came from the
work of the UCA's Jesuits with the poor in El Salvador. Id.
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their positions in government, not all individuals who had participated in gross
human rights violations were removed, and corrupt or dysfunctional institutions,
such as the judiciary, did not undergo much-needed reforms. Equally important,
the Peace Accords failed in great measure to address the conditions of economic
inequality and marginalization that had given rise to the conflict. They did not
help create a more equal society. Many commentators have since pointed out
that the present high levels of violence, including gender violence, and impunity
can be understood only within this historical context.
II. LEVELS AND UNDERLYING CAUSES OF VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR
A. Levels of Violence
Post-war El Salvador has consistently experienced violence at higher levels
than during the armed conflict.67 Salvadoran governmental sources were the first
to report higher homicide rates following the Peace Accords.68 At least one
Salvadoran government source, the Ministry of Justice, reported that crime
increased two years prior to the conclusion of the war and the Peace Accords.
And these levels of post-war violence have remained among the highest in the
world. In 2013, El Salvador's homicide rate was 39.7 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants, which is six times the world average and four times the rate
considered by the Pan American Health Organization to constitute an epidemic
of violence.71 The homicide rate appeared to drop from 2012 to 2014 during a
67. MOODIE, supra note 2, at 46. Charles Call notes that there were actually three different phases
regarding the increase in crime in El Salvador in the decade following the Peace Accords. From
1991 to 1995, "crime skyrocketed"; from 1996 to 2000, "crime stayed at high levels, with
kidnappings and robberies dipping then surging once more"; and from 2000 to the end of 2002, there
was a "slight decline." Charles T. Call, Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the
Rule of Law in El Salvador, 35 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 827, 841 (2003).
68. MOODIE, supra note 2, at 46. In 1995, the Salvadoran government reported "a murder rate of 138.9
per 100,000 population - more than the annual wartime violent death rate, the highest in the
Americas and second only to South Africa in the world." Moodie notes that some are skeptical about
these figures, with "one recent estimate [suggesting] that the rate was about 80 per 100,000." Id.
69. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE 2013, at 24 (Mar.
2014), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/GSH2013/2014 GLOBAL
HOMICIDEBOOK web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2RX-4ZBH]. The IUDOP of the UCA issued a
study in 2014 with homicide rates for those years with available data from 1990 to 2013. The years
and corresponding rates (the number of homicides per 100,000 people) are as follows: 1990 - 69.8;
1994 - 138.2; 1996 - 117.4; 2003 - 36; 2004 - 48.7; 2005 - 63; 2006 - 64.6; 2007 - 57.3; 2008 -
51.9; 2009 - 71.2; 2010 - 64.8; 2011- 70.3; 2012 - 41.6; 2013 - 39.7. The study's authors note that
questions have been raised about he reliability of the statistics, especially those for the years 1994
and 1996. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 3.
70. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 3.
71. Id.
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negotiated gang truce,72 but it rose precipitously again once the truce came to an
end."
These high levels of violence have a gender dimension: El Salvador is one
of the most dangerous places in the world to be a woman.74 It ranks among the
countries with the highest femicide rates in the world.7 5 The numbers of violent
killings of women has steadily increased since the early 2000s, with the only
exception being the temporary slight downturn in homicide rates during the gang
truce. As discussed infra Part II.C, Salvadoran women are in fact victims of a
range of forms of violence, including intrafamilial violence, sexual violence,
incest, sex trafficking, and sexual harassment, both in the home and in society at
large.
B. Underlying Causes
Many ascribe the high levels of violence in El Salvador to the proliferation
of gangs and organized crime, although there is some controversy over the
72. Kyra Gurney, El Salvador Homicides Skyrocket After Gang Truce Unravels, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan.
9, 2015), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/el-salvador-homicides-skyrocket-after-gang-
truce-unravels [https://perma.cc/4FX9-9XAJ]. The drop in reported homicides during the truce
coincided with a rise in disappearances, and the subsequent discovery of clandestine graves holding
many bodies, which has brought into question whether there really was a drop in killings during this
period. The relationship between disappearances and the homicide rate is further discussed infra
note 168.
73. The homicide rate in El Salvador was 43.7 per 100,000 people in 2013 and 68.6 per 100,000 in 2014.
Id. In 2015, the rate rose to 104 per 100,000. Joshua Partlow, Why El Salvador Became the
Hemisphere's Murder Capital, WASH. POST (Jan. 5,2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/worldviews/wp/2016/01/05/why-el-salvador-became-the-hemispheres-murder-capital/ [https://
perma.cc/SKR6-ZEHH]. In the first two months of 2016, there were 1,399 murders, more than
double the number for the same period in 2015. El Salvador's Already Horrific Murder Rate is
Getting Much Worse, VICE NEWS (Mar. 3, 2016, 12:50 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/el-
salvadors-already-horrific-murder-rate-is-getting-much-worse [https://perma.cc/U3NR-LXE8].
However, preliminary numbers how a drop to 81.7 homicides per 100,000 people in 2016. Nelson
Renteria, Murders in Notoriously Violent El Salvador Drop 20 Percent in 2016: Police, REUTERS
(Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-elsalvador-violence-idUSKBN14MI5F [https://
perma.cc/4DN3-4PLG].
74. Two studies published pursuant to the adoption of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and
Development, a diplomatic initiative aimed at addressing the relationship between armed violence
and development, show that El Salvador has exceedingly high levels of violence against women.
GLOBAL BURDEN OF ARMED VIOLENCE 2015: EVERY BODY COUNTS, supra note 13; Alvazzi del
Frate, Femicide: A Global Problem, SMALL ARMS SURVEY RESEARCH NOTES (2012).
75. Mimi Yagoub, Why Does Latin America Have the World's Highest Female Murder Rates?, INSIGHT
CRIME (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-does-latin-america-have-
the-world-s-highest-female-murder-rates [https://perma.cc/6SM6-HGGN].
76. GLOBAL BURDEN OF ARMED VIOLENCE 2015: EVERY BODY COUNTS, supra note 13.
77. Roque Planas, How El Salvador Became The World's Most Violent Peacetime Country,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2016, 5:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/el-salvador-
most-violent-country_us_56d9e239e4b0000de4047fbe [https://perma.cc/EK7Z-39E4]; Arron
Daugherty, El Salvador is Most Violent Nation in Western Hemisphere, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 4,
2018] 15
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
percentage of homicides attributable to gang violence.78 However, if gangs are
one of the predominant causes of violence, it is important to determine why El
Salvador has proved such fertile ground for their emergence. Jos6 Miguel Cruz,
who has written extensively about the phenomenon of criminal violence in
Central America, argues convincingly that the nature of the transition from war
to peace is a strong determinant.7 9 Key questions Cruz asks include whether
human rights violators are purged and punished pursuant to law and whether
there are true institutional reforms to consolidate democracy.8 0 One might also
ask how decades of structural violence affect a population and its susceptibility
to criminal violence. Furthermore, the immediate causes of the conflict in El
Salvador - economic inequalities and marginalization - have never been
adequately ameliorated. The failure to address those realities may well contribute
to the current situation. Finally, it is important to consider the particular impact
that these socio-historical factors have had on the perpetuation of long-standing
patriarchal norms and gender violence. The following section discusses these
factors.
1. Structural Violence, the Civil War, and Impunity
Historically, the Salvadoran state routinely deployed extreme violence to
maintain the exploitative status quo at the service of economic elites. The
Matanza of 1932 remains "etched into the nation's collective memory."8 1 During
the civil war, state security and paramilitary forces used assassination, torture,
mutilation, and forced disappearances against the FMLN and its supporters.82
Students, trade activists, and peasant organizers were kidnapped, disappeared,
tortured, and murdered. "The civilian population in disputed or guerrilla-
controlled areas was automatically assumed to be the enemy,"83 leading to mass
2016), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-is-most-violent-nation-in-western-
hemisphere [https://perma.cc/Y9SY-2MH4]; Partlow, supra note 73.
78. David Mungia Pay6s, the former Minister of Justice and Public Security, attributed 90 percent of the
homicides to gangs. In contrast, police data put the number at 10.4 percent for 2009 and 11.3 percent
for 2010, with an increase to 26.4 percent by 2011. RIDOP, supra note 11, at 19-20.
79. Jos6 Miguel Cruz, Democratization Under Assault: Criminal Violence in Post-Transition Central
America at 22, presentedat Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, 2009 Annual Meeting & Exhibition (Sept. 3-
6, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450237 [https://perma.cc/3DNH-BY8T].
80. Id.
81. Mo Hume, Contesting Imagined Communities: Gender, Nation, and Violence in El Salvador, in
POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN LATIN AMERICA 73, 80
(Will Fowler & Peter Lambert eds. 2006).
82. The UN Truth Commission examined "serious acts of violence" by the state or rebel forces
committed between 1980 and 1991. Truth Commission Report, supra note 4; Call, supra note 67, at
851.
83. MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 344 (2006).
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executions in rural areas.84 Numerous religious leaders were killed, with the
highest-profile incidents being the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in
March 1987 and the killings of six Jesuit priests, their cook, and the cook's
daughter at the UCA in 1989.
State security forces engaged in widespread sexual brutality. Women were
targeted for sexualized forms ofviolence, including mass rape.8 6 These acts often
took place during attacks on rural communities where "[p]regnant women were
... routinely tortured and their babies were taken from them [and] [w]omen's
bodies were mutilated by cutting off their breasts or ramming objects into their
vaginas."87 The sole survivor of the 800-person massacre at El Mozote recounted
that assailants raped women and girls before killing them.88 Women held in state
detention also frequently suffered rape, sexual torture, and humiliation. 9
Many Salvadorans have commented that the violence of the war has
contributed to the contemporary situation.90 Those who were trained to fight and
kill reentered society, and the violence has had a transgenerational effect.9 1
84. Truth Commission Report, supra note 4, at 27.
85. Id. at 19, 45, 127.
86. Elisabeth J. Wood, Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?, 37 POL. &
Soc'Y 131, 152 (2009). Wood notes that there were no cases reported to the UN Truth Commission
of sexual violence committed by the FMLN: "Of the 450 cases of sexual violence listed by the Truth
Commission in the unpublished annexes to its report (270 cases were reported directly to the
Commission by victims, family members or friends; 180 were reported directly by human rights
groups, churches, or other organizations) no case was attributed to FMLN cadre." Id. at 152.
87. Mo HUME, THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE: GENDER, CONFLICT AND COMMUNITY IN EL SALVADOR 58
(2009).
88. MICHELE LEIBY, STATE-PERPETRATED WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 238
(2011).
89. Id. at 246.
90. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Salvador E. Mendndez Leal, Procurador Adjunto para la Defensa de
los Derechos Humanos [Deputy Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights], Procuraduria para la
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) [Office of the Procurator for the Defense of Human
Rights, or Human Rights Ombudsman's Office], in San Sal., El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on file with
author). Mendndez commented that the amnesty, which resulted in impunity for crimes as atrocious
as the massacre at El Mozote, contributed to the culture of impunity, noting that the "historical
impunity is a factor in the impunity currently existing." Roberto Rodriguez Mel6ndez, an expert on
human rights and children's rights observed that "El Salvador's drawn out and intensely violent civil
war had lasting effects in the country, including a cultural acceptance of violence and an
institutionally weak and unstable government." Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Meldndez,
Director de la Escuela de Capacitaci6n Judicial [Director of the Judicial Training School],
Departamento de Ciencias Juridicas de la Universidad Centroamericana "Jos6 Sime6n Caftas"
(UCA) [Legal Sciences Department, Jose Sime6n Callas Central American University] (2014) (on
file with author). Zaira Navas, a human rights attorney who served as Inspector General of the
Policia Nacional Civil (PNC) [National Civil Police] in 2010 pointed to the "culture of war" and the
consequent "dehumanization" as well as social disintegration and migration as contributing factors.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Zaira Navas, Inspectora General [Inspector General], Policia Nacional
Civil (PNC) [National Civil Police], in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2010) (on file with author).
91. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Blanca Figueroa, Jefa de la Unidad de Juvenil y Familia [Chief of the
Unit for Children and Family], PoliciaNacional Civil (PNC) [National Civil Police], in San Sal., El
Sal. (Oct. 2013) (on file with author). Blanca Figueroa stated:
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Salvadorans who were traumatized by witnessing extreme levels of violence
became inured to it9 2 and in many cases began to see it as a normal means of
problem solving.9 3 Exacerbating the situation was the easy availability of illegal
arms and the knowledge of widespread impunity allowing violence to go
unpunished.94
The negotiated settlement that brought El Salvador's conflict to an end failed
to meaningfully address the massive human rights violations that had taken place
during the war. The majority of individuals responsible for these acts were not
removed from government or the military, nor were they even punished.95
Pursuant to the Peace Accords, an Ad Hoc Commission was formed and
tasked with reviewing the files of military officers. The Commission's purpose
was to recommend the removal of officials who had been involved in abuses
during the war.96 Faced with the daunting task of evaluating the records of 2,293
army officers, the Commission made the decision to "focus on the army's upper
echelons and those individuals about whom it had obtained information,
approximately 10 percent of the total." It ultimately called for the "discharge
There was so much violence during the war. The psychological impact of the war was
left untreated and trickled down to children who are now adults... . The war left families
disintegrated... . These issues are not addressed by the State, so violence is repeating
itself with people living in fear.
Id.
92. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Doris Montenegro, Presidenta [President], and Ima Rocio Guirola,
Instituto de Estudios de la Mujer "Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera" (CEMUJER) [Norma
Virginia Guirola de Herrera Institute for Women's Studies], in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 19, 2010) (on
file with author). Doris Montenegro, who has criticized the amnesty, observed, "To kill is to kill and
there should not be amnesty for killing. The entire society is sick, it is used to violence, and this is
not just all the fault of the gangs." Id.
93. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Maria T. Delgado de Mejia, Especialista en Protecci6n Infantil [Child
Protection Specialist], Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia (UNICEF) [United Nations
Children's Fund] at 5-6, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 17, 2013) (on file with author). Delgado de Mejia
observed that as a result of the conflict and the lesson it taught "we [Salvadorans] have a serious
problem of resolving disputes," without violence, and that eight percent of the homicides were over
"trivial incidents[.]" Id. Doris Montenegro made the same point, asking "How can we possibly
understand why someone can kill another person just because he stole your parking space; the rage
and violence is that extreme." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Doris Montenegro and and Ima Rocio
Guirola, CEMUJER, supra note 92.
94. CGRS/RH{RC Interview with Salvador E. Men6ndez Leal, PDDH, supra note 90; CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Benjamin Cuellar, Director [Director], and Roxana Marroquin, Coordinadora para
Defensa de Niflos y Adolescentes [Coordinator for Defense of Children and Adolescents], Instituto
de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana "Josd Sime6n Caftas" (IDHUCA)
[Institute of Human Rights, Jos6 Sime6n Caflas Central American University], in San Sal., El Sal.
(Apr. 2010) (on file with author).
95. MARGARET POPKIN, PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE: OBSTACLES TO BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN EL
SALVADOR 106-09, 150-59 (2000).
96. Id. at 95-97.
97. Id.
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or transfer of 103 officers."9 8 But then-Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani
resisted taking action against these officers. It was only with sustained
international pressure that they were removed, but even then they were not
required to admit wrongdoing and were "allowed to take their normal retirement
and honorable discharges."99 Although the work of the Ad Hoc Commission was
important, it has been characterized largely as a "symbolic cleansing" since the
"process could not possibly constitute a thorough or systematic review of the
entire officer corps."100 Many officers who had participated in atrocities, or who
had extensive involvement in death squads, were allowed to continue in official
positions with no accountability for their egregious acts.10
The Peace Accords also created the UN Truth Commission, whose role it
was to investigate "serious acts of violence" committed between 1980 and 1991,
and to attribute responsibility for those violations.' 0 2 It was given a six-month
mandate, and limited resources.10 3 In light of these constraints, it was not
contemplated that the Truth Commission would attempt to compile a
comprehensive report on the thousands of violations committed throughout the
conflict. To the contrary, both the FMLN and the government intended for the
Commission to select a limited number of "notorious and representative
cases."'0 4 Although the Truth Commission did receive over 22,000 complaints
regarding violent acts,105 it ultimately focused on only 32 cases, which one of the
members of the Truth Commission noted was consistent with "the wishes of the
[FMLN and the Salvadoran government,] who wanted an 'investigation that
focused on some of the most egregious acts and a set of recommendations to help
ensure that the past would not repeat itself."'
106
The Truth Commission's report identified by name those it considered to be
perpetrators of these most egregious acts, and there was an assumption that the
report would lead to further investigations, prosecution, and punishment in these
cases.107 In fact, a reference to the Truth Commission in the Peace Accords stated
that the perpetrators must be "the object of exemplary action by the law courts
so that the punishment prescribed by law is meted out to those found
9 8. Id.
99. Id. at 108.
100. Id at 107.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 94.
103. Id at 134.
104. Id. at 112.
105. Id. at 112 n.14.
106. Id. at 112.
107. Id. at 110.
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responsible."108 But, notwithstanding this aspirational statement, the reality was
that the Truth Commission itself did not think prosecutions were likely.
Throughout the conflict there had been virtually no prosecutions in the face of
massive human rights violations, 10 9 and the judiciary was considered responsible
for this impunity.1 10 In its report, the Truth Commission stated that "El Salvador
has no system for the administration of justice which meets the minimum
requirements of objectivity and impartiality so that justice can be rendered
reliably.""' The deficiencies in the Salvadoran justice system were not a product
of the civil war-rather, "[a]n independent, efficient, accessible, and impartial
justice system had never existed in El Salvador."1 12
The possibility of prosecutions, already unlikely given the compromised
state of the country's justice system, was even more severely undercut by the
passage of the Ley de Reconciliaci6n Nacional [Law of National
Reconciliation]113 and then the Ley de Amnistia General para la Consolidaci6n
de la Paz [General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of Peace (Amnesty
Law)].1 4 The Law of National Reconciliation, which constituted a "partial
amnesty,"I15 was enacted in January 1992, shortly after the signing of the Peace
Agreement. It was intended to "legalize the situation of the FMLN leaders who
were returning to the country and would be involved in implementing the [P]eace
[A]ccords[J" 116 It excluded from its scope individuals who had been convicted
by a jury and persons named in the Truth Commission's report "as being
responsible for serious human rights violations,"'17 leaving open the possibility
of some prosecutions. However, this was not to come to pass.
The Truth Commission made its report public on March 15, 1993. Among
its findings was the fact that approximately 85 percent of the reported acts of
violence had been committed by governmental and paramilitary forces, and
death squads allied with them, and that only 5 percent of the violence was
attributable to the FMLN. 18 The report drew the immediate and harsh criticism
108. Chap6ltepec Agreement, supra note 1, at 8.
109. Prosecutions for politically motivated killings were limited to those in which the victims were U.S.
citizens. POPKIN, supra note 95, at 47.
110. Id. at 126.
111. Id. at 140.
112. Id. at 97.
113. Ley de Reconciliaci6n Nacional [Law for National Reconciliation] Decree 147, D.O. 14, Vol. 314,
Jan. 23, 1992 (El Sal.).
114. Ley de Amnistia General para la Consolidaci6n de la Paz [General Amnesty Law for the
Consolidation of Peace] Decree 486, D.O. 56, Vol. 318, Mar. 22, 1993 (El Sal.).
115. POPKiN, supra note 95, at 151.
116. Id.
117. This provision was intended to preclude amnesty for two officers who had been convicted for the
murder of the Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter. Id.
118. Id. at 112 n.14.
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of President Cristiani and other high-level executive officials.1 19 On March 20,
1993, five days after the publication of the Truth Commission report, the
Legislative Assembly approved the Amnesty Law, which went into effect eight
days later, on March 28, 1993.120 The Amnesty Law was extremely broad in its
reach, providing for "[fiull, absolute and unconditional amnesty."1 21 It applied
regardless of the stage of criminal proceedings and mandated the release of
anyone sentenced and imprisoned; it also "extinguish[ed] civil responsibility in
all cases."2 2
The Truth Commission's report included the names of those individuals
-(governmental and non-governmental) who had directly participated or been
complicit in the acts of violence it had registered.12 3 The Commission asked the
government to dismiss those who occupied posts in the "armed forces, the civil
service, or the judiciary."1 24 It also recommended that the government disqualify
these individuals "from holding any public office or post for at least ten years
and permanently from any activity related to public security or national
defense."l2 5 Because of the judiciary's failure to respond to the gross human
rights violations, the Commission called on all the justices of El Salvador's
Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) to give up their positions.126 The government
refused, with representatives stating that the Commission had "exceeded its
mandate."1 2 7 The CSJ also refused, "explicitly reject[ing] the commission's
findings regarding members of the judiciary."l 28
119. President Cristiani voiced his dissatisfaction with the Truth Commission's report and urged an
immediate and total amnesty. His military commanders took to the airwaves to denounce the
Commission's report, as did the entire Supreme Court. Minister ofthe Presidency Oscar Santamaria,
who headed the government's negotiating team, termed the report "an insult to Salvadoran society
. . . and very explosive." Id. at 121. General Mauricio Vargas, who represented the military on the
negotiating team, called the report "biased, incomplete, unfair, totally unacceptable"; Nelson Garcia,
then president of the Salvadoran Lawyers Federation, found that the Commission's report did "not
even meet the requirements of the Inquisition," and the entire leadership of the armed forces
appeared on national television to blast the report as "unfair, incomplete, illegal, unethical, partisan
and insolent." Id.
120. Ley de Amnistia General para la Consolidaci6n de la Paz [General Amnesty Law for the
Consolidation of Peace], supra note 114.
121. Id. art. 1. The Amnesty Law did exempt a small category of crimes committed for profit, or related
to kidnapping or extortion, from the amnesty. Id. art. 3.
122. Id art. 4.




127. Id. at 127.
128. Id
212018]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
As a consequence, many of those named in the Truth Commission's report
continued to hold positions of power and influence.12 9 In addition, the many
more who had committed human rights violations but were not named in the
Commission report were able to incorporate themselves into new bodies created
pursuant to the Peace Accords.130 The incorporation of members of the former
security bodies into new institutions, coupled with the blanket amnesty, has had
far-reaching consequences for the rise of crime and violence in El Salvador.
With the conflict over, some of these ex-security members simply "switched
to criminal activities, preserving close links to state structures, including the new
civilian police force."13 1 As scholars have commented, although the creation of
the National Civil Police (PNC) "was one of the greatest achievements of the
peace accords,"1 32 this force faced numerous challenges, in addition to the
incorporation of human rights violators, that undermined its ability to perform
its role. The PNC had poor leadership, insufficient resources, difficulties with
recruitment, inadequate training, and no internal "discipline mechanisms."33
Cumulatively, these factors hobbled the police force's ability to function
effectively. Declining confidence in police and law enforcement ultimately
resulted in less effective policing.
Neighboring Nicaragua provides a helpful contrast to El Salvador. The
Sandinistas, who ruled Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990 after ousting that country's
dictator, Anastasio Somoza, eradicated "all vestiges of the security apparatus of
the old regime" and created new institutions.13 4 These institutions were
"committed to institutional rules" and the police developed an "institutional
culture based more on community needs."13 5 This is one of the key factors in
explaining why Nicaragua "stands as a special case with its relatively low levels
129. Popkin describes how a number of those listed in the report were elected to the Legislative
Assembly, while Rodolfo Parker, "who had been named by the commission for his purported role
in altering suspects' statements in the Jesuit murder investigation," was the Christian Democratic
Party's presidential nominee in 1999. POPKIN, supra note 95, at 128.
130. One of the new bodies was the National Civil Police force. It was to replace those security forces
that had committed egregious abuses - the Treasury Police, National Guard, National Police, and
paramilitary defense patrols. The newly formed National Civil Police was to be constituted of 20
percent former police, 20 percent FMLN, and 60 percent civilians. Call, supra note 67, at 831-33.
131. Cruz, supra note 79, at 24. Numerous Salvadoran sources share the analysis that violent civil war
elements have incorporated into current criminal enterprises. For example, in a 2010 interview,
Sandra Edibel Guevara commented that the "right wing forces that were tied to the death squads
during the civil war are linked to organized crime[.]" CGRS/RHRC Interview with Sandra Edibel
Guevara, Directora Ejecutiva [Executive Director], Asociaci6n y Movimiento de Mujeres M61ida
Anaya Montes ("Las M6lidas") [M61ida Anaya Montes Women's Movement], in San Sal., El Sal.
(Apr. 2010) (on file with author).
132. POPKIN, supra note 95, at 175.
133. Id. at 176.
134. Cruz, supra note 79, at 27.
135. Id at 31.
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of crime" in comparison to the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras.13 6
There are many commentators who see a connection between historical
impunity for acts of violence in El Salvador, going back to the 1932 Matanza,137
and the contemporary high levels of violence.138 The enactment of a blanket
amnesty,1 39 the refusal to root out and punish human rights violators,14 0 and the
failure to create institutions to assure public securityl41 contributed to the
creation of an environment where violent criminal activity could flourish.
In an encouraging development, after many unsuccessful challenges to the
Amnesty Law over the years,14 2 on July 13, 2016, the Constitutional Chamber of
the CSJ ruled the Amnesty Law unconstitutional, opening the door for the
136. Id. at 3. The homicide rate in Nicaragua for 2013 was 9 per 100,000 people. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
OVERSEAS SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL (OSAC), NICARAGUA 2015 CRIME AND SAFETY REPORT (June
12, 2015), https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17797 [https://perma.cc
/M822-LQCJ]. In 2014, the rate dropped slightly to 8.7 per 100,000. David Gagne, InSight Crime
2014 Homicide Round-Up, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.insighterime.org/news-
analysis/insight-crime-2014-homicide-round-up [https://perma.cc/PF29-JYYQ]. In 2015, the rate
further dropped to 8 per 100,000 people. David Gagne, 2015 Latin America Homicide Round-Up,
INSIGHT CRIME (2016), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-
up-2015-latin-america-caribbean [https://perma.cc/5SAQ-XSYA].
137. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Benjamin Cuellar and Roxana Marroquin, IDHUCA, supra note 94.
138. Robin Maria DeLugan, Amnesty No More, NACLA (July 20, 2016), http://nacla.org/news/2016/07
/20/amnesty-no-more [https://perma.cc/CV4X-KRGU].
139. Doris Montenegro, President of CEMUJER, commented that the "Amnesty Law was a historical
atrocity," and that it was politically expedient, but "no one anticipated the damage it would do to
Salvadoran society, how the violence and impunity would destroy the Salvadoran populace."
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Doris Montenegro and and Ima Rocio Guirola, supra note 92.
140. Benjamin Cuellar noted that contemporary "impunity dates back to the war." He observed that
"[t]hose who kill once (and are not punished)[ will kill again." CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Benjamin Cuellar and Roxana Marroquin, IDHUCA supra note 94.
141. Aracely Bautista Bayona, whose work as a lawyer began during the Salvadoran armed conflict,
points to the weakness and corruption of key institutions as factors strongly contributing to impunity.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona, Consultora Legal [Legal Consultant],
Comisi6n de Familia, la Mujer, y la Niftez de la Asamblea Legislativa [Commission on Family,
Women, and Children ofthe Legislative Assembly], in San Sal., El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on file with
author).
142. The first decision was on May 20, 1993, when the Constitutional Chamber of the CSJ ruled
inadmissible a request to review the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law because the law was an
"eminently political act." Sala de lo Constitucional de la CSJ [Constitutional Chamber of the CSJ],




[https://perma.cc/DNW7-FCGM]. Subsequently, on September 26, 2000, the Constitutional
Chamber of the CSJ once again upheld the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law but qualified its
application. Sala de lo Constitucional de la CSJ [Constitutional Chamber of the CSJ], 24-97/21-98,
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prosecution of crimes committed during the civil war.1 4 3 This ruling's potential
impact on the country's pervasive and persistent levels of impunity remains to
be seen, but the CSJ's decision is certainly a welcome development in affirming
the principle that the state has the obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish
those who have committed crimes. However, as many in-country sources have
continued to observe, the Salvadoran people have very little confidence in the
judiciary as a whole. Judges pose an especially significant obstacle to justice in
cases involving gender violence, where their biases, rather than the law,
determine their decision-making.
2. Economic Inequalities and Social Exclusion
The conflict in El Salvador was fought in response to the concentration of
wealth in the hands of an economic elite that had exploited the majority of
Salvadorans for decades. The Peace Accords, however, did not meaningfully
"address the underlying economic inequalities that underscored the war." 44 To
the contrary, the neoliberal economic policies that were adopted toward the end
of and after the conflict deepened poverty and inequality. As many have
observed, the absence of "economic alternatives for vast swathes of the
population ... has created the opportunity for crime and violence to flourish."1 45
The United States played a significant role in El Salvador's adoption of the
neoliberal economic policies that led to greater poverty and marginalization
among the Salvadoran population. Beginning in 1985, the United States "began
to attach conditions to support the Salvadoran government, demanding structural
adjustment toward a more open economy."146 The plan for economic
liberalization, which was developed by the Fundaci6n Salvadorefia para el
Desarrollo Econ6mico y Social (FUSADES) [Salvadoran Foundation for
143. Sala de lo Constitucional de la CSJ [Constitutional Chamber of the CSJ], 44-2013/145-2013, July





144. IRINA C. SILBER, EVERYDAY REVOLUTIONARIES: GENDER, VIOLENCE, AND DISILLUSIONMENT IN
POSTWAR EL SALVADOR 16 (2011). See also HUME, supra note 87, at 61 (noting that "[tjhe 1992
peace accords are widely recognized as having put an end to the twelve-year war, although they
have failed to build a new and more equal society").
145. HUME, supra note 87, at 171 (noting that "simplistic linkages between crime and poverty should be
avoided"). A former justice of the CSJ has commented that the violence is tied to the "neoliberalism
of ARENA that excluded people." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Mirna A. Perla Jimenez, Juez
[Justice], Sala de lo Civil de la CSJ [Civil Chamber of the CSJ], in San Sal., El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on
file with author). This perspective was repeated by other sources. Sandra Edibel Guevara said that
neoliberal policies, such as privatization, had been adopted to help big business but had harmed
"poor people" and led to the country's economic crisis. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Sandra Edibel
Guevara, Las M61idas, supra note 131.
146. MOODIE, supra note 2, at 42.
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Economic and Social Development], a United States Agency for International
Development (USAID)-funded Salvadoran think tank, involved "eliminating
price controls, deregulating interest rates, and cutting public spending, especially
in public services such as education and health care."14 7 The plan also involved
reprivatizing banks and "granting autonomy to the Central Reserve Bank, a move
that allowed the financial sector to concentrate its power[.]" 14 8
When Alfredo Cristiani, of the right-wing ARENA party, gained the
presidency in 1989 - two years before the war ended - his government
"immediately launched" FUSADES' economic program and began
implementing structural adjustment measures promoted by the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.14 9 It was that same year that reportedly
marked the beginning of the rise in crime, with an 83 percent increase over the
amount of crime reported in 1988.so
More than two decades later, the high levels of violence continue, as do the
conditions of poverty and inequality. Although poverty levels have temporarily
declined at times,s more than 30 percent of Salvadorans now live below the
poverty level, and more than half of the country's income goes to the wealthiest
20 percent of the population.15 2 The most basic necessities for human
development - such as nutrition, early childhood health care, and education - are
impacted by this economic reality. 5 3 The "poorly performing education system
fails to provide the necessary skills" for Salvadorans to obtain employment,
which further deepens poverty and social exclusion, both contributing factors to
the emergence of gangs. 154 As one Salvadoran expert observed, "[e]xclusion ...
leads to violence. Although there is no direct relationship between poverty and
violence, and not all poor people are violent, where there's poverty, there are no




150. Id. at 67.
151. Elisabeth J. Wood, Challenges to Political Democracy in El Salvador, in THE THIRD WAVE OF
DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: ADVANCES AND SETBACKS 179, 199 (Frances Hagopian
ed., 2005).
152. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CENTRAL AMERICA: INFORMATION ON MIGRATION OF
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN FROM EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS 2-3 (Feb. 2015),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668749.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C5D-YW3W].
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 5. Blanca Figueroa, of the PNC, commented on the importance of investing in education in
order to bring about social change and the reduction of violence. CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Blanca Figueroa, Unit for Children and Family, PNC at 5, supra note 91.
155. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Maria T. Delgado de Mejia, supra note 93. In a 2013 interview, M6lida
Guevara of Oxfam commented on the way in which poverty and its consequences, combined with
other factors, rendered youth susceptible to gang recruitment, stating:
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3. Gangs and Organized Crime
Two rival gangs operate in El Salvador - Barrio 18 (the 18th Street Gang)
and Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13). Estimates of the total number of gang
members in El Salvador vary from 20,000156 to 60,000.'7 The deportation from
the United States of many Salvadoran youth who had joined gangs and
committed crimes in 1990s Los Angeles is often cited as a principal cause for
the emergence of gangs in El Salvador.158 However, as Jos6 Miguel Cruz has
written, "[y]oung people joined the gangs not because of the influx of United
States deportees, but because the local conditions in post-war El Salvador were
ripe for the affiliation of hundreds of teenagers with these organizations."159
[T]he combined effect of poverty, the absence and abandonment of parents, the absence
of early stimulation and play, the absence of nutrition and health services and violence
at home and at school generate conditions of vulnerability. The result is that more than
half of all children abandon school and become vulnerable to recruitment by criminal
organizations.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with M6lida Guevara, Coordinadora del Programa de la Justicia del Gtnero
[Coordinator of the Gender Justice Program], Oxfam, at 4, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 17, 2013) (on
file with author). Mario Mena Mdndez, who works with children who have come into conflict with
the law, commented on the difference that exposure to art and music could have on children. He
emphasized the importance of sending youth the message that they are not "irredeemable" and that
society is willing to invest in them. He illustrated this point by telling the following anecdote:
I have a friend who studied in Sweden, he's Salvadoran and went to Sweden when he
was five. He was in the typical situation of an immigrant who couldn't find his place in
the country. He would go to the market and steal bags and he would take off running
just for the thrill of being chased by the security guards. He was brought before the judge
and the judge asked him "what do you want to do in life?" Half as a joke he said "I want
to play the drums." So the judge sentenced him to become the best drummer in the city.
When he robbed the bags again he was brought before the judge again and the judge
asked him the same question. Again as a joke, he said "I want to play guitar." So the
judge sentenced him to learn guitar at the conservatory in Stockholm. And this really
had an effect on him, and he was very moved, and that's when he understood that "they
wanted to make me a citizen and that just because I committed a crime didn't mean I
was irredeemable."
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Mario F. Mena Mdndez, Jefe de la Divisi6n de Admisi6n, Evaluaci6n
y Diagnostico [Head of the Division of Admission, Evaluation, and Diagnostics], Instituto
Salvadoretlo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Nitlez y la Adolescencia (ISNA) [Salvadoran Institute
for the Comprehensive Development of Childhood and Adolescence] at 7, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct.
16, 2013) (on file with author).
156. UNODC, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A
THREAT ASSESSMENT, 78 fig.79 (Sept. 2012), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis
/StudiesfTOCCentralAmericaand theCaribbean english.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MEG-TLRJ].
157. Edgardo Ayala, El Salvador's New Government to Inherit Hot Potato of Gang Truce, INTER PRESS
SERV. (May 10, 2014), http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/05/el-salvadors-new-government-inherit-hot-
potato-gang-truce/ [https://perma.cc/RTY6-3643].
158. Jos6 Miguel Cruz, Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence, presented at
Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding, 2009 Global Gangs Workshop (May 14-15,
2009), http://www.academia.edu/1451010/Global Gangs inElSalvadorMarasand the
Politics-of Violence [https://perma.cc/T3L7-X4BY].
159. Id. at 6-7.
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Cruz's analysis is shared by many who look to the decades of structural
violence, the civil war, and the war's aftermath to explain the emergence of the
gangs and related criminal activity.16 0 The society was "shattered by poverty,
social inequality and political violence," and the civil war had "left a fragmented
and traumatized civil society, with tens of thousands of internally displaced
inhabitants making their way into the major cities and the flooding of the streets
with weapons[.]"'6 Families had been torn apart by the conflict, and conditions
in the home were often punishing and violent. Youth lacked opportunity for
education or employment. In addition, strong societal norms of patriarchy and
machismo contributed to the idealization of a gang identity that adopted and
exaggerated these norms.
The government of El Salvador failed to address the conditions that had led
to the proliferation of gangs. Instead, it enacted a series of harsh and punitive
laws, generally referred to as the "Mano Dura" [Iron Fist] laws.16 2 Although
human rights groups criticized the Mano Dura laws, they were popular with a
public that was weary of violent crime.163 But the Mano Dura laws are generally
160. In her book El Salvador in the Aftermath ofPeace, Ellen Moodie quotes a psychologist, Amdrica
Tenorio, who interviewed Salvadorans who had turned to crime after the war came to an end.
Tenorio explained:
Most of the people in prison ... had been dehumanized by deep structural violence long
before their arrests. The majority of ex-soldiers . . . had become drug addicts in the
military . ... They came into treatment traumatized and even brain-damaged. Many
others had lived long lives of deprivation . ... What can you expect in a country that
has never known a durable democracy, that has a long, troubled history of
authoritarianism, repression, exploitation, and murder?
MOODIE, supra note 2, at 167. In-country sources have underscored the need for treatment as
opposed to harsh and draconian punitive measures. Mirna Antonieta Perla Jimenez, a judge on El
Salvador's Supreme Court, stated that there were "other options that could work," including "better
treatment for those addicted to drugs" and fostering "positive leadership" for youth. CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Mirna A. Perla Jimenez, Civil Chamber of the CSJ, supra note 145.
161. Cruz, Global Gangs in El Salvador, supra note 158, at 5.
162. Draconian anti-gang laws were adopted by the Salvadoran government, along with the governments
of the other Northern Triangle countries. El Salvador enacted its first harsh anti-gang "Mano Dura"
law in 2003. See Ley Anti Maras [Anti-Gang Law], Decree 158, D.O. 188, Vol. 361, Oct. 10, 2003
(El. Sal.). This law allowed for the arrest and imprisonment of youth suspected of gang membership
and "included rounding up thousands of youth based on their appearance, associations or address."
Steven Dudley, How 'Mano Dura' is Strengthening Gangs, INSIGHT CRIME (Nov. 21, 2010),
http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs [https://perma
.cc/8377-J2YR]. The law was struck down as being unconstitutional, but it was followed by the
passage of "Super Mano Dura" in July 2004. See Ley para el Combate de las Actividades
Delincuenciales de Grupos o Asociaciones Ilicitas Especiales [Law for Combating the Delinquent
Activities of Special Illicit Groups or Associations], Decree 305, D.O. No. 65, Vol. 363, Apr. 2,
2004 (El. Sal.). Super Mano Dura gave the police expanded power to search and arrest suspected
gang members and increased penalties. CLARE R. SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GANGS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 10 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAN4-
95AX].
163. SEELKE, supra note 162, at 10 (anti-gang policies put into effect in response to "popular demands
and media pressure for the government to 'do something' about an escalation in gang-related
crime").
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perceived as having strengthened the gangs164 and stigmatized many innocent
youth, making them more susceptible to gang recruitment.
El Salvador's gangs contribute to the high rates of homicides, although there
is a difference of opinion as to the percentage of killings that are gang-related.16 5
One can infer a high percentage is attributable to the gangs from the notable drop
in killings during the time period that the Salvadoran government, assisted by
the church, brokered a truce between the warring gangs in 2012.166 The number
of homicides per day reportedly dropped by almost two-thirds during the gang
truce, from 14 homicides a day (in the period immediately preceding the truce)
to 5 a day (during the truce).16 7 The annual homicide rate decreased from 70.3
homicides per 100,000 people in 2011, (before the truce), to 41.5 in 2012,
(during the truce).16 8 After the truce came to an end in March of 2014, homicide
164. The mass incarceration overwhelmed the prison system, and conflicts between MS-13 and Barrio-
18 broke out in the jails, resulting in hundreds dying in riots. This led to the separation of the rival
gangs in prison, which had the unintended consequence of strengthening them. In jail the "leaders
of these gangs had more time to organize, strategize and plan their activities." Dudley, supra note
168. Ironically, once the rival gangs were housed separately, the members "were safer in jail" than
they would have been on the outside, and they "could communicate easier." Id. It was in this time
period that they expanded their operations, "entering new criminal territory, specifically extortions
and kidnappings." Id. They directed these operations while imprisoned; the "Salvadoran prosecutor
in charge of the anti-extortion unit estimates that 84 percent of all extortion operations are run from
the jail." Id This point was affirmed by many in-country sources. For example, in an October 2010
interview, Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar observed:
[Mano Dura was] reactionary and repressive and strengthened the identity and capacity
of the gangs . . .. It was key in the transformation of gang members into hardened
criminals .... The gangs became stronger and they developed stronger vertical
characteristics and methods of control. The leaders expanded gang territory and gained
control of criminal activities on a national level, directing homicides and kidnappings
anywhere in the country.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Edgardo A. Amaya Cobar, Asesor [Consultant], Ministerio de Justicia
y Seguridad Publica (MJSP) [Ministry of Justice and Public Security], in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 22,
2010) (on file with author).
165. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 18-20.
166. Gurney, supra note 72. But see IUDOP, supra note 11, making the opposite claim.
167. Hannah Stone, El Salvador Sees Almost 60% Drop in Murders in April, as Gang Truce Holds,
INSIGHT CRIME (May 1, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-sees-almost-
60-drop-in-murders-in-april-as-gang-truce-holds [https://perma.cc/YH9B-TNFZ]. See also Juan
Carlos Garzon, How to Strengthen the Fragile Gang Truce in El Salvador, INSIGHT CRIME (July 18,
2013), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/el-salvador-homicides-gang-truce-breakdown
[https://perma.cc/58TD-6WJZ].
168. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 4 tbl.1.1. Notwithstanding these numbers, questions have been raised as
to whether killings were actually reduced during the truce. During that time period there was a rise
in disappearances, followed by the discovery of clandestine graves. Many of the individuals reported
as disappeared may have actually been killed, but until their bodies were uncovered, their deaths did
not contribute to the homicide rates. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 21-22; Mike LaSusa, El Salvador
Disappearances Down from Post-Gang Truce Peak, INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www
.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-disappearances-down-from-post-gang-truce-peak
[https://perma.cc/T54N-56CZ]. Experts attributed the disappearances and killings to gangs and
organized crime. Gurney, supra note 72; Steven Dudley, Mass Graves Burying the Truth about El
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rates skyrocketed, with El Salvador once again occupying first place with a
homicide rate of 104.2 homicides per 100,000 people.
In addition to homicides, gangs perpetrate a wide range of other violent
crimes, including kidnapping, extortion, sex trafficking, and labor trafficking.16 9
A recent report addressed the xtent of gang extortion: "All businesses[,] from
street vendor[s] to transnational companies, pay extortion[.]" 7 0 No one escapes
gang extortion - "teachers, students, telecommunication companies, judicial
workers, bus drivers, and businesses" are targeted, as are "residents who are
receiving remittances from abroad, and people who are successful in obtaining
employment with higher pay."'7' The gangs attempt to obtain information about
the revenue of a targeted business and set their demands at 20 to 30 percent of
that amount.1 72 It is estimated that gangs engage in extortion valued at 30 to 60
million dollars per month.173
Although the entire Salvadoran society has been impacted by their
proliferation, gangs have singled out certain groups. Gangs recruit young
children and force them to participate in gang activities under threat of "being
killed or having family members killed in reprisal." 74 And not all children
confront equal risk; "[g]angs target children from poor and broken families, or
who live with their grandparents, children who have relatives in the US, or those
who have psychological problems or mental disabilities."175
There are also "serious" levels of violence at schools, with both teachers and
students being threatened and killed at high numbers.17 6 The control of
neighborhoods by the gangs has impacted school children in an additional way:
because the gangs do not permit individuals living in an area controlled by one
gang to enter or travel through the territory of the opposing gang, children cannot
Salvador Gang Truce, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis
/homicides-mass-graves-and-truth-about-el-salvador-gang-truce [https://perma.cc/9692-C26E].
169. SEELKE, supra note 162, at 19.
170. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA, EL SALVADOR: INFORMATION GATHERING MISSION
REPORT - PART 1: GANGS IN EL SALVADOR AND THE SITUATION OF WITNESSES OF CRIME AND




174. Id. § 4.3.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 4.5.3. "[In 2014, 38 students and 9 teachers were killed; in 2015, 75 students and 15 teachers
were killed; and from 1 January to 20 April 2016, 20 students and 5 teachers were killed." Id. Blanca
Figueroa, with the Unit for Children and Family of the PNC, underscored the degree of gang
infiltration in the schools, saying, "Schools are contaminated; they are centers for gang recruitment.
The schools are a very harmful environment, with much violation of rights, drugs, sex, and gangs."
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Blanca Figueroa, PNC, supra note 91, at 2.
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attend a school - even if it is just several blocks away - if it happens to lie in the
territory of the opposing gang.177
The high levels of gender violence, including femicides, also are linked to
the proliferation of gangs. Patriarchal norms and machismo, discussed infra Part
II.B.4, are even more intense within gang culture and are more lethal because
"gang members have access to deadly weapons and vast criminal networks."'78
Women and girls are considered to be the property of gangs79 and may be killed
for refusing to become the sexual partner of a gang member,18 0 for being
suspected of cheating, or simply for being seen "accompanied by other men." 8 1
They are used for whatever purposes gang members dictate - from carrying out
extortion, to delivering drugs, to serving as the sex partner to imprisoned gang
members.182 Vendettas between warring gangs are also played out on the bodies
of women and girls, who may be killed as a way of exacting revenge on an
opposing gang member.1 8 3
The gangs in El Salvador have, according to some analysts,184 transformed
into what are referred to as "third generation"'85 gangs, characterized by
177. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA-PART 1, supra note 170, § 4.1.1. M6lida Guevara of
Oxfam commented that the problem of violence in schools was so bad that the number of students
attending had been dropping. CGRS/RHRC Interview with M6lida Guevara, Coordinadora del
Programa de la Justicia del G6nero [Coordinator of the Gender Justice Program], Oxfam, in San
Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with author).
178. Declaration of Aracely Bautista Bayona, Consajera Legal [Legal Consultant], Comisi6n de Familia,
la Mujer, y la Niflez de la Asamblea Legislativa [Commission on Family, Women, and Children of
the Legislative Assembly] at 9 (2011) (on file with author).
179. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA - PART 1, supra note 170, § 4.3.1.
180. Girls as young as 12 years old may be targeted in this manner. Id.
181. Id
182. Id Yanira Argueta, current Director of the Instituto Salvadoreflo para el Desarrollo de la Mujer
(ISDEMU) [Salvadoran Institute for the Development of the Woman], recounted that gang members
take photographs of girls and women on the street, show them to their jailed confederates so they
can "choose," and then tell the selected female that if she does not agree to visit the jail and have
sexual relations, she or her family will suffer violence. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Yanira Argueta,
Directora Ejecutiva [Executive Director], Asociaci6n para la Autodeterminaci6n y Desarrollo de
Mujeres Salvadoreflas (AMS) [Association for Self-Determination and Development of Salvadoran
Women], in San Sal., El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on file with author).
183. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA - PART 1, supra note 170, § 4.3.1.
184. MAX G. MANWARING, A CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY: GANGS AND
OTHER ILLICIT TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, EL
SALVADOR, MEXICO, JAMAICA, AND BRAZIL (2007), available at http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu
/pdffiles/pub837.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW6Z-V586]; John P. Sullivan & Robert J. Bunker, Third
Generation Gang Studies: An Introduction, 14 J. GANG RES. 5 (2007); HAL BRANDS, SMALL WARS
JOURNAL, THIRD GENERATION GANGS AND CRIMINAL INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA (2009),
available at http://smallwarsjoumal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-and-criminal-insurgency-
in-latin-america [https://perma.cc/TH4P-994F].
185. First-, second-, and third-generation gangs are described and distinguished as follows:
First-generation gangs, which make up the largest of the three categories, are street
gangs. They focus mainly on protecting their turf - normally.no more than a few city
blocks, from equally parochial rivals. Their criminal activities - assault, robbery, and
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participation in transnational criminal operationsl86 and the imposition of
territorial control supplanting state authority. In their early days, the gangs had
mostly an urban presence, but they are now "present throughout the country,
including in rural areas."187 The gangs utilize the strategies of "plata o plomo"
(money or bullets) 188 in pursuit of geographic dominance - they attempt to bribe
corrupt governmental authorities and resort to violence when that fails. It is not
difficult to understand why, "confronted with the choice between an easy payout
and a gruesome death, law enforcement personnel often opt for the former[.]" 89
Gang strategy in El Salvador has evidently worked. In an increasing number of
regions, gangs have become the "de facto"'9 0 authorities, dictating who can enter
or exit the area as well as the procedures to follow when coming into a
neighborhood, imposing curfews, and otherwise controlling the lifestyle of the
inhabitants.19 1
Impunity for crimes committed by gangs is extremely high. Lack of
confidence in the weak and corrupt justice system, coupled with the very realistic
fear of being killed for reporting, has led many Salvadorans to remain silent.19 2
petty extortion-are small-scale and opportunistic.... Second-generation gangs are
larger and more complex. ... Frequently organized around illicit economies like drug
trafficking, second-generation gangs operate across several cities or even
internationaly. They have links to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) like
drug cartels, and feature amore centralized leadership and a more hierarchical structure
than first-generation gangs.
Third-generation gangs are sophisticated TCOs in their own right. ... While they
participate in many of the same activities as first- and second-generation gangs, they
operate on a grander scale.... Most important, third-generation gangs stand astride the
line separating crime and insurgency. These organizations go to such lengths to protect
their highly lucrative economic activities that they end up undermining the authority and
legitimacy of the state. They murder police officers, soldiers, and other authorities that
try to interfere with their business; they infiltrate, corrupt, or otherwise weaken
government institutions: they use intense, calculated violence to carve out geographic
zones where they can dominate the population and operate completely free of state
control.
BRANDS, supra note 184, at 2.
186. As early as 2011 there were indications that the Zetas, one of the more violent Mexican drug cartels,
had a presence in El Salvador. Douglas Farah, Organized Crime in El Salvador: The Homegrown
and Transnational Dimensions, WOODROW WILSON INT'L CE4ER FOR SCHOLARS: LATIN AM.
PROGRAM (2011). It has also been reported that the Salvadoran gangs were developing ties with the
Zetas and had a strong interest in expanding into the international drug trade. Garzon, supra note
167.
187. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA - PART 1, supra note 170, § 4.1.
188. BRANDS, supra note 184, at 5.
189. Id.
190. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA - PART 1, supra note 170, § 4.1.
191. Id.
192. The territorial control gang members possess has facilitated their ability to determine who has gone
to the authorities; in some neighborhoods, gangs "surveil police stations through cameras
clandestinely posted in trees located at the front of these stations" to identify who has gone to the
police. Id. at 19. El Salvador's witness protection program has been ineffective, and "[t]here are
many cases of protected witnesses that have been killed." Id. at 21.
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In those limited cases that are prosecuted, only five to seven percent result in
sentences.19 3 This is notwithstanding El Salvador's creation of special courts to
hear gang-related cases; the caseload of these special courts is so high that it only
"contributes to the inefficacy of the justice system." 9 4
4. Patriarchy, Machismo, and Gender Violence
The high levels of violence in El Salvador include exceptionally elevated
levels of violence against women. The factors discussed above - structural
violence, economic inequalities, and the proliferation of gangs and organized
crime - paint an incomplete picture when it comes to understanding the
prevalence and consequent normalization of gender violence. Patriarchy,
understood as a system in which men hold the power and women are
subordinate,19 5 and machismo, a particularly aggressive manifestation of
patriarchy characterized by hypermasculinity,196 are central to the phenomenon
of violence against women in El Salvador.197 Patriarchy and machismo underpin
men's belief that they have the prerogative to regard women as property and to
use violence against them as they see fit.
Aracely Bautista Bayona, a Salvadoran lawyer and expert on women's
rights, has identified the impact of patriarchy and machismo in Salvadoran
society on women:
Patriarchal norms define the fundamental sociopolitical structure of El
Salvador and disadvantage women in every aspect of Salvadoran
society. Among the most entrenched characteristics of Salvadoran
society is machismo, a system of patriarchal gender biases which
subject women to the will of men.198
193. Id. at 19.
194. Id.
195. According to sociologist Sylvia Walby, patriarchy can be defined as "a system of social structures,
and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women." Sylvia Walby, Theorising
Patriarchy, 23 Soc. 214 (1989).
196. Michael Hardin, Altering Masculinities: The Spanish Conquest and the Evolution of the Latin
American Machismo, 7 INT'L J. SEXUALITY AND GENDER STUD. 1, 1-22 (2002). Hardin describes
machismo as a "stereotype that emphasizes hypermasculinity." Id at 2.
197. Virtually every source interviewed in El Salvador acknowledged the widespread acceptance of
violence and its relationship to men's belief that "women are pieces of property and that they have
the right to do [to them] whatever they want." CGRS/RHRC Interview with M61ida Guevara,
Coordinadora del Programa de la Justicia del Gdnero [Coordinator of the Gender Justice Program],
Oxfam, in San Sal., El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on file with author).
198. Declaration of Aracely Bautista Bayona, supra note 178, at 5. In explaining how deeply entrenched
these attitudes are, Bautista Bayona commented that many people believe that submission of the
woman to the man was absolutely necessary for society to exist - it was an "untouchable" principle
that could not be questioned; to do so would lead to the apocalyptic destruction of society. Id. at 6.
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Literature discussing the origins of patriarchy and machismo in El Salvador
is scant. Bautista Bayona has traced the norm to the early 16th century and the
Spanish conquest of El Salvador.199 In his study of Salvadoran culture, La
Cultura del Diablo [The Culture of the Devil], philosopher Jos6 Humberto
VelAsquez also emphasizes that machismo tendencies in Latin American and
Salvadoran society are rooted in Christianity and were "strengthened by the
brutality of the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers."2 00
Archaeologists and anthropologists have undertaken extensive research on
gender relations among indigenous ocieties in the Americas.2 0 1 Their research
reveals wide variation in the status of women among different groups.202 For
example, by the time of the Conquest, both the Inca and Aztec Empires'
dominant deities were depicted as male, which is one sign of male domination
within these societies.20 3 Other groups, such as the Kalapalo of Central Brazil,
exhibited more egalitarian tendencies with respect to gender relations.2 0 4
While many indigenous groups may have exhibited patriarchal tendencies,
there is evidence that the Conquest of the Americas contributed to the
development of a particularly virulent form of sexism. For example, Michael
Hardin argues that the origins of Latin American machismo are related to "the
degree to which sexuality was made part of the [Spanish] conquest."205 Hardin
makes the connection between the Spanish colonizers' reliance on indigenous
populations for slave labor and sex and higher incidents of rape of indigenous
women by Spanish colonizers compared to the English Puritans, who "strove to
create isolated communities."2 06 While the English colonizers, like the
Spaniards, clearly relied on indigenous peoples to survive in the Americas, they
were more likely to have arrived with women and children. In addition, they
were motivated by specific religious biases against indigenous people that led
them to push indigenous peoples out of the territories they colonized rather than
to incorporate them in any way. 20 7 The fact that the early English colonies lacked
199. Id at 5. "[C]onquistadors subjected indigenous groups to the patriarchal Spanish imperial order.
The conquistadors ystematically raped indigenous women. . . . Spanish colonialism also brought
with it the Roman principle of the paterfamilias (the rule that a male head of household owned legal
title to all the women in his family)." Id.
200. JOst HUMBERTO VELASQUEZ, LA CULTURA DEL DIABLO [THE CULTURE OF THE DEVIL] 48 (1986).
201. See generally June Nash, Gender Studies in Latin America, in GENDER AND ANTHROPOLOGY:
CRITICAL REVIEWS OF RESEARCH AND TEACHING, 228, 228-45 (Sandra Morgen, ed., 1989).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 229 (citing June Nash, The Aztecs and the Ideology of Male Dominance, 4 SIGNS: JOURNAL
OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 349, 349-62 (1978) and IRENE SILVERBLATT, MOON, SUN,
AND WITCHES: GENDER IDEOLOGIES AND CLASS IN INCA AND COLONIAL PERU (1987)).
204. Id. at 230 (citing ELLEN B. BASSO, THE KALAPALO INDIANS OF CENTRAL BRAZIL (1973)).
205. Hardin, supra note 196.
206. Id. at 6.
207. Id. at 5-6.
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the gold and silver deposits found in Spanish territories also resulted in less
reliance on indigenous slave labor during this early period in American
history.208 These factors contributed to the development of an agricultural
economy in the early English colonies that was less reliant on extractive
activities and indigenous slaves than its Spanish counterpart.2 09
The Spanish conquistadors, on the other hand, were driven to conquer the
indigenous peoples at least in part by their desire to integrate them as slaves in
the colonial economy, and they used sexual violence and humiliation in order to
do so. For the Spanish conquistadors, "masculinity [in the Americas] meant
permission to rape and abuse, something that was not permitted in Spain or with
Spanish women."210 In turn, the violent treatment of women, along with their
conceptualization as the property of men,2 11 became part of a new model of
"Christian" masculinity imposed on the indigenous male population by force.212
At least one contemporaneous account supports Hardin's assertion that violence
against women among the indigenous population increased as a result of the
Conquest.2 13
Violeta Sara-Lafosse also traces the origins of machismo in Latin America
to the gender dynamics of the Conquest.2 14 For Sara-Lafosse, the primary
difference between patriarchy and machismo as forms of sexism is the tendency
of males to abandon their children within machista societies.2 15 In highly
patriarchal societies, boys growing up in fatherless homes tend to develop
208. Id. at 6; EDUARDO GALEANO, OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE
OF A CONTINENT (1997).
209. Hardin, supra note 196, at 5-6.
210. Id at 16.
211. Hardin recounts an episode in which the Aztec leader Cuautdmoc confronted Hernan Cortds, a
Spanish conquistador, regarding the kidnapping of indigenous women by Cort6s' men. Cortds
responded by "answer[ing] that it would be difficult to take them away from their present masters."
Id at 16-17 (quoting BERNAL DtAZ DEL CASTILLO & J. M. COHEN, THE CONQUEST OF NEW SPAIN
(1963)). For Hardin, the use of the word "masters" "indicat[es] that there was no pretense of social
acceptance for these women: they were the property of men." Hardin, supra note 196, at 17. See
also Declaration of Aracely Bautista Bayona, supra note 178, at 5 (explaining women's legal status
as the property of men during the colonial period).
212. Hardin, supra note 196, at 16-17.
213. Id. at 16 ("[A Spanish] priest, [Friar Diego] de Landa, noticed [an increase in violence against
women] among the Maya: 'they are very jealous, and do not lightly suffer infidelity on their wives'
part; and now that they see the Spaniards kill their wives for this reason, they are beginning to
maltreat and even to kill them."' (internal citations omitted)).
214. Violeta Sara-Lafosse, Machismo in Latin America and the Caribbean, in WOMEN IN THE THIRD
WORLD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 107, 107-14 (Nelly P. Stromquist & Karen
Monkman eds. 1998).
215. Id at 107. Bautista Bayona lso identified paternal abandonment as a trait of El Salvador's machista
society, noting that "[p]aternal irresponsibility is a cultural phenomenon - it is socially acceptable
for men to be absent from the home and have multiple sexual relationships, leaving the women with
total responsibility for maintaining the home and raising children." Declaration of Aracely Bautista
Bayona, supra note 178, at 6.
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exaggerated masculine identities and exhibit aggressive and forceful behavior.216
Sara-Lafosse, like Hardin, explains that the development of machismo was
related to the relatively small number of Spanish women who migrated to the
Americas during the colonial period and the sexual violence wrought on the
indigenous population.2 17 Spanish men felt no compulsion to recognize the
children born of rapes or unions with indigenous women, resulting in high rates
of illegitimacy during the colonial period. This phenomenon of fathers not
recognizing their children has continued through modem times and perpetuates
the development of machista tendencies in men.2 1 8
Although machismo is generally described as a set of behaviors that
emphasize "hypermasculinity,"219 its expression varies from country to country.
In El Salvador, machismo has been described as "an understanding of accepted
masculine behavior ... which emphasizes control, physical force and the
treatment of women as possessions lacking rights of their own." 2 2 0 The "use and
experience of violence appears bound up with dominant notions of what it means
to be a man."221 One Salvadoran feminist underscored the additional element of
misogyny - hatred for, or ingrained prejudice against, women.2 22 In a society
where machismo is deeply entrenched, violence against women is not just
tolerated, it is unquestioned and accepted as the norm. It becomes "so routine
and entrenched in everyday relations that it is expected as an inevitable and
culturally sanctioned element of growing up or being a woman."223 This helps
216. Sara-Lafosse, supra note 214, at 108-09.
217. Id. at 110 (citing ASUNC16N LAVRIN, WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ARGENTINA,
CHILE, AND URUGUAY: 1890-1940 (1995)).
218. Id. at 111, 107-09.
219. Hardin, supra note 196, at 2.
220. L.J. Madrigal & W.V. Tejeda, Facing Gender-based Violence in El Salvador: Contributions from
the Social Psychology ofIgnacio Martin-Baro, 19 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 368, 368-74 (2009).
221. Mo Hume, Researching the Gendered Silences of Violence in El Salvador, 40 I.D.S. BULLETIN 83
(2009). Maria Teresa Delgado de Mejia, child protection specialist with UNICEF, pointed to
patriarchal norms as a root cause of epidemic levels of violence across the country:
There are many explanations [for violence]. A transcendent factor is the way in which
children are raised. Parenting is very violent. This is because of a patriarchal heritage,
of the power that men have within the family, how fathers behave at home. It's
authoritarian. The father beats the mother, the mother beats the children, the eldest child
beats the youngest, and the youngest beats the dog. It's a cycle of violence.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Maria Teresa Delgado de Mejia, supra note 93, at 5.
222. Amdrica Joaquina Romualdo Ci.rcomo referred to machismo as a "set of misogynistic gender biases
that relegate women to being the property of men . . . creating a patriarchal society that justifies ...
violence." Declaration of Am6rica J. Romualdo Circomo, Coordinadora de Programas [Program
Coordinator], Asociaci6n Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida (Las Dignas) [Women's Association
for Dignity and Life] (May 16, 2011) (on file with author), at 3.
223. Mo Hume, "It's As If You Don't Know, Because You Don't Do Anything About It": Gender and
Violence in El Salvador, 16 ENV'T AND URBANIZATION 67 (2004). Lawyer and women's rights
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explain the high levels of gender violence, as well as El Salvador's frequent
ranking as number one worldwide in its rate of femicide.
C. Forms and Prevalence of Gender Violence
This section provides an overview of the most prevalent forms of gender
violence - violent killings of women, intrafamilial violence, rape and other forms
of sexual violence, incest, and human trafficking. Statistics regarding incidence
and trends are provided where available, but two caveats concerning these data
are in order. First, there is significant underreporting by victims given the high
levels of impunity and lack of confidence in the system.22 4 Lack of knowledge
expert Alba Evelyn Cortez de Alvarenga expounded on the concept of "pater familia" and its
influence on Salvadoran culture and its legal system:
We took our patriarchal system from Spain. . . . The laws come from the Spanish
monarchy.... They come from Roman concepts of "pater familia" where power is the
power of the man. First a father has power over a woman and then he passes it to the
husband to have power over the woman.. . . In 1921 we gained our independence from
Spain. While we may have been independent, we still took Spanish law [with us]....
For example, the law gave [the man] the right to correct the woman up until the point of
killing her. It allowed for [the man] to take away her kids if he wants, to make her
pregnant if he wants. The idea of marital rights did not exist.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Alba E. Cortez de Alvarenga, Jefa de la Unidad de Gdnero [Head of
the Gender Unit], Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly], in San Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 2016)
(on file with author).
224. Underreporting of violent crime in general is pervasive in El Salvador, and the problem is likely
higher in cases of violence against women. See ELIZABETH SHRADER, METHODOLOGIES TO
MEASURE THE GENDER DIMENSIONS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE 8 (2001). Numerous in-country
sources reiterated that normalization of violence, lack of confidence in the system, and fear of
retribution are significant factors for failure to report. For example, Jeanette Aguilar stated: "Owing
to fear of the victim, fear of reprisal, many cases are not reported . . .. Only 30 percent of crimes are
denounced, 70 percent are not ... in cases of gender violence, [there is] even less denunciation than
for other crimes." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Aguilar, Directora [Director], Instituto
Universitario de Opini6n P6blica (IUDOP) de la Universidad Centroamericana Jos6 Sime6n Cafias
(UCA) [University Institute of Public Opinion, Jos6 Sime6n Cafias Central American University],
in San Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with author). She recalled cases of women "who had been
mistreated for decades, and it took the woman being almost to the point of death for her to denounce"
noting that the violence was normalized, even by the victims themselves. Id.; see also OXFAM AM.,
REPORT ON PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER VIOLENCE: RESULTS OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS IN EL
SALVADOR 45-46 (2008) (specifically addressing intrafamilial violence and noting that 63.5 percent
of respondents believed that victims do not report abuse because of fear of reprisal).
Vilma Vaquerano Cruz of the Organizaci6n de Mujeres Salvadoreftas por la Paz (ORMUSA)
[Organization of Salvadoran Women for Peace] cautioned against inferring a reduction in violence
from official statistics; she noted that denunciations were down because women are scared to report,
they have no confidence in the system, and, in areas where gangs control the territory, there are even
fewer complaints "because police are not allowed to go into the communities." CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz, Directora de Comunicaciones [Director of
Communications], Organizaci6n de Mujeres Salvadoreflas por la Paz (ORMUSA) [Organization of
Salvadoran Women for Peace], in San Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with author).
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about their rights has also contributed to victims' underreporting.225 Second,
there are serious deficiencies in governmental collection and analysis of relevant
data, compromising the statistics' reliability.2 26 This is compounded by El
Salvador's failure to establish the centralized national statistical system on
violence against women that is required by law.2 27 So although the statistics
provide some useful information, they should be understood to paint an
incomplete - and perhaps even inaccurate - picture.
1. Violent Deaths of Women and Femicides/Feminicides
In this section, the term "violent killings of women" is used because it is a
more inclusive term than "femicide" or "feminicide." As discussed supra,22 8 in
the international context, the terms femicide and feminicide denote a gender-
motivated killing of a woman, while feminicide adds the additional element of
government complicity. A number of Latin-American countries,229 including El
Salvador, have understood femicide or feminicide as separate crimes and have
incorporated different elements in their definitions.23 0 Where such laws exist,
classification of a woman's death into one of these categories is a legal
determination that can be made only by specifically empowered governmental
225. A 2010 Oxfam survey conducted in six of El Salvador's departments reported that 80 percent of
women were unfamiliar with how to access the criminal justice system for protection. CGRS/RHRC
Interview with M6lida Guevara (Apr. 2010), supra note 197.
226. Salvadoran officials have called into question the validity of statistics on violence against women.
Vanda Pignato, El Salvador's Secretary for Social Inclusion stated in November 2015 that
government statistics on gender violence "are not real," pointing out that women do not report
"because of fear, because of shame ... and above all because they lack confidence in the judicial
system." Susana Peflate, Pandillas Segunda Causa de Violencia Contra Mujer [Gangs Second
Cause of Violence Against Women], GRAPHIC PRESS (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.laprensagrafica
.com/2015/11/13/pandillas-segunda-causa-de-violencia-contra-mujer [https://perma.cclN369-
B27S]. Salvador E. Men6ndez Leal, Deputy Procurator of the PDDH, commented that statistics are
not reliable because the various government agencies (including the PNC, the Instituto de Medicina
Legal (IML) [Institute of Legal Medicine], and the Fiscalia General de la Rep~iblica (FGR) [Office
of the Prosecutor General of the Republic]), as well as the NGOs, did not share a uniform approach.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Salvador E. Men6ndez Leal, PDDH, supra note 90.
227. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.A-ii.B.
228. See supra note 13.
229. Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic use the
term "femicide" in their penal classification, while Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Mexico, and Peru have codified the crime as "feminicide." GENDER EQUAL.
OBSERVATORY FOR LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN, ECON. COMM'N FOR LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN (ECLAC), UNITED NATIONS, FEMICIDE OR FEMINICIDE AS A SPECIFIC TYPE OF
CRImE IN NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA: AN ON-GOING PROCESS (July 2015), http:/
oig.cepal.org/sites/default/files/noteforequality_17O.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WR6-E7HD].
230. The LEIV defines a feminicide as the killing of a woman for reasons of "hatred or contempt" and
lists various factors that may indicate the presence of those reasons. LEIV, supra note 17, art. 45.
For example, the killing might be classified as a feminicide if it was preceded by a violent act by the
perpetrator against the victim or if the death was caused by mutilation. Id.
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actors, which in El Salvador include prosecutors and judges. 2 3 If proof of the
required elements cannot be established, a killing will not be categorized as a
femicide or feminicide. Therefore, the use of the broader term "violent killings
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Figure 1. Annual killings of women in El Salvador, Jan. 1999-Dec. 2016.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, with few exceptions, violent killings of women
in El Salvador have increased significantly since 1999,232 when statistics first
became available. The only exception was from 2012 to 2014, during the gang
truce, when El Salvador's overall homicide rate significantly declined. However,
as discussed supra Part II.B.3, the increase in forced disappearanceS233 and the
231. The categorization of a killing as one or the other is not without its controversy, with many
commenting on the reluctance, or refusal, of authorities to recognize or treat the killing of a woman
as a feminicide as opposed to as homicide more generally. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 8-9. Jos6
Alberto Franco Castillo gave the example of a businessman who shot his unarmed wife five times
and was charged with feminicide. The defense counsel argued that the couple had been married for
20 years, and he had supported and taken care of her, so he could not have killed her for reasons of
"hatred." On the basis of this argument the judge categorized the case as a homicide, rather than a
feminicide. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jos6 A. Franco Castillo, Coordinador de Derecho de
Familia y Gdnero [Family Law and Gender Coordinator], Escuela de Capacitaci6n Judicial del
Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura (CNJ) [School of Judicial Training of the National Judiciary
Council], in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 9, 2012) (on file with author).
232. The statistics from 1999 to 2008 and for 2016 are from ORMUSA, Indicadores de Violencia
Intrafamiliar [Indicators of Intrafamilial Violence], OBSERVATORIO DE LA VIOLENCIA DE GNERO
CONTRA LAS MUJERES [OBSERVATORY OF GENDER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN], http://
observatoriodeviolencia.ormusa.org/index.php [https://perma.cc/Z95Q-ECHW]. The statistics from
2009 to 2013 are from IUDOP, supra note 11, at 22. The statistics from 2014 to 2015 are from
ISDEMU. ISDEMU, INFORME SOBRE EL ESTADO Y'SITUACION DE LA VIOLENCIA CONTRA LAS
MUJERES EN EL SALVADOR: JULIO 2015 - JUNIO 2016 [REPORT ON THE STATE AND SITUATION OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN EL SALVADOR: JULY 2015 - JUNE 2016] 7, http://www.transparencia
.gob.sv/system/documents/documents/000/149/812/original/libro web_25.11.pdf?1500375224
[https://perma.cc/X4C4-Z3EF].
233. A study of police statistics conducted by the UCA showed that, from 2009 to 2013, reports of
missing individuals increased by 161 percent from 436 to 1,140. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 22.
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subsequent discovery of clandestine graves, in which women's bodies made up
more than half those interred,234 bring into question whether the number of
killings of women did in fact drop during this period. Putting that aside, it is clear
that the number of annual killings has not gone below 193, the number recorded
in 2000, and in 2015 and 2016 it remained above 500.
25
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Figure 2. Annual killings per 100,000 women in El Salvador, 2003-2015.
Another way to examine trends in the violent killings of women is to look at
them in terms of El Salvador's homicide rate for women in those years for which
the data is available (2003 through 2015). Figure 2 shows the same drop in the
years 2012 and 2013 as the raw numbers in Figure 1 do, but the rate of violent
deaths of women has generally been rising and is still among the highest in the
world.235 Furthermore, although the homicide rate for women is lower than that
for men, the proportion of homicide victims who are female increased from 10
percent in the early 2000s to 15 percent in recent years.2 3 6
234. A criminologist with the Fiscalia General de la Reptblica (FGR) [Office of the Prosecutor General
of the Republic] involved in the excavation of these graves reported that over half of those uncovered
in the last 12 years have contained women's remains. El Salvador's Horrifying Culture of Gang
Rape, N.Y. POST (Nov. 6, 2014 11:57 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/11/06/the-youth-are-theirs-el-
salvadors-horrifying-culture-of-gang-rape/ [https://perma.cc/SB9L-DG8P] (reprinted from the
Associated Press). An official with the MJSP estimated that 80 percent of bodies found in
clandestine graves were women's. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Edgardo A. Amaya Cobar, Asesor
de Despacho [Dispatch Advisor], MJSP, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 10, 2012) (on file with author).
See also Edward Fox, How the Drug Trade Fuels Femicide in Central America, INSIGHT CRiME
(July 19, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/analysis/how-the-drug-trade-fuels-femicide-in-
central-america [https://perma.cc/98BD-AC3Y] ("In the first six months of this year [2015]
seventeen clandestine graves were discovered in El Salvador, containing 48 bodies, 70 percent of
whom were females, according to the Attorney General's Office (FGR). All were aged under 25,
and 90 percent are thought to have had links to criminal gangs, reported La Prensa Grafica.").
235. The rates from 2003 through 2013 are reported by the IUDOP, while those from 2014 and 2015 are
from ISDEMU. See IUDOP, supra note 11, at 7; ISDEMU, supra note 232 at 8.
236. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 7.
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The killings of women tend to be carried out in a particularly brutal manner
when compared to the killings of men.2 3 7 "A man is killed with a bullet to the
head[,] but women in addition are raped, beaten and tortured ... women are
mutilated, their breasts are cut, they are bitten, they are assaulted, they are cut."238
Numerous in-country sources reiterated the extreme violence that characterizes
the killings of women23 9: dismemberment and other forms of mutilation, often
including signs of gang involvement, are the norm.24 0 The intent is to cause
"more suffering and terror,"241 reflecting the misogyny discussed supra Part
II.B.4.
Victims of feminicide tend to be disproportionately young. Data show that
64 percent of the total number of feminicide victims from 2012 to June 2015
were women aged 10 to 39.242 Women aged 18 to 30 made up almost 34 percent
of victims in 2014, according to the PNC data.2 4 3
Because of the high levels of impunity for feminicide in El Salvador, there
are only very limited data on the circumstances and contexts surrounding the
237. ISDEMU, EL FEMINICIDIO EN EL SALVADOR: OBSTACULOS PARA EL ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA
[FEMICIDE IN EL SALVADOR: OBSTACLES TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE] (2015), http://www.isdemu.gob
.sv/index.php?option=comphocadownload&view--category&id=199%3Ainvestigaciones_2015&
download=901%3Afeminicidio-en-el-salvador-obstaculos-para-el-acceso-a-la-justicia&Itemid=O&
lang=es at 49 [https://perma.cc/79JZ-ZDQC]; IUDOP, supra note 11, at 8.
238. ISDEMU, supra note 237 (translated by author).
239. See, e.g., CGRS/RHRC Interview with Glenda Vaquerano Cruz, Jefa de la Unidad de la Realidad
Nacional [Chief of the Unit of National Reality], PDDH, in San Sal., El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on file
with author). Lorena Morales, a prosecutor with the Unit of Specialized Attention for Women,
described the differences in killings of men and women:
For men, if they are killed, there is usually just one gunshot and then they [the
perpetrator] will just run away. In cases involving women, there are power relations
between aggressor and victim. There is not just an injury, there is usually a destruction
of their face, lots of beatings or other injuries on their body and vagina. There could be
sexual violence too, before or after the death. They might have left an object in the
vagina or left some sort of mark or note on the body.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Lorena Morales, Directora de la Unidad de Atenci6n Especializada
para las Mujeres [Director of the Unit of Specialized Attention for Women], FGR, in San Sal., El
Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with author).
240. Bautista Bayona recounted how a group of women were killed and cut into thirteen pieces, sending
a message regarding involvement of the MS-13. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista
Bayona, Consajera Legal [Legal Advisor], Comisi6n de Familia, laMujer, y laNiflez de la Asamblea
Legislativa [Commission on Family, Women, and Children of the Legislative Assembly], in San
Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 21, 2010) (on file with author).
241. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Zaira Navas, PNC, supra note 90.
242. ISDEMU, INFORME SOBRE EL ESTADO Y SITUACI6N DE LA VIOLENCIA CONTRA LAS MUJERES EN
EL SALVADOR: NOVIEMBRE 2015 [REPORT ON THE STATE AND SITUATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST





243. ORMUSA, supra note 232.
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violent killings of women. However, numerous in-country. sources share the
opinion that many of the killings are the consequence of escalating intrafamilial
violence.24 4 In fact, some experts believe that the majority of murders of women
are the result of domestic violence.24 5 This observation does not deny the
relationship between gangs and the escalating killings of women. Many women
and girls are forced to become the partners of gang members,246 and their
murders represent the intersection of intrafamilial and gang violence. However,
the lack of reliable data makes it impossible to precisely quantify the overlap.2 4 7
2. Intrafamilial Violence
One of the most common forms of violence against women is intrafamilial
or partner violence.2 4 8 It is a product of deeply entrenched patriarchy, discussed
supra Part II.B.4. As one expert observed, "[m]achismo - the set of misogynistic
gender biases that relegate women to being the property of men - is engrained
in the country's history and culture, creating a patriarchal society that justifies
domestic violence."249
244. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Zaira Navas, PNC, supra note 90; Declaration of Amdrica J.
Romualdo Circomo, supra note 222 ("[M]any, if not the majority, of murders of women in El
Salvador are related to domestic violence."). Aracely Bautista Bayona has estimated that 40 percent
of the femicide victims were "previously victims of domestic violence, and the system failed them."
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 21, 2010), supra note 240.
245. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Zaira Navas, PNC, supra note 90.
246. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo, Coordinadora de Programas
[Program Coordinator], Asociaci6n Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida (Las Dignas) [Women's
Association for Dignity and Life], in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 8, 2012) (on file with author) (women
are forced to have relationships with gang members who treat them as their property; a gang member
will claim a woman is his, whether she wants to be with him or not). Edgar Alberto Amaya Cobar
emphasized the impact of patriarchy on gang predation of women:
Women are the victims of gangs because of the patriarchal culture, the machismo that
exists, and because they are considered the property of men. For women who are in
gangs, the risk is much more dangerous compared to men. While men are at risk from
the members of other [rival] gangs, women are at risk from these other gangs too, but
also at risk from the members in their own gang... . If a woman is thought to have been
unfaithful to a gang, or her partner in the gang, they will kill her. This is extreme.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Edgardo A. Amaya Cobar, Asesor de Despacho [Dispatch Advisor],
MJSP, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 22, 2010) (on file with author).
247. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz (Nov. 2016), supra note 224.
248. United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the
International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from El Salvador 37 (Mar. 15, 2016), available
at http://www.refworld.org/docid/56e706e94.html ( ast visited July 9, 2017); Peflate, supra note
226.
249. Declaration of Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo, supra note 222. Romualdo Circomo went on to say
that, "Women are often blamed for the violence they encounter . . . a recent prominent national
survey glaringly illustrates this phenomenon. When asked how women should avoid domestic
violence, the majority of men said that women should 'behave well,' and the majority of women
replied they should not give men any 'reason' to beat them." Id.
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Caveats regarding under-reporting are especially pertinent to incidents of
intrafamilial violence. Despite their "alarming impact on victims and the society
at large,"2 5 0 cases of intrafamilial violence are often not denounced because of
"shame, fear of retaliation, [or] normalization [of domestic violence] by the
patriarchal society, or due to the relationship the victim has with the
aggressor."2 5 1 Notwithstanding those limitations, the available data still indicate
a high incidence of partner violence. A 2015 study reported that an estimated
54.4 percent of the 1,274 Salvadoran women between the ages of 15 and 64 who
were interviewed had been the victims of intimate partner violence (including
physical, sexual, and psychological forms of violence).2 52 The United States
State Department's most recent report on human rights in El Salvador also
recognized the prevalence and gravity of violence in the home.253
The level of violence inflicted in these incidents is serious, often leading to
physical injuries. In its 2015 report, the Instituto Salvadoreflo para el Desarrollo
de la Mujer (ISDEMU) [Salvadoran Institute for the Development of the
Woman], the lead Salvadoran government agency on women's rights, reported
that the Instituto de Medicina Legal (IML) [Institute of Legal Medicine] attended
to a total of 11,012 physical injuries from violent attacks between January 2013
and June 2015.254 Of these attacks, 61 percent, or almost 7,000, were attributed
to intrafamilial violence.25 5 More recent data show that from January 2013 to
June 2016, 85 percent of the complaints of physical violence received by the
Procuraduria General de la Rep6blica (PGR) [Office of the Procurator General
of the Republic] were for violence committed in the home; the other 15 percent
were for workplace violence.25 6
Rates of intrafamilial violence in El Salvador remain drastically higher than
in most other countries in the region.257 While 2015 and the first months of 2016
250. [UDOP, supra note 11, at 26.
251. Id.
252. La Universidad Tecnol6gica de El Salvador (UTEC) [Technological University of El Salvador],
Presentacidn de Investigacidn: " Violencia contra las Mujeres en El Salvador, Estudio Poblacional
- 2014" [Presentation of Research: "Violence against Women in El Salvador, Population Study -
2014"], MINISTERIO DE SALUD [MINISTRY OF HEALTH] (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.salud.gob.sv
/23-11-2015-presentacion-de-investigacion-violencia-contra-las-mujeres-en-el-salvador-estudio-
poblacional-2014-utec/ [https://perma.cc/BR68-24Z3].
253. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: EL SALVADOR 21-24 (2016).
254. ISDEMU, supra note 237, at 10.
255. Id.
256. ISDEMU, supra note 232, at 24.
257. Daugherty, supra note 77; Rita Beamish, Thousands of Women Flee Central America to Escape
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saw a substantial and unexplained decrease25 8 in reports of intrafamilial violence
made to the PNC,259 this dip came after a nearly 500 percent increase in
hospitalizations resulting from intrafamilial violence over the four-year period
from 2009 to 2013, as reported by the national health ministry.260
It is not only adult women who are the victims of violence in the home.
According to a 2008 survey, three out of ten women between the ages of 15 and
59 reported suffering physical abuse prior to their 18th birthdays,261 and nearly
one in three adolescent girls ranging in age from 15 to 19 reported experiencing
intimate partner violence of some type.262 Child abuse committed by parents is
also prevalent in Salvadoran homes, where "the patriarchal structure places
female children and female adolescents in an especially vulnerable position,
leading to a high incidence of sexual violence and abuse at home[.]"263
3. "Crimes Against Sexual Liberty" -Rape and Other Forms ofSexual
Violence
The Salvadoran Penal Code establishes the category of "crimes against
sexual liberty."264 This category includes twenty separate crimes, with the most
violent being rape and sexual assault of adults and rape and sexual assault of
258. The dip indicated in government data should be contrasted with survey data indicating that levels of
domestic violence remained relatively stable from 2008 to 2014. Twenty-four percent of women
aged 15 to 49 surveyed in 2008 reported having lived in a home where men repeatedly abused
women. UNICEF, 2014 INFORME DE SITUACI6N DE LA NIEFEz Y ADOLESCENCIA EN EL SALVADOR
[2014 REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN EL SALVADOR] 102 (2014)
(citing to FESAL 2008 survey); see also supra note 252 (UTEC study showing that I in 4 women
surveyed reported physical or sexual abuse in 2014).
259. ORMUSA, supra note 232.
260. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 32.
261. UNICEF, supra note 258, at 20.
262. UNICEF, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN
140 (2014). Overall rates of intrafamilial violence, as opposed to those related solely to intimate
partner violence, are likely even higher. For example, in another survey 7 out of 10 children reported
being a victim of abuse in the home. Rashida Manjoo, United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes
and Consequences, U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/26/Add.2 (Feb. 14, 2011) http://www2.ohchr.org/english
/issues/women/rapporteur/docs/A.HRC. 17.26.Add.2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7Y7-FTB8].
263. Declaration of Roberto Rodriguez Meldndez, supra note 90, 1 19. Nori Flores, a prosecutor with the
Unit for Minors and Women, stated that the "highest incidence of sexual violence occurs in the
home, by step-fathers or even by the natural fathers," and that the majority of these cases "involve
girls who are age ten or younger." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Nori Flores, Unidad de Menores y
Mujeres [Unit for Minors and Women] at 1, FGR, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 14, 2013) (on file with
author).
264. C6digo Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] Decree 1030, D.O. 105, Vol. 335, June 10, 1997, Title IV, art.
158-173B (El Sal.) (as amended). The C6digo Penal has been amended many times. Unless
otherwise indicated, all references to the C6digo Penal in this article are to the version of the law in
effect as of the date of publishing, a copy of which is available on the Asamblea Legislativa's
website at https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/COAB56F8-AF37-
4F25-AD90-08AE401COBA7.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5HV-7T5Z] (last visited May 4, 2018).
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minors or incapacitated individuals.26 5 Intrafamilial violence, discussed above,
and sexual violence are the two most prevalent forms of gender-based violence.
These categories of violence have been so widespread that when the Salvadoran
government established specialized courts to improve access to justice for
women,266 it excluded these forms of violence from the courts' jurisdiction in
order to avoid "collapse" of the system.267
The Fiscalia General de la Repttblica (FGR) [Office of the Prosecutor
General of the Republic] reported 21,478 cases of crimes against sexual liberty
from January 2013 through June 2016. Although there was a slight downturn in
registered cases from 2013 to 2016, ISDEMU cautioned against drawing a
conclusion that here had actually been a reduction in these crimes, pointing to
the many factors that result in under-reporting.2 68 Data collected by the PGR
demonstrate that sexual violence is common not only in the home but also in the
workplace. From January 2012 through June 2016, 42 percent of all complaints
received by the PGR were for incidents occurring in the workplace. Salvadoran
law criminalizes acoso sexual [sexual harassment], which includes sexual
harassment by a superior,269 but government enforcement of the law is
ineffective.2 7 0 Due to the lack of employment opportunities, women feel they
have no option but to continue in their positions even if they have been the
victims of harassment.2 7 1
265. Id arts. 158-64.
266. See Decree 286, supra note 21; see also further discussion infra Part III.D.
267. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Alba E. Cortez de Alvarenga (Nov. 2016), supra note 223 (stating that
the new court system would collapse if sexual violence had been included because "it is the largest
problem in the country"); CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona, Consajera Legal
[Legal Advisor], Comit6 Directivo del Grupo Parlamentario de Mujeres (GPM) [Executive
Committee of the Parliamentary Group of Women], in San Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with
author) (stating that sexual violence was "not included because they didn't want the courts to
collapse"). The United States State Department has also affirmed the pervasive incidence of sexual
violence, noting in its 2015 report that "rape and sexual crimes against women were widespread."
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: EL SALVADOR 17 (2015).
268. ISDEMU's 2016 report lists a number of reasons for failure to denounce, such as "lack of trust that
women and society in general have in [government] institutions . . ; the normalization of sexual
violence or the minimization of the impact of sexual violence on the lives of women and girls; the
view of victims as having provoked the violence and the fear of exposure to the community."
ISDEMU, supra note 232, at 19 (translated by author).
269. C.P., supra note 264, art. 165.
270. "As of August 28, the ISDEMU reported 11 cases of alleged sexual harassment and referred five
cases to the FGR. . . ." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: EL SALVADOR 17 (2014).
One in-country source noted that sexual harassment is so normalized that neither the victim nor the
aggressor recognize it as impermissible conduct. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Elena M. G6mez
Luna, Directora de la Unidad de G6nero [Director of the Gender Unit], Ministerio de la Economia
[Ministry of the Economy], San Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with author).
271. CGRS/RHRC Interview with M6lida Guevara (Apr. 2010), supra note 197. Aracely Bautista Bayona
observed that domestic employees are particularly vulnerable because the women come from rural
areas and are living with their employers - and often end up being impregnated by them.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 21, 2010), supra note 240.
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Surveys have also revealed high levels of sexual harassment in schools,
which adversely impacts girls' access to education.2 72 In-country sources
recounted numerous occasions in which teachers and school administrators had
engaged in sexual harassment of their students but had either failed to suffer the
consequences or had been supported by their colleagues, while their young
accusers were blamed.273
Statistics tracking the various forms of sexual violence demonstrate that the
victims are disproportionately young or incapacitated.27 4 In 2016, out of the
3,947 cases of sexual violence reported by the PNC, 1,873 (47.5 percent)
involved minors or incapacitated victims. 27 5 The vulnerability of girls and
adolescents has been consistently documented. In her report from a visit to El
Salvador in 2011, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against
Women, Rashida Manjoo, cited to a report from the UN's Committee against
Torture found that "over half of the complaints involving rape and incest (in El
Salvador) come from victims who were minors when the offense was
committed."276
In her report, Manjoo also noted that "incest remains a serious concern."2 77
Many in-country sources have confirmed the prevalence of incest and observed
that it arises from the patriarchal view that the father "owns" the rest of the family
and therefore has the unrestricted right to sexual relations within it.2 7 8 In many
cultures, incest is taboo and remains largely hidden, but Salvadoran sources
referred to the "general tolerance [of incest] in society and in the state"279 and
provided examples of acts of incest being committed openly.280 Although the
272. CGRS/RHRC Interview with M6lida Guevara (Apr. 2010), supra note 197.
273. Id. (discussing the case of a teacher who had been imprisoned for rape but continued teaching);
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Yanira Argueta, AMS, supra note 182 (discussing the case of a school
director who was jailed for sexual harassment ofa fifteen-year-old but continued to be supported by
his colleagues and members of his church, who instead "persecuted" his victim).
274. ORMUSA, supra note 232. Art. 159 ofthe Penal Code defines being incapacitated as being mentally
weak or in an unconscious state or otherwise unable to resist. C.P., supra note 264.
275. ORMUSA, supra note 232.
276. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, supra note 262, at 7 (citing U.N. Doc. CAT/C/
SLV/CO/2). As a consequence, El Salvador has experienced a high rate of adolescent pregnancy; in
2013 one out of every 200 girls aged 10 to 14 had given birth at least once. ISDEMU, supra note
232, at 23.
277. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, supra note 262, at 7 (citing U.N. Doc. CAT/C/
SLV/CO/2).
278. Declaration of Amdrica J. Romualdo C~rcomo, supra note 222, at 4. Sources provided examples
based on their personal knowledge. One source recounted an incident in which a father impregnated
the mother of his child and that 15-year-old child at the same time. Due to fear and dependency the
mother did not report the crime. CGRS/RHRC Interview with M61ida Guevara (Apr. 2010), supra
note 197.
279. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Glenda Vaquerano Cruz, PDDH, supra note 239.
280. Id. (describing the case of a twelve-year-old who went with her family to visit her father in prison;
the father took her aside and raped her in the prison). Ondina Castillo of the United Nations
Population Fund observed that people "do not think it is wrong for a stepfather to abuse his
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true dimensions of incest may not be known due to underreporting81 and a lack
of reliable record keeping, a recent study of government data by the Universidad
Technol6gica de El Salvador (UTEC) [Technological University of El Salvador]
indicated that nearly a quarter (22.8 percent) of all cases of sexual aggression
reported by the IML in 2013 involved perpetrators who were the father, the step-
father, or another family member of the victim.2 8 2
4. Human Trafficking
Human trafficking, especially sex trafficking, is a significant problem in El
Salvador.283 According to the United States State Department, "El Salvador is a
source, transit, and destination country for women, men, and children subjected
to sex trafficking and forced labor."284 Much of the trafficking is at the hands of
gangs and organized crime,2 8 5 who find it more profitable than weapons or drug
trafficking because "arms and drugs you sell just one time, but a woman or a
child can be held for [years] and be sold multiple times.,2 86
stepdaughter, and get her pregnant. Incest is seen as normal. Rather, because a stepfather is providing
food and helping the girl, he is not seen as a bad person. . . .Everyone sees that the girl is pregnant,
including teachers, but no one denounces because they do not see the abuse as a crime." CGRS/
RHRC Interview with Ondina Castillo, Coordinadora de Gdnero [Gender Coordinator], Fondo de
Poblaci6n de las Naciones Unidas (UNFPA) [United Nations Population Fund], in San Sal., El Sal.
(Oct. 16, 2013) (on file with author).
281. Fear of or economic dependence on the father may contribute to under-reporting. Nori Flores, of the
FGR, stated that when a "child is abused sexually by her father, because of men's control over
women in this country, the mother feels she must allow it. She may do this out of fear, or economic
dependency." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Nori Flores, supra note 281, at 4. Flores further noted
that sometimes even doctors or teachers who are aware of sexual violence will not report because
they "fear retribution for reporting crimes on the part of the father or other aggressor." Id.
282. See IUDOP, supra note 11, at 28 fig.1.11 (showing that 11.2 percent of cases of sexual aggression
were perpetrated by family members of the victim and 11.67 percent by the father or step-father.).
Aracely Bautista Bayona commented that "[m]any women have borne children from their fathers,
uncles, brother or cousins" and that there are cases of children who "bear three or four children with
their fathers or stepfathers." CGRS/RIHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 21, 2010),
supra note 240.
283. Jaime Armando Lopez & Xiomara Orellana, The Crime No One Fights: Human Trafficking in the
Northern Triangle, INSIGHT CRIME (June 4, 2015), http://www.insighterime.org/news-analysis
/human-trafficking-northern-triangle [bttps://perma.cc/735X-3P4R].
284. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 162 (2016).
285. Id. In-country sources have discussed how girls and young women who try to escape from the gangs
often end up as trafficking victims: "The leader of gangs pick out girls from the community thought
to be the most beautiful. These girls are called 'jaina' and they are forced to become 'girlfriends' of
gang members. If they say no, they are killed. The jaina are also used to introduce drugs into the
jails. . . . [They] become at risk for sex trafficking.... There are several cases that we know of like
this. It is common for them to start out as jainas as adolescents, and in trying to leave the mara, fall
into the control of the trafficker." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Mario F. Mena M6ndez, ISNA,
supra note 155.
286. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Yanira Argueta, AMS, supra note 182. Raquel Caballero de Guevara
of the PDDH also observed that in El Salvador "[h]uman trafficking is actually a worse problem
than trafficking in arms and drugs." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Raquel Caballero de Guevara,
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El Salvador enacted the Ley Especial contra la Trata de Personas [Special
Law Against Human Trafficking] in October 2014, and the law went into effect
on January 14, 2015.287 The Special Law provides for penalties of ten to fourteen
years' imprisonment.28 8 It also permits the prosecution of those who purchase
illegal services.2 89
The United States State Department classifies El Salvador as a Tier 2
country, meaning that the country is not meeting the minimum standards of its
Trafficking Victims Protection Act but is making substantial efforts to address
the issue.2 9 0 Given the volume of trafficking and the low number of arrests -just
96 arrests for human trafficking in the last four yearS291 - the assessment that El
Salvador is making "substantial efforts" is open to question. In addition to the
small number of arrests, the Salvadoran government identified fewer victims of
sex trafficking in 2015 than 2014 - reporting only 49 victims compared to 87 in
the prior year.2 9 2
"Corruption, particularly within the judiciary," has been cited as a major
barrier to the prosecution and conviction of traffickers.29 3 An additional barrier
to enforcement has been governmental officials' complicity with traffickers.294
"[P]ublic officials[,] including legislators, political party officials, and a mayor,"
have purchased commercial sex acts from victims of trafficking.295 Impunity in
these cases has been the norm, with the government failing to investigate,
prosecute, or convict any of the accused governmental officials.296
There are very limited protections for victims of trafficking. Victim and
witness protection is insufficient to prevent retaliation from traffickers, and the
government maintains only one shelter for female victims.29 7 Although the law
permits compensation to trafficking victims, the procedures to seek reparations
are unwieldy, and very few people have actually received awards.298
Procuradora Adjunta para la Defensa de Mujeres y la Familia [Deputy Procurator for the Defense
of Women and the Family], PDDH, in San Sal., El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on file with author).
287. Ley Especial contra la Trata de Personas [Law Against Human Trafficking] (enacted Oct. 16, 2014;
entered into force Jan. 13, 2015), supra note 19.
288. Id.
289. Ley Especial contra la Trata de Personas [Law Against Human Trafficking], supra note 19, art. 56.
290. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 284, at 162, 39.
291. Jaime Armando Lopez & Xiomara Orellana, The Crime No One Fights: Human Trafficking in the
Northern Triangle, INSIGHT CRIME (June 4, 2015), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis
/human-trafficking-northern-triangle/.
292. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 284, at 163.
293. Id. at 162.
294. Id
295. Id
296. Id at 163.
297. Id.
298. In 2015, there were no awards of compensation; in 2014 there were only 3. Id.
472018]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
EVOLUTION, IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT
A. Overview
There are five laws that are most relevant to addressing violence against
women in El Salvador. They are, in order of adoption: the 1996 Ley contra la
Violencia Intrafamiliar (LVI) [Law against Intrafamilial Violence], the 1998
amendment o Penal Code article 200 (addressing domestic violence), the 2010
Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres (LEIV
or Integral Law) [Special Integral Law for a Life Free of Violence against
Women], the 2011 Ley de Igualdad, Equidad y Erradicaci6n de la
Discriminaci6n contra las Mujeres (LIE or Law of Equality) [Law of Equality,
Equity, and Eradication of Discrimination against Women] and Decreto 286 para
la Creaci6n de los Tribunales Especializados para una Vida Libre de Violencia
y Discriminaci6n para las Mujeres (Decree 286) [Decree 286 for the Creation of
Specialized Courts for a Life Free of Violence and Discrimination against
Women].299
These five laws remain in force, with each successive law intended to
broaden the scope of the legal framework to address gender violence. The earliest
law, the LVI, addressed domestic violence; further, it sought only to prevent the
violence rather than punish it. Penal Code article 200 purported to focus on
punishment300 by providing for a one- to three-year prison sentence for the
commission of domestic violence. The Integral Law and the Law of Equality are
much more expansive and ambitious. The Integral Law defines a number of acts
as crimes and sets up new governmental bodies, imposing specific
responsibilities on each to carry out the law's objectives. Similarly, the Law of
Equality creates an extensive governmental structure - spanning numerous state
ministries - with the objective of securing genuine gender equality.
The following sections discuss each of these laws in detail, examining their
scope, structure, and objectives, as well as their implementation. The statistics
on gender violence in El Salvador do not show a significant reduction in the
levels of violence or in the impunity for its perpetrators. Based on literature as
well as interviews with a wide range of in-country experts, the following sections
attempt to identify and explore reasons for the failure of these laws to impact the
persistence of gender violence in El Salvador.
299. Decree 286, supra note 21.
300. Penal Code article 200 provided that a family member who committed acts of violence as defined
within the LVI, would be subject to punishment. However, as discussed infra Part III.B.2.b, the LVI
did not criminalize domestic violence, and although Penal Code article 200 was touted as doing so,
it did not. What it did do was make punishment of domestic violence contingent on a finding that
the act separately and independently meets the criteria of an existing crime in the Penal Code.
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B. The Law Against Intrafamilial Violence and Penal Code Article 200
1. Scope ofthe LVI
The first significant law in El Salvador to address violence against women
was the Law against Intrafamilial Violence, or LVI, enacted in December 1996.
A principal catalyst for the LVI's adoption was El Salvador's ratification of the
Convenci6n Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia
contra la Mujer (Convenci6n de Beldm do Para) [Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women
(Convention of Beldm do Para)].30 1 The Convention of Beldm do Para
represented a "powerful consensus among both state and non-state actors
concerning the need to eradicate gender violence" in the Americas.30 2
The Convention of Beldm do Para defines violence against women as
physical, psychological, and sexual violence occurring in either the private or
public sphere3 03 and proclaims a woman's right to a life free of violence, as well
as the right to have prompt recourse to a competent court for protection against
acts that violate this and other related rights.304 It also requires all State parties
to include in their laws measures necessary to punish any act of violence against
women,30 5 as well as to create programs to promote the eradication of violence
against women.3 0 6 States must include in their report to the Inter-American
Commission of Women "information on measures adopted to prevent and
prohibit violence against women, and to assist women affected by violence, as
well as on any difficulties they observe in applying those measures, and the
factors that contribute to violence against women."307
El Salvador signed and ratified the Convention of Bel6m do Para in August
and November of 1995, respectively.3 0 8 The enactment of the LVI shortly after
its ratification was understood to be pursuant to Convention obligations. The LVI
defined intrafamilial violence30 9 and listed the forms in which it could occur as
301. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
Women, June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T. 3301, 1438 U.N.T.S. 63, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english
/treaties/a-61.html [https://perma.cc/4NJK-ZR6K] [hereinafter "Convention of Beldm do Pard"].
302. Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol, Law, Culture, and Equality - Human Rights' Influence on Domestic
Norms: The Case of Women in theAmericas, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 33, 35-36 (2000).
303. Convention of Bel6m do Park, supra note 301, art. 2.
304. Id. art. 3.
305. Id. art. 7(c).
306. Id. art. 8.
307. Id. art. 10.
308. Convention of Belem do Par, Signatories and Ratifications, available at http://www.oas.org
/juridico/english/sigs/a-61.html [https://perma.cc/6223-FMFD].
309. LVI, supra note 16, art. 3. Intrafamilial violence is any action or omission, direct or indirect, that
causes physical, sexual, or psychological suffering or death to family members. Id.
2018] 49
50 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 30:3
physical, psychological, and sexual.3 10  The LVI's overarching purpose,
according to women's rights advocates involved in its drafting, was to create a
prompt, efficient, and accessible process for women to obtain orders of
protection and compensation.311 It attempted to do so by providing that a woman,
or an individual acting on her behalf, could denounce violence (i.e., file a
complaint) and obtain protective orders through any one of three routes. First,
she could file a complaint directly with the courts - with jurisdiction provided
either in the tribunales de paz [peace courts] or the tribunales de familia [family
courts],312 which could issue an order of protection1 and order compensation
for harm suffered.314 Second, a woman could denounce to the PNC, who would
have the obligation to bring the case to a competent ribunal.1 s Third, the woman
could denounce to the PGR, which could undertake a process of conciliation,
seek an order of protection on behalf of the woman, or bring the case to the
courts.1 Cases brought to the peace or family courts were to be resolved
expeditiously in one or two hearings.318
Under the 1996 version of the LVI, the only entities empowered to issue
protective measures were the peace and family court judges. The LVI was
310. Patrimonial violence was not originally included in the forms of harm recognized by the LVI, but it
was incorporated through 2002 reforms to the law. Reformas en la Ley contra la Violencia
Intrafamiliar [Reforms in the Law against Intrafamilial Violence] [hereinafter RLVI] Decree 892,
D.O. No. 137, Vol. 356, July 24, 2002 (El Sal.). Patrimonial violence is defined as any "action or
omission of one who affects or impedes proper care of the needs of the family or any of the persons
referred to in this Law; damages, loses, removes, destroys, retains, embezzles or appropriates
objects, instruments or assets." See id. art. 2.
311. Declaration of Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo, supra note 222, at 6.
312. LVI, supra note 16, art. 21. Peace Courts are located in every municipality; Family Courts are
located only in departmental capitals.
313. Id. art. 23.
314. Id. art. 28(e).
315. Id. art. 11.
316. The PGR is a component agency of the Public Ministry. Among other services, it provides legal
assistance and representation to individuals of limited resources in civil (including family and labor)
and criminal matters. It also provides mediation and conciliation services. Ley OrgAnica de la
Procuradurfa General de la Repdblica [Organic Law of the Office of the Procurator General of the
Republic] Decree 775, D.O. No. 241, Vol. 381, Dec. 22, 2008, art. 3 (El Sal.). Amdrica Romualdo
has been particularly critical of the PGR's conciliation and mediation services, saying that they go
"on and on and never come to an end" with victims caught in an "endless revolving cycle."
CGRS/RHRC Interview with America J. Romualdo Circomo, Coordinadora de Programas
[Program Coordinator], Asociaci6n Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida (Las Dignas) [Women's
Association for Dignity and Life], in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 18, 20, 2010) (on file with author).
317. LVI, supra note 16, art. 16.
318. According to Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo, who helped draft the LVI, a judge can issue an order
of protection or compensation after a single hearing if the abuser does not deny the facts. If the
abuser contests the facts, the judge is supposed to schedule a second hearing at which additional
evidence is given. At the conclusion of that hearing, the judge is to decide if the abuser is responsible
for domestic violence, whether orders of protection should be issued, and whether the abuser must
compensate the victim for any injuries suffered. Declaration of Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo,
supra note 222, at 10.
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reformed in 2002, giving authority to the police to issue special temporary
protective orders not to exceed eight hours.3 19 The LVI was reformed again in
2004320 and 2014.321 The 2004 reform, whose preamble described intrafamilial
violence as a "complex social phenomenon," focused on the incorporation of
psychologists and social workers throughout the LVI process.322 The 2014
reform, enacted after the passage of the Integral Law and the Law of Equality,
stated that its purpose was to strengthen the protection afforded to victims of
intrafamilial violence. It obliges the PNC to provide information to the victim
about her rights and the range of services available to her, and increases from
eight to 48 hours the length of the special temporary protective orders that the
police have authority to issue.32 3
2. The Failure of the LVI to Reduce Intrafamilial Violence
a. Institutional Biases
Notwithstanding its symbolic importance as the first law of its kind, the LVI
is universally considered to have failed in its objective of reducing intrafamilial
violence. In a 2010 interview, legal expert and women's rights activist Aracely
Bautista Bayona observed that in the nearly fifteen years since the LVI had been
in effect, "the phenomenon of beatings, rapes, and murders of women ha[d]
continued to increase in both frequency and brutality."324 Bautista Bayona and
319. RLVI, Decree 892, supra note 310. Art. 9 added art. 10(f) to the LVI, permitting the police to order
the aggressor to stay away for a maximum of eight hours. The 2002 reforms also expanded the LVI's
focus on children and adolescents and assigned additional responsibilities to governmental bodies:
Id. art. 1. For example, the ISDEMU, which was created in 1996 prior to the passage of the LVI (see
Ley del Instituto Salvadoreflo para el Desarrollo de Ia Mujer [Law of the Salvadoran Institute for
the Development of the Woman], Decree 644, D.O. No. 43, Vol. 330, Mar. 1, 1996 (El Sal.)), and
which was designated as the ente rector [lead entity] for the implementation of the LVI, was to
"promote the participation of government organizations and non-governmental organizations, local
governments, private companies, churches, international organizations and others ... to establish
mechanisms of necessary coordination in order to integrate the different institutions of the State and
the society to prevent, attend to, protect and contribute to resolving the issue of intrafamilial
violence." RLVI, Decree 892, supra note 310, art. 6.
320. RLVI, Decree 403, D.O. No. 178, Vol. 364, Sept. 27, 2004 (El Sal.).
321. RLVI, Decree 591, D.O. No. 11, Vol. 402, Jan. 20, 2014 (El Sal.).
322. Pursuant to these reforms, personnel from these multidisciplinary teams could provide forensic
services as well as treatment, to both victims as well as perpetrators. RLVI, Decree 403, supra note
320 (reforming arts. 24 and 28 of the LVI). Anecdotal evidence indicates that psychologists are not
immune to the patriarchy and gender bias that exist throughout the system. One in-country source
described the situation of a woman seeking economic support from her former spouse following a
divorce: her children were sent to see a psychologist during the process, and "[i]nstead of the
psychologist helping, she asked the children if their mother had a lover." CGRS/RHRC Interview
with Nidia Hidalgo Celari6, Coordinadora de la Oficina de Gdnero [Coordinator of the Gender
Office], UNDP, in San Sal., El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on file with author).
323. RLVI, Decree 591, supra note 321, Preamble VII, art. 2 (reforming arts. 10(d) and (f) of the LVI).
324. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 21, 2010), supra note 240.
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other experts pointed to deeply entrenched patriarchy as an overarching factor
for the failure of the LVI to have any discernible positive impact.325 Stereotypes
and gender biases translated into the failure of governmental officials - from the
police, to prosecutors, to the peace and family court judges with key roles
pursuant to the law - to fulfill their responsibilities under the LVI. 326 Although
governmental actors across agencies were criticized, judges have consistently
been singled out for being particularly resistant and not interested in gender.32 7
A comprehensive 2007 Oxfam study underscored the role of patriarchy in
thwarting the LVI's effectiveness. The study identified a number of other
contributing factors to the failure.of the law, including institutional weaknesses
that resulted in a lack of coordination between the courts, which were charged
with issuing protective measures, and the police, who were charged with
enforcing them.32 8 The Oxfam report also pointed to the LVI's requirement of
conciliation.3 29 Although subsequently amended, article 16 of the 1996 version
325. Id.; Declaration ofAmerica J. Romualdo Circomo, supra note 222, at 7, 13; CGRS/RHRC Interview
with Silvia I. Juarez Barrios, Abogada [Attorney], ORMUSA, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2010) (on
file with author); CGRS/RHRC Interview with Doris Montenegro and and Ima Rocio Guirola, supra
note 92; CGRS/RHRC Interview with Benjamin Cuellar and Roxana Marroquin, IDHUCA, supra
note 94; CGRS/RHRC Interview with Josd A. Franco Castillo (Oct. 9, 2012), supra note 231.
326. Declaration of Amdrica J. Romualdo Cdrcomo, supra note 222, at 7, 13.
327. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jos6 A. Franco Castillo, Coordinador de Derecho de Familia y G6nero
[Family Law and Gender Coordinator], Escuela de Capacitaci6n del Consejo Nacional de la
Judicatura (CNJ) [School of Judicial Training of the National Judiciary Council], in San Sal., El Sal.
(Apr. 29, 2010) (on file with author). Franco Castillo commented that under many circumstances,
such as a woman's failure to have dinner ready when her husband comes home from work, judges
see violence as "justifiable." Id. He commented that 30 to 40 percent ofjudges have this mentality,
"including men and women [judges] of all ages." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jos6 A. Franco
Castillo (Oct. 9, 2012), supra note 231; see also CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ondina Castillo (Oct.
16, 2013), supra note 280 (referring to the "deep cultural biases" held by judges). Alba E. Cortez de
Alvarenga commented on the "sexist" attitudes ofjudges, who believe that "women like to be beaten
by their husbands." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Alba E. Cortez de Alvarenga, Jefa de la Unidad
de G6nero [Head of the Gender Unit], Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly], in San Sal., El
Sal. (Oct. 2012) (on file with author).
328. The Oxfam report found that the justice system was unresponsive to the needs of victims: officials
not only demonstrated insensitivity in their interactions but failed to carry out their responsibilities
under the law. OXFAM AM., CONCLUSIONES DE LA INVESTIGACION DE LA APLICACION DE LA LEY
CONTRA LA VIOLENCIA INTRAFAMILIAR, EL SALVADOR [CONCLUSIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF
THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW AGAINST INTRAFAMILIAR VIOLENCE, EL SALVADOR] 3-7 (2007) (El
Sal.). According to Aracely Bautista Bayona, there is no coordination among the courts that issue
the orders and the prosecutors and police who are supposed to follow-up. She commented on the
cultural dimension of failed implementation:
Culturally embedded machismo interferes with law enforcement officers' sense of
obligation or vision. A judicial or police officer may feel that women don't deserve the
order of protection. They let their personal feelings or ideas from their own lives
influence the way they think about women victims they encounter, and they treat victims
the way they would treat their own wives, saying to themselves "these women do
nothing but complain all the time."
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 21, 2010), supra note 240.
329. The requirement of conciliation has been attributed to "beliefs about family unity that run deep in
Salvadoran culture." Declaration of America J. Romualdo Circomo, supra note 222, at 10. These
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of the LVI required the PGR to schedule a meeting between the parties in an LVI
proceeding to attempt conciliation.33 0 The 2002 LVI reforms modified the
language so that the PGR was to proceed with conciliation only if "requested by
the victim or if it were appropriate,"331 but it was reported long after 2002 that
the PGR as well as judges continued to pressure parties to "resolve their
differences and reconcile."332 Oxfam criticized the use of any kind of
"conciliation," as well as the "conscious and unconscious tendency ofjudges" to
use it, noting that it is inappropriate in cases involving intrafamilial violence
because there cannot be "negotiation between unequals."333
b. Design Flaws
Although the LVI's lack of success can be attributed in large part to
patriarchal attitudes, there were also problems inherent in the LVI's conception
and design. The LVI is a "special law"; it stands alone, as opposed to being a
provision of an existing code, such as the Penal or Family Code. Conflicts
between or confusion about the interplay of the LVI and other codes had
unintended adverse consequences.3 34 One of the most significant of these arose
attitudes have often had the result of pressuring women to "continue in relationships with abusive
partners." Id
330. Article 16 of the original LVI, provided in relevant part: "The [PGR], when it has knowledge of
facts which constitute intra-familial violence . . . will schedule the persons in conflict for the
purposes of seeking conciliation." LVI, supra note 16, art. 16.
331. RLVI, Decree 892, supra note 310, art. 13 (reforming art. 16 of the LVI).
332. America Romualdo has pointed out that the term "conciliation" in the LVI was misunderstood, with
the distinction being blurred between "conciliation" and "reconciliation." The former, according to
Romualdo, refers to a process of determining if there are facts or areas which are uncontested or
agreed upon by the parties, while the latter refers to a resolution of differences leading to the parties
reuniting. Conciliation should never be used when there has been physical violence, which should
be addressed by an order of protection and criminal prosecution. Declaration of Amdrica J.
Romualdo CArcomo, supra note 222, at 10; CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo
Circomo (Oct. 18, 20, 2010), supra note 316.
333. OxFAM AM., supra note 328.
334. For example, judges thought that they were to apply principles set forth in their governing Codes
(Penal Code for the Peace Courts and Family Code for the Family Courts), rather than those set forth
in the LVI. This meant that judges in Peace Courts would "often place a burden of proof on victims"
that was drawn from criminal proceedings, which was higher than that intended in civil LVI
proceedings and difficult for victims to meet. Declaration of Am6rica J. Romualdo Circomo, supra
note 222, at 10. The LVI does not require victims to be represented, which exacerbates the
difficulties they would have in meeting this heightened evidentiary burden imposed by Peace Court
judges. The issue of representation itself was another one leading to confusion; judges in the Family
Courts were unaccustomed to parties being unrepresented (since parties in Family Court are required
to have an attorney) and would require that they obtain counsel, "despite a contrary provision in the
LVI intended to increase accessibility for poor victims who cannot afford an attorney." Id. at 10.
The PGR does provide free representation, but it "usually represents the first party to request an
attorney," which means that if aggressors "contact the PGR preemptively, [they] can prevent their
victims from getting representation and accessing the legal process." Declaration of Am6rica J.
Romualdo Carcomo, supra note 222, at 10. Aracely Bautista Bayona has explained that legislative
approval of special laws is often easier to obtain than amendments of existing codes, which explains
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from facially contradictory language between the LVI and Penal Code article
200, which addresses intrafamilial violence. At the time the LVI was enacted in
1996, domestic violence was not recognized as a crime, and the LVI did not
change this. Beginning in 1997, Penal Code article 200, as amended in 1998 and
2004, appeared to recognize domestic violence as a distinct crime. Article 200
states that a family member who commits violence, as defined within article 3 of
the LVI, 3 35 will be punished with a one- to three-year prison sentence.3 3 6
Notwithstanding the reasonable facial interpretation of Penal Code article
200 that acts of domestic violence are punishable crimes, Salvadoran experts
explain that this is not how it has been interpreted; acts that constitute physical,
psychological, or sexual violence constitute crimes only if they are recognized
as such under other provisions of the Penal Code.337 For example, for acts of
physical violence to constitute crimes under the Penal Code, they must result in
lesions that incapacitate an individual for a set period of time and that, in most
cases, require medical treatment.3 3 8 Psychological violence is not defined as a
crime anywhere in the Penal Code; criminal prosecution for such action could
only take place if the psychological harm met the criteria for other defined
crimes, such as those that affect the dignity or personal autonomy of the
why advocates resort to the special law route. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona
(Oct. 21, 2010), supra note 240. Jos6 Alberto Franco Castillo recounted how women without
attorneys who appear in Family Court are adversely impacted when they are unable to meet the
judge's request that they submit evidence or present witnesses. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jos6
A. Franco Castillo, School of Judicial Training of the CNJ (Apr. 29, 2010), supra note 327.
335. Art. 3 of the LVI defined intrafamilial violence as acts causing physical, psychological, or sexual
. suffering. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
336. Article 200 provides as follows: "Any family member ... who commits violence in any of the forms
mentioned in Art[icle] 3 of the [LVI] shall be punished with one to three years of imprisonment."
C.P., supra note 264, art. 200; see also C6digo Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] Decree 345, D.O. 143,
Vol. 340, July 30, 1998 (El Sal.); C6digo Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] Decree 210, D.O. 4, Vol. 362,
Jan. 8, 2004 (El Sal.).
337. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ima Rocio Guirola, Coordinadora de Relaciones Piblicas [Public
Relations Coordinator], CEMUJER, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 11, 2012) (on file with author).
338. The Penal Code includes four articles defining crimes on the basis of length of time the victim is
incapacitated, and/or in need of medical treatment. Article 375, entitled Lesiones y Golpes [Injuries
and Blows], applies to instances where the victim is incapacitated or requires medical assistance for
a period less than five days; the punishment is detention for "fifteen to twenty weekends." Article
142, entitled Lesiones [Injuries], requires incapacitation or medical treatment for five to twenty days;
the punishment is imprisonment for one to three years. Article 143, entitled Lesiones Graves [Grave
Injuries], requires incapacitation or medical treatment for more than twenty days; the punishment is
three to six years imprisonment. Article 144, entitled Lesiones Muy Graves [Very Grave Injuries],
requires grave or permanent physical injury, or serious psychological disturbance; the punishment
is four to eight years imprisonment. C.P., supra note 264, arts. 375, 142-44.
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person,339 constitute slander340 or defamation,341 or are an insult.342 The same
would be true for sexual violence (i.e., sexual violence would have to be defined
as a separate crime under the Penal Code).343 Therefore, in reality, Penal Code
article 200 did nothing to move Salvadoran law forward in its recognition of
intrafamilial violence as a crime. Acts that were already defined as crimes
continued to be crimes, and those not so defined remained outside the scope of
the law - whether in the context of intrafamilial violence or not.
Penal Code article 200 did, however, have a pernicious effect, as it includes
a clause that has impeded prosecution of even those acts of intrafamilial violence
that are independently recognized as crimes within the Penal Code. This clause
states that criminal prosecutions may be initiated only once the judicial
proceedings established in the LVI are exhausted.34 On its face, this provision
appears to require that a woman exhaust her request for protective measures
under the LVI (which are the only judicial proceedings established in the LVI)
before she can file a criminal complaint seeking prosecution of her abuser.
Interpreting the clause to require exhaustion under these circumstances -
which is how it is commonly understood - puts a woman at greater risk. During
the time required for a woman to exhaust protective measures, a violent
aggressor could continue and/or escalate his abuse, free from detention. While
experts acknowledge the existence of confusion over this clause - perhaps a
result of poor drafting -they maintain that the exhaustion requirement applies
only when a woman seeks criminal prosecution of her abuser for violation of a
protective order,34 5 and in the case of any other crime, a woman should be able
to go directly to the FGR to file a complaint and request prosecution. However,
this is not the common interpretation. Therefore, Penal Code article 200, lauded
for addressing domestic violence, did very little to advance protection. It not only
failed to criminalize domestic violence per se-it is also read to impose an
339. Penal Code articles 153 and 154 could be invoked in this context. Penal Code article 153 criminalizes
the use of coercion to prevent an individual from exercising his or her fundamental rights, while
article 154 makes it a crime to use threats in order to harm an individual in the exercise of personal
and sexual autonomy, honor, or patrimonial rights. Id. arts. 155, 154.
340. Id. art. 177.
341. Id. art. 178.
342. Id. art. 179.
343. See supra notes 264-282 and accompanying text (discussing crimes against sexual liberty and
crimes of sexual violence). C.P., supra note 264, art. 200.
344. This clause of Penal Code 200 states: "For the exercise of penal action, it is necessary to exhaust
judicial proceedings under the aforementioned law [LVI]." (The clause in its original Spanish is as
follows: "Para el ejercicio de la acci6n penal, serA necessario el agotamiento del procedimiento
judicial establecido en la ley antes mencionada." (translated by author))
345. Penal Code article 338A criminalizes the failure to comply with an order of protection; the
punishment is one to three years of prison or its equivalent in public service. C.P., supra note 264,
art. 338A.
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additional procedural requirement, not required for any other crime, before
criminal proceedings can be commenced against a violent aggressor.34 6
The failure of the LVI to result in greater protection for women has led
women's rights activists, such as Aracely Bautista Bayona, to call for a different
approach - one that was "integrated" and "holistic." 347 This widely held view
resulted in the enactment of the Integral Law and the Law of Equality.
C. The Integral Law and the Law ofEquality
1. Background
The Integral Law, which focuses on violence against women, was enacted
on November 25, 2010, and went into effect on January 1, 2012. The Law of
Equality, addressing gender equality, was enacted on March 17, 2011, and went
into effect on April 8, 2011. The passage of both laws was celebrated as a victory
for the women's rights movement, with special pride for the fact that female
Diputadas [Assembly Members] of the Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative
Assembly] crossed party lines and unified in support of the laws.3 4 8 This is all
the more remarkable in the context of El Salvador, where the right-wing ARENA
party and the left-wing FMLN party represent those factions that were literally
in pitched battle throughout the country's civil war. Some commentators have
observed, however, that the compromises that were made in order to obtain a
consensus between conservative and more liberal members of the Legislative
Assembly resulted in the exclusion of some important issues. For example, in
relation to the Law of Equality, there was resistance to including the concept of
separation of church and state,349 which is significant because church tenets are
346. The Oxfam report noted that even when an act constitutes a crime under the Penal Code, there is a
troubling failure of government officials to refer it for prosecution. OXFAM AM., supra note 328.
347. Id.
348. In an interview that took place in October 2010, prior to the passage of the two laws,
congressmember Milena Calder6n de Escal6n of the ARENA party, who is also the sister of former
Salvadoran president Armando Calder6n Sol, stated, "[tihe women ... of the Legislative Assembly
come from many backgrounds, but we are unified in working together for a life free of violence for
the women of El Salvador." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Milena Calder6n de Escal6n, Diputada -
ARENA [Assembly Member-ARENA], Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly], in San Sal.,
El Sal. (Oct. 2010) (on file with author). In an interview in October 2012, women's rights expert
Amdrica J. Romualdo CArcomo noted the strategic value of cross-party unity, stating that "[t]he law
wasn't the result of one party's efforts but was the result of bipartisan efforts of women in the
Legislative Assembly. This is important for the strength of the law; we did not want polarization
because that would have made it more difficult to implement the law." CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Am6rica J. Romualdo Circomo (Oct. 8, 2012), supra note 246.
349. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo (Oct. 8, 2012), supra note 246.
Romualdo Circomo also commented that these laws were "20 years in the making," referring to the
fact that El Salvador's feminists had been making "proposals going back to the time of the Peace
Accords." Roxana Delgado, an advisor to the Legislative Assembly, echoed Romualdo Circomo's
comment, stating that even with the "intense polarization" in the system, the Integral Law was
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invoked in areas such as reproductive choice (abortion is criminalized in El
Salvador),350 sexual orientation, and gender identity. Protections based on sexual
orientation and sexual diversity were originally included in drafts of the law, but
they were ultimately removed.3 51 Efforts to provide protection for sex workers
failed for similar reasons.3 52
Notwithstanding these compromises, the passage of the Integral Law and the
Law of Equality raised expectations among activists and experts alike, lauding
their potential to bring about significant improvements in the lives of women.3 53
passed with a consensus of the women members of the Assembly. CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Roxana Delgado, Economista de la Unidad de Andlisis Presupuestaria de la Asamblea Legislativa
[Economist with the Budgetary Analysis Unit of the Legislative Assembly], San Sal., El Sal. (Nov.
2016) (on file with author).
350. Penal Code article 133 through 136 address various abortion-related crimes. C.P., supra note 264,
arts. 133-36. Prior to 1997, abortion was permitted in El Salvador in circumstances ofrape or genetic
defect; however, 1998 reforms to the Penal Code eliminated these exceptions. Pressure to prohibit
abortion under all circumstances came from conservative Catholic groups, such as Opus Dei, as well
as conservative evangelical churches. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Apr.
2010), supra note 141. It has often been noted that women accused of having an abortion are treated
far more harshly than men who have committed "multiple homicides." CGRS/RHRC Interview ith
Ondina Castillo (Oct. 16, 2013), supra note 280. Ondina Castillo observed the following:
In cases of rape where a woman has sought an abortion, she will go to jail but her rapist
is absolved ... [a] woman might arrive to the hospital bleeding [from a miscarriage], be
suspected of aborting, and end up in jail.
There is a study of women called "From the Hospital to the Jail" (Del Hospital a la
Cdrcel) that is looking at the abortion cases. Abortion is treated as a homicide and a
woman could spend even 30 years in jail. These cases are treated more harshly than even
multiple homicides . . . . We have tracked 146 cases - some with convictions [for
homicides in cases of abortion] and others in process - over a ten-year period. Most of
these women are from rural areas with little education. These women go to jail while
men who may have killed 7 or 8 people are not even prosecuted.
Id.
351. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdtica J. Romualdo Circomo (Oct. 8, 2012), supra note 246. On
May 12, 2010 the Legislative Assembly issued Decree No. 56, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. Notwithstanding this Decree, it is reported that
"LGBTI persons in El Salvador are discriminated against, ill-treated, marginalized, and persecuted."
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA, EL SALVADOR: INFORMATION GATHERING MISSION
REPORT - PART 2, THE SITUATION OF WOMEN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE AND OF SEXUAL MINORITIES
IN EL SALVADOR § 5.1 (2016).
352. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo (Oct. 8, 2012), supra note 246.
353. Aracely Bautista Bayona and Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo, both attorneys and women's rights
activists, expressed optimism. Bayona commented that the laws "could help empower women" and
stated that she was giving the Integral Law and the Law of Equality the "benefit of the doubt" with
respect o their abilities to effectuate change. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona,
Consajera Legal [Legal Advisor], Comisi6n de Familia, la Mujer, y la Nitlez de la Asamblea
Legislativa [Commission on Family, Women, and Children of the Legislative Assembly], in San
Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2012) (on file with author). Romualdo CArcomo stated that she was "optimistic"
about the laws. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo Cdrcomo (Oct. 8, 2012), supra
note 246. Whereas the LVI only applied in the private sphere of domestic relationships, the new
laws were to apply in the public sphere, which represented significant progress. CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Emely Flores and Ruth Polanco, ISDEMU, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2012) (on file
with author).
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However, as we pass the four- and five-year marks since the respective laws'
enactment, levels of violence against women - which may have dipped during
the gang truce - are on the rise again, and high levels of impunity for all crimes
- including gender crimes - continue, while key indicators of inequality continue
unabated.3 54 Reports, as well as interviews conducted in Fall 2013 and 2016,
point to the persistence of deeply entrenched patriarchal attitudes, the lack of
political will and of adequate funding, and - most significantly - the failure of
key governmental bodies to implement, in full or in part, the two laws' most
essential provisions. Most recently, and in an apparent response to criticisms
regarding the government's failure to take effective action relating to gender
violence, the Legislative Assembly enacted Decree No. 286355 creating
specialized courts on violence and discrimination against women. As discussed
infra, the likelihood that these special courts will have any positive impact is
seriously in question. The following sections provide an overview of the Integral
Law, the Law of Equality, and Decree 286.
The Integral Law and the Law of Equality are lengthy documents - the
former is comprised of 58 separate articles and the latter of 41, and many of the
articles have numerous subsections. These various provisions set forth guiding
principles, define or expound on relevant terms and concepts, and assign
extensive new responsibilities across governmental entities. However, not all
obligations and responsibilities are of equal importance. There are indisputably
some provisions that are essential to advancing the laws' objectives. They
include: 1) the allocation of sufficient funding to those government agencies
charged with new responsibilities under the laws; 2) the establishment of a
reliable system to track violence and discrimination against women; 3) the
creation of an adequate shelter system; 4) the implementation of measures to
remove gender bias and improve the justice system's response to crimes against
women; and 5) the adoption by State agencies of internal norms consistent with
the requirements of the two laws.
Although the discussion that follows will describe the overall framework of
both laws, the focus will be on the failure of the government to carry out these
key requirements in a meaningful way.
354. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA -PART 2, supra note 351, § 3 (citing a Department of
State statistic that women are paid 55 percent of what men are paid for comparable work). Women
also suffer higher levels of unemployment and lack of educational opportunities than men; 80
percent of Salvadorans who do not go to school or work are women. CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Amdrica J. Romualdo Circomo, Concertaci6n Feminista Prudencia Ayala [Prudencia Ayala
Feminist Coalition], in San Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with author).
355. Decree 286, supra note 21.
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2. The Integral Law
The introductory paragraphs to the Integral Law state that it is an expression
of the State's obligation to enact legislation addressing violence against women,
including measures for detection and prevention, the provision of services,
reparations to women victims, and punishment of perpetrators.356 The Integral
Law contains two principal sections (titulos, or titles), which are divided into
sub-sections (capitulos, or chapters), each of which contains a number of
articulos, or articles. Title I creates the overall framework for accomplishing the
law's stated objectives, while Title II addresses prosecution and punishment.
a. Title I
i. Scope of Title I
Article 1 reiterates that the law's objective is to guarantee a woman's right
to a life free of violence,5 which includes the right to be free of all forms of
discrimination as well as from social and cultural practices based on concepts of
inferiority or subordination.3 58 Subsequent articles make the connection between
gender inequality and violence, stating that violence has its origins in "unequal
power relations."359 The law defines key terms such as sexism (discrimination
based on sexual differences)360 and misogyny (hatred, rejection, aversion, or
contempt for women).3 61 Violence against women is defined as any action
"based in gender that cause[s] death, harm or physical, sexual or psychological
suffering ... in the public as well as private sphere."362 Article 9 of the Integral
Law recognizes and defines a broad range of acts as constituting violence against
women - from symbolic violence to feminicides at the extreme end of the
continuum.36 3 However, it should be noted that article 9 does not criminalize
these acts, and those which are not separately and independently identified as
crimes (in Title II) are not subject to prosecution and punishment.
356. LEIV, supra note 17.
357. Id art. 1.
358. Id. art. 2.
359. Id. art. 7 (translated by author).
360. Id. art. 8(j).
361. Id art. 8(d).
362. Id art. 8(k) (translated by author).
363. The other enumerated forms of violence against women are economic, physical, psychological,
emotional, patrimonial and sexual. Id art. 9.
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The Integral Law assigns responsibilities to numerous governmental
agencies,3 64 but it designates ISDEMU as the instituci6n rectora, or the lead State
entity responsible for the execution and fulfillment of the law. 36  ISDEMU's
overarching role is to "assure, monitor, and guarantee" compliance with and
implementation of the law. 3 66 A Comisi6n Tdcnica Especializada (STC) [Special
Technical Commission], under the direction of ISDEMU, is to facilitate the
implementation of the law. 36 7 The Integral Law mandates that ISDEMU
formulate a National Policy for Access of Women to a Life Free of Violence,
develop a Plan of Action,368 and present annual reports to the Legislative
Assembly on the state of violence against women.3 6 9 Responsibilities are
assigned at the municipal level, with each municipality required to develop a
plan every three years for the prevention of violence against women.37 0 The law
also requires the creation of Unidades Institucionales de Atenci6n Especializada
para la Mujeres [Institutional Units of Specialized Attention for Women] in those
364. For example, the Ministerio de Educaci6n [Ministry of Education] is to promote the principles of
the law throughout the educational system (id. art. 20); the Ministerio de Salud Pt~blica y Asistencia
Social [Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance] is to guarantee methods in public health
services for the prevention, early detection, attention to, and intervention in cases of violence against
women, to incorporate measures for follow-up for women affected by violence, giving special
attention to their mental and emotional health, and to prepare an annual report on the number of
women assisted who were in situations of violence (id. art. 23); and the Ministerio de Trabajo y
Prevision Social [Ministry of Labor and Social Security] is directed to implement sensitivity training
at work centers, to consider absences from work by victims of violence to be justified, and to protect
the labor rights of those who suffer violence (id. art. 24).
365. Id. art. 12.
366. Id. (translated by author).
367. The STC is made up of representatives of the following key governmental bodies: Organo Judicial
(OJ) [Judiciary], the Ministerio de Hacienda [Treasury], Ministerio de Gobemaci6n [Ministry of
Governance], Ministerio de Relaci6nes Exteriores [Ministry of Exterior Relations], Ministerio de
Economfa [Ministry of the Economy], Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderfa [Ministry of
Agriculture and Livestock]. Id. art. 14.
368. Id art. 16.
369. Id art. 13(e).
370. The Integral Law also requires municipalities to convene and coordinate institutions to implement
the municipal plan, to budget money for this purpose, to report progress to its citizenry as well as
ISDEMU, and to submit gender violence statistics to the MJSP. Id. art. 29. A report published by
ISDEMU in 2015 shows that municipalities have failed to implement responsibilities in key areas.
Less than a quarter of the municipalities (22.7 percent) had developed a municipal plan for the
prevention of gender violence, and provision of services to women victims, and only 14.6 percent
had developed a municipal plan for equality and the eradication of gender discrimination. ISDEMU,
INFORME DE MONITORED SOBRE EL CUMPLIMIENTO DE COMPETENCIAS MUNICIPALES PARA LA
IGUALDAD, No DISCRIMINACION Y VIDA LIBRE DE VIOLENCIA [MONITORING REPORT ON
COMPLIANCE OF MUNICIPAL COMPETENCIES FOR EQUALITY, NON-DISCRIMINATION AND A LIFE
FREE OF VIOLENCE] 24, 26 (2015), http://www.isdemu.gob.sv/index.php?option=com
phocadownload&view=category&id=199%3Ainvestigaciones_2015&download=951%3Ainform
e-de-monitoreo-sobre-el-cumplimiento-de-competencias-municipales-para-la-igualdad&Itemid-0
&lang=es [https://perma.cclX39G-7FJG]. Less than a fifth of the municipalities (19.3 percent)
reported that they maintained statistical information regarding violence against women. Id. at 25.
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governmental offices that receive women seeking assistance in order to
centralize information and services and reduce re-victimization.37 1
ii. Barriers to and Failures in Implementation
A. Budgeting
As described above, the Integral Law imposes a number of responsibilities
across governmental bodies. In order for these agencies to take on additional
responsibilities, they require adequate funding. In recognition of this need, the
law states that the General Budget37 2 should allocate monies every year to each
government agency. However, this statement is aspirational3 73 and not binding
on decisions made as part of El Salvador's normal budgetary process.37 4
Sources in El Salvador have repeatedly noted that the government has
simply failed to allocate adequate funding to government institutions that were
given significant new responsibilities under the gender laws.3 75 Although El
371. The Units for Specialized Attention are intended to provide integrated services so that a woman who
has been victimized does not have to go from office to office seeking information. These Units are
to be located in the capital and in the departmental offices ofthe Judiciary, the Fiscala General de le
Republica (FGR), the Procuradoria General de le Repdblica (PGR), the Procuradoria para la Defensa
de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH), the Policia Nacional Civil (PNC), the Institute de Medicina
Legal (IML), and the Ministerio de Salud Pdblica y Asistencia Social [Ministry of Public Health and
Social Assistance], and in other offices "that have competence in this subject matter." LEIV, supra
note 17, art. 25.
372. The law also states that monies can come from national, regional, and international sources. Id. art.
33.
373. Julio Quinteros of the Unidad Tdcnica Ejecutiva del Sector de Justicia [Technical Executive Unit of
the Judicial Sector] lamented the fact that El Salvador is not like other countries that, when they pass
a law, make "sure that there is enough in the budget to implement" it. CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Julio Quinteros and Carlos Amaya, Unidad Tdcnica Ejecutiva del Sector de Justicia [Gender Board
Coordinator, Technical Executive Unit of the Judicial Sector], in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2012) (on
file with author). In a 2012 interview, Ima Rocio Guirola ofCEMUJER commented that El Salvador
has a "tradition of passing laws and not giving them adequate funding," pointing to the country's
failure to sufficiently fund programs included in the country's child protection law, the Ley de
Protecci6n de la Niftez y Adolescencia [Law for the Protection of Childhood and Adolescence] (El
Sal.). CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ima Rocio Guirola (Oct. 11, 2012), supra note 337.
374. Requests for funding are initiated by governmental institutions, which submit their requests to the
Ministerio de la Hacienda [Treasury]. The Treasury approves or denies requests before sending them
on to the relevant commission ofthe General Assembly, in this case the Treasury Commission. After
the Commission review, budgets are presented to the full Assembly for a vote. CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz, Directora de Comunicaciones [Director of
Communications], ORMUSA, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2012) (on file with author).
375. In-country sources pointed to various areas where insufficient funding had hobbled the
implementation of the new laws. Jos6 Alberto Castillo noted that a promised shelter system never
materialized and that although the PGR was given extensive new responsibilities, it had not received
funding commensurate with its expanded role. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jos6 A. Franco Castillo
(Oct. 9, 2012), supra note 231. In a 2013 interview, Aracely Bautista Bayona commented on the
inadequate funding of ISDEMU, which had resulted in slow and difficult implementation of both
the Integral Law and the Law of Equality. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona,
Consajera Legal [Legal Advisor], Comisi6n de Familia, la Mujer, y la Niflez de la Asamblea
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Salvador is not a wealthy country, many see the insufficient funding as related
not so much to sparse resources as to lack of political will.3 76 Budgetary
allocations are a clear indicator of "commitments and political priorities,"077 and
"while laws are an important component"378 in addressing gender violence, it is
not enough to approve them without assigning sufficient funds for their
application - which is what has happened in El Salvador.
However, it would be an error to attribute all failures in the implementation
of the law to insufficient funding, even assuming that the lack of funding
indicates lack of political will. In some instances, insufficient funding played
little or no part; the resources were there, but the willingness to implement was
not. The following discussion of the failure to establish a national database is one
such example, where resistance, rather than resources, has stymied
implementation.
B. The Stalled Creation of a National System on
Violence Against Women
The Integral Law mandates the creation of a comprehensive national
statistical system on violence against women: the Sistema Nacional de Datos,
Estadisticas e Informaci6n de Violencia contra las Mujeres ("National System")
[National System of Data, Statistics and Information on Violence against
Legislativa [Commission on Family, Women, and Children of the Legislative Assembly] at 3, in
San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2013) (on file with author). She commented again on the inadequate funding
in a Nov. 2016 interview. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Nov. 2016), supra
note 267.
376. In a 2012 interview, Vilma Vaquerano Cruz of ORMUSA observed:
The problem is that when it comes down to laws that protect women and children there
is always the excuse that there is no money. That is because the rights of women are not
valued equally to men. As a poor country, budget will always be a problem, but really
the problem is that violence against women is not prioritized and the limited budget is
just an excuse.
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz (Oct. 2012), supra note 374. Lack of political
will, along with limited resources, was cited by many sources as the reason for insufficient funding.
See, e.g., CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Tobar de Cortez, Coordinadora [Coordinator],
Unidad de Gdnero de la PGR [Gender Unit ofthe PGR], San Sal., El, Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with
author) (stating that the Legislative Assembly does not give the Gender Unit sufficient "importance"
or sufficient resources). M61ida Guevara of Oxfam commented that "[g]ender issues get he least
amount of people and resources because of this [cultural] resistance. And this is from a leftist
government. But it is still men who make the decisions." CGRS/RHRC Interview with M6lida
Guevara (Apr. 2010), supra note 197.
377. CoMIsl6N ECON6MICA PARA AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS (CEPAL),
SI NO SE CUENTA, NO CUENTA: INFORMACI6N SOBRE LA VIOLENCIA CONTRA LAS MUJERES
[UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (ECLAC),
IF IT IS NOT COUNTED, IT DOES NOT COUNT: INFORMATION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN] 156
(2012).
378. Id.
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Women].379 This system is to capture a wide range of information, including
categories of violence, demographics pertaining to victims and perpetrators
(geographic location, age, marital status, occupation, level of education), data on
government services provided to women victims, and resources expended in
providing services to women. Reports are to be issued based on these data
evaluating the impact of State policies on eradication of violence.38 o
The Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Piblica (MJSP) [Ministry of Justice
and Public Security] is responsible for managing the system, working in
coordination with the Direcci6n General de Estadisticas y Censos (DIGESTYC)
[General Directorate on Statistics and Census] of the Ministerio de la Economia
[Ministry of the Economy].381 Every governmental institution3 8 2 that possesses
relevant information is to submit it to DIGESTYC and to the MJSP for the
publication of detailed annual reports.3 83
The importance of collecting such data has been repeatedly affirmed by
international organizations addressing violence against women and gender
equality.3 84 The ongoing maintenance of high-quality data is necessary to
379. LEIV, supra note 17, arts. 30, 31. The National System is a component of an overarching statistical
system whose creation is mandated by article 14 of the Law of Equality. This overarching system is
called the Sistema de Estadisticas y Monitoreo de Igualdad (SEMI) [System of Indicators and
Monitoring of Equality]. A 2015 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) stated that ISDEMU developed SEMI with the objective
of complying with Art. 14 of the LEIV. CEDAW, SURVEY OF REPORTS PRESENTED BY STATE
PARTIES UNDER ART. 18 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN ¶ 43 (June 12, 2015), http://www.refworld.org/type
,STATEPARTIESREP,CEDAW,,56e7bf994,0.html [https://perma.cc/VVR9-LURL]. SEMI is
under the aegis ofthe Direcci6n General de Estadistica y Censos (DIGESTYC) [General Directorate
on Statistics and Census] within the Ministry of the Economy. A key component of SEMI is SNEIG
(Sistema Nacional de Estadisticas e Indicadores de Gdnero [National System of Statistics and
Indicators of Gender]). Art. 14 of the LEIV mandates the creation of SNEIG but refers to it by a
shorter name, calling it the Sistema de Indicadores. The 2014 CEDAW report, mentioned above,
refers to it by its full, current name, the Sistema National de Estadisticas e Indicadores de Gdnero.
Id SNEIG is to maintain data in seven distinct areas, including, as mentioned above, the National
System of Data, Statistics and Information on Violence against Women. See infra notes 478-479
and accompanying text for a description of the other six areas to be maintained under SNEIG. See
Appendix C for a chart displaying the structures of and relationships among the Ministry of
Economy, DIGESTYC, SEMI, and SNEIG.
380. LEIV, supra note 17, art. 30.
381. Id. art. 30. DIGESTYC's Organic Law, art. 5, states that it is an agency located within the Ministry
of Economy. Ley Orgdnica del Servicio Estadistico, DIGESTYC, available at http://www.digestyc
.gob.sv/index.php/institucion/marco-institucional/ley-organica-del-servicio-estadistioo.html
[https://perma.cc/L62M-XPZF] (last visited May 21, 2018).
382. DIGESTYC is in charge of soliciting and receiving information. The Integral Law directs the
Instituto de Medicina Legal (IML), whose primary role is to provide forensic expertise to
governmental entities, such as the police, prosecutors, and the courts, to present an annual diagnostic
that includes information on the prevalence of feminicide; the effects of physical, psychological,
and sexual violence on women; and the effects of exposure to violence on children. LEIV, supra
note 17, art. 32.
383. LEIV, supra note 17, art. 30.
384. In a 2013 interview, Ondina Castillo, Gender Coordinator of the UNFPA, noted that without a
unified system of data collection on violence against women, it was "hard to understand the
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measure progress, to evaluate the efficacy of governmental policies, to assure the
provision of necessary services, and to inform legislation and the development
of public policy.3 85 The "availability of accurate and inclusive information is also
of crucial importance to strengthening social condemnation of violence against
women, and expanding consensus around the necessity of eradicating it." 386
In a 2012 interview, Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, an official with the
MJSP involved in the development of a pilot program for the National System,
acknowledged that El Salvador did not have much of a "tradition" of collecting
and maintaining data.38 7 Available data were inconsistent and unreliable because
each institution - the PNC, the FGR, the IML, and the Organo Judicial (OJ)
[Judiciary] - had its own methodology and did not agree on the format or
variables for data collection.3 88 Amaya Cobar lauded the Integral Law for
pushing the government to create a reliable system of information and explained
that key elements of the new system would be: 1) use of a single database, 2)
with agreed-upon variables that would be used by all government institutions, 389
and 3) the creation of a "unique code" to identify victims. 3 9 0 Amaya Cobar
predicted that the pilot would be launched in 2013 and hoped that it would be
put into operation by 2014.391
As of the end of 2016, however, the National System had yet to be launched,
and numerous in-country sources affirmed that this failing was the result not of
resources or technical barriers but of the refusal of State agencies to cooperate in
its creation.392 Jeanette Aguilar, Director of the IUDOP of the UCA and the
phenomenon of violence and what the numbers could tell us." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ondina
Castillo, Coordinadora de G6nero [Gender Coordinator] UNFPA, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 16,2013)
(on file with author). See also CEPAL, supra note 377, at 33.
385. CEPAL, supra note 377, at 33.
386. Id.
387. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Edgardo A. Amaya Cobar (Oct. 10, 2012), supra note 240. Amaya
underscored the importance of reliable statistics to the development of policy, noting that historically
the government did not "develop policy based on statistics and hard facts" and instead often adopted
policies "without having the data to support them." He expressed his hope that the development of
a well-designed system in the area of gender would "positively stimulate other parts of government
to keep reliable statistics." Id.
388. Id.
389. In a 2013 interview, Ondina Castillo, Gender Coordinator with the UNFPA, explained how the use
of different variables led to confusion, giving the example that one institution might register a
particular incident as pornography while another records it as sexual violence. Castillo was
encouraged that government agencies had signed an inter-institutional agreement to develop and use
consistent variables; she characterized this as a significant advance since institutions were not
"accustomed" to working so collaboratively. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Ondina Castillo (Oct. 16,
2013), supra note 384.
390. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Edgardo A. Amaya Cobar (Oct. 10, 2012), supra note 240.
391. Id.
392. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Aguilar, Directora [Director], and Laura Andrade,
Investigadora [Researcher], IUDOP de la UCA [IUDOP of the UCA], in San Sal., El Sal. (Nov.
2016) (on file with author).
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author of many publications on various aspects of El Salvador's justice system,
noted that resistance to creating a unified system of data was not new; calls to
create such a system were first made more than twenty years ago but were not
realized.3 93 Government institutions would rather hide their data because, given
how bad things are, there is a "political cost to transparency."394 Aguilar noted
that in the absence of a harmonized National System, it is virtually impossible to
track a criminal case from denunciation through investigation, prosecution, and
sentencing, which makes it difficult to evaluate the performance of governmental
actors - police, prosecutors, and judges - in the various stages of the judicial
process.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of assessing the operation of the justice
system, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), working with the UN Development
Program (UNDP), recently completed a study on access to justice in cases of
gender violence.395 The UN agencies obtained access to case files by agreeing to
give the government the final say on publication of their findings. A principal
objective of the report was to determine why fewer feminicide cases than
homicides resulted in sentences. The researchers identified cases of interest and
followed each one through its various procedural steps.3 9 6
393. Id. The advantages ofa unified system, and the resistance to establishing one, have been noted over
the years. For example, in an April 2010 interview, Mirna Antonieta Perla Jimenez noted how a
unified system would benefit victims, who would no longer need to go from office to office if
information about he violence they suffered had been entered into a database across governmental
agencies. She stated that such a change "could be implemented administratively, but it would be
better to do it legislatively." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Mirna A. Perla Jimenez, Civil Chamber
of the CSJ, supra note 145. Unfortunately, the legislative mandate has not resulted in government
compliance. In October 2010, Vilma Guadalupe Portillo noted the institutional resistance to creating
a unified database; she singled out the PNC, FGR, PGR, IML, and the courts. Vilma Guadalupe
Portillo, Coordinadora del Proyecto Regional sobre Violencia Sexual [Coordinator of the Regional
Project on Sexual Violence], Fondo de Poblaci6n de las Naciones Unidas (UNFPA) [United Nations
Population Fund] (Oct. 21, 2010).
394. Id. Jeanette Aguilar elaborated on this point, stating that government authorities do not want to
produce the type of data that would allow them to be evaluated: "They do everything possible to
avoid providing the data. There is a failure of interest on the part of the government and institutions;
they just want [to do enough] to show that they need to get more money." CGRS/RHRC Interview
with Jeanette Aguilar, IUDOP of the UCA, supra note 224. Edgardo Aberto Amaya Cobar also
commented on the resistance to keeping data because of "political sensitivities," citing the low
proportion of cases - only 20 percent - that the FGR sends to the courts for prosecution, which
"doesn't look good for the prosecutor." CGRS/RHRC Interview with Edgardo A. Amaya Cobar
(Oct. 10, 2012), supra note 240. Accusations and suspicions abound regarding the institutional
tendency to distort the numbers; Miguel Velasquez-Velasquez, head of statistics of IML commented
that the PNC might want to reduce numbers for "political reasons." CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Miguel Velasquez-Velasquez, Jefe Tdcnico de Estadisticias [Technical Head of Statistics], IML,
San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2012) (on file with author).
395. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Aguilar, IUDOP of the UCA, supra note 224. One other
source, who requested anonymity, also described this study and the government's refusal to permit
its publication.
396. Id. Generally, a criminal case begins with information being submitted to a Justice of the Peace, the
PNC, or the FGR. The FGR has the responsibility to investigate and, depending on the sufficiency
of the evidence, either to request that the judge initiate a penal process or to terminate proceedings.
If the Justice of the Peace does not terminate proceedings, the case proceeds to the Judge of
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Their conclusions were critical of the governmental actors, finding failings
on the part of the authorities in the investigation and prosecution of the cases and
in the lack of adequate protocols guiding subsequent action. The report and its
identification of deficiencies could have served as a useful blueprint of high-
priority areas for improvement. Unfortunately, consistent with its preference for
hiding inconvenient truths, the government refused to allow the report to be
published.3 9 7
As an aside, it is important to note that this is not the first time that the
government has opted to bury a study because it revealed problems and high
levels of impunity in the justice system. Nearly a decade ago, the UNDP
commissioned a report to examine homicides with the objective of identifying
the causes of high levels of impunity. 398 The study focused on homicides
committed in 2005, and its researchers examined individual files as each case
moved through the system.3 99 The study's principal finding was that there was a
97 percent impunity rate.4 0 0 The report identified serious deficiencies at every
stage of the process, committed by the PNC, the FGR, and the courts.4 0 1 When
the report was first released, the press praised it for allowing the country to have
a "real picture" of the situation.40 2 Within a few days, however, the government
began to harshly criticize the report, accusing the researchers of improprieties.4 03
Shortly afterward, the UNDP withdrew the report so that it was no longer
publicly available.404 The UNDP explained its actions by saying that "it has to
work with the government" and if a report they release "damages relations with
Instruction, where the FGR continues developing the evidence. The Judge of Instruction can
provisionally dismiss the case if the evidence is insufficient or can send it on to the Sentencing Court
for trial. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 42-44.
397. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Aguilar, IUDOP of the UCA, supra note 224. One source,
who chose to remain anonymous, commented that the government was "resistant to publishing
because there were so many details about all the weaknesses" in the system although in reality the
report did not reveal anything new. This same source lamented that two years had been invested -
and ultimately wasted - on research connected to the study.
398. One of the principal authors of the report was Sidney Blanco Reyes, who currently sits on the CSJ.
399. UNDP, DEFICIENCIAS POLICIALES, FISCALES 0 JUDICIALES EN LA INVESTIGACION Y JUZGAMIENTO
CAUSANTES DE IMPUNIDAD [POLICE, FISCAL OR JUDICIAL DEFICIENCIES IN INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION CAUSING IMPUNITY] 6 (2007); CGRS/RHRC Interview with Sidney Blanco Reyes,
Juez [Justice], Sala de lo Constitucional de la CSJ [Constitutional Chamber of the CSJ], in San Sal.,
El Sal. (Apr. 2010) (on file with author). The research entailed direct review of files at the
prosecutor's office and at the courts. The researchers listed the responsibilities of the governmental
actors (i.e. police, prosecutors, judges, medical forensic experts) and identified the most common
deficiencies in fulfilling their obligations. They found "grave mistakes" during investigations, such
as failure to interview witnesses or even to carry out autopsies.
400. UNDP, supra note 399, at 36.
401. Id.
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the government, it adversely affects UNDP's ability to constructively work" with
them.405
Given the Salvadoran government's preference for hiding unfavorable
information, it seems unlikely that the Integral Law's mandate of creating a
National System to allow greater transparency will be fulfilled. And
unfortunately, as some knowledgeable source's have observed, there is no way to
force the government to do what it does not want to do.406
C. Shelters and a "Special Fund"
Article 26 of the Integral Law requires the creation of a shelter program
coordinated by ISDEMU.407 The law is silent on specific requirements as to
capacity, geographic distribution, or other factors that would assure that women,
along with their children, could access a safe refuge. Five years after the
enactment of the Integral Law, shelter capacity remains extremely limited. There
are only two government shelters in the entire country, one for victims of
domestic violence and the other for victims of trafficking.40 8 The shelter for
women fleeing domestic violence can accommodate only 15 women; the
capacity of the other shelter is unknown. Neither shelter accepts women with
daughters over 18 or sons over nine years old or women in need of medical
attention.4 09
There is some dispute regarding the length of time women can remain in
these two government shelters; ISDEMU has reported that the shelter for women
fleeing intrafamilial violence allows stays of two to twelve months and that
trafficking victims may stay a maximum of three years. The women's NGO
Organizaci6n de Mujeres Salvadoreflas por la Paz (ORMUSA) [Organization of
Salvadoran Women for Peace] contradicts this information, stating that neither
shelter allows women to remain for more than five days.4 10 In light of the high
levels of intrafamilial violence, the lack of shelters is a serious gap in protection.
An expert to the judiciary expressed frustration that the Integral Law did not
require the development of a national network of shelters, which could interface
405. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Nidia Hidalgo Celari6, UNDP (Apr. 2010), supra note 322.
406. This source asked to remain confidential because she did not want to appear critical of the
government. She also observed that within the last year the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) had issued a confidential report for the government of El
Salvador that identified the lack of statistics as a major obstacle.
407. LEIV, supra note 17, art. 26.
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with the justice system so that judges could provide women at risk with
information about where they might go.4 11
Other measures in the Integral Law that are intended to assist women in need
of support have also failed to come to fruition. For example, the law provides for
the establishment of a Fondo Especial para Mujeres Victimas de Violencia
[Special Fund for Women Victims of Violence].412 Special Fund monies are
supposed to finance measures such as social assistance or subsidies to women
victims,4 13 presumably for necessities such as housing. A serious limitation to
the design of the Special Fund is that sanctions imposed for violations of the
Integral Law constitute its sole source of funding.4 14 However, to date, no
sanctions have been levied, meaning that zero funding is available for these
purposes.
b. Title II
i. Scope of Title II
As mentioned above, the Integral Law also includes provisions criminalizing
specified acts of violence against women. Title II defines a range of acts as
crimes,415 beginning with feminicide416 and aggravated feminicide.4 17 A
feminicide is defined as the killing of a woman for reasons of "hatred or contempt
because she is a woman," and lists five criteria for making that determination.418
A feminicide may be considered aggravated if committed under certain
enumerated circumstances, including if there were multiple perpetrators or if the
411. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jos6 A. Franco Castillo (Oct. 9, 2012), supra note 231. At the time of
his interviews, Jos6 Alberto Franco Castillo was a trainer at the CNJ; however, he was recently
appointed as ajudge.
412. LEIV, supra note 17, art. 35.
413. Id. It is widely recognized that women's economic dependence on their abusive partners causes them
to not pursue their rights or denounce violence, making the need for social assistance or subsidies
all the more important. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Yanira Argueta, AMS, supra note 182; CGRS/
RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 2012), supra note 353. Bautista Bayona
observed that women may even lack the money to travel to governmental institutions - the courts,
the prosecutor's office, or the IML - which is necessary for a denunciation.
414. LEIV, supra note 17, art. 35.
415. Articles 44-55 ofthe Integral Law define the crimes; articles 56-61 lay out the procedural measures.
Id. arts. 44-55, 56-61.
416. Id. art.45.
417. Id. art. 46.
418. The criteria are: 1) the killing was preceded by acts of violence committed by the perpetrator whether
or not the victim had denounced it; 2) the perpetrator took advantage of physical or psychological
vulnerability of the victim; 3) the perpetrator took advantage of superiority he had by virtue of
unequal power relations based on gender; d) prior to the killing the perpetrator committed acts
considered to be crimes against sexual liberty; or e) the death was caused by mutilation. Id. art. 45.
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victim was a minor or physically or mentally disabled.4 19 Feminicides are to be
punished by sentences of 20 to 50 years, while aggravated feminicides carry
sentences of 30 to 50 years.
Other criminalized acts include inducing or assisting a woman to commit
suicide if preceded by violence or control over the victim, 420 the publication or
distribution of erotic or pornographic images of a woman without her consent,4 21
and the distribution of personal information that damages a woman's honor or
privacy.422 The law also criminalizes verbal or non-verbal expressions of
violence against women in a range of contexts.4 23 Several provisions address
economic rights; it is a crime for an intimate partner to steal a woman's
property,424 to steal profit or income derived from family economic activities,4 2 5
or to refuse to provide information about the income of a person who has the
obligation to provide economic assistance to a woman.4 2 6 The law makes it a
punishable crime to block access to justice: any public official who "causes,
promotes or tolerates impunity or barriers to investigation" can be sentenced to
427a two- to four-year sentence and terminated from employment.
Notable in its absence from the list of crimes in the Integral Law is
intrafamilial or domestic violence, which, as explained supra Part III.B, was not
criminalized by the LVI or as a separate crime in various Penal Code reforms.
The Integral Law does, however, address one issue that was first raised in the
context of the LVI: the issue of whether conciliation is appropriate in cases of
gender violence where there are unequal power relations. The Integral Law
explicitly prohibits any form of conciliation or mediation for its enumerated
428
crimes.
In apparent response to consistent criticisms of bias and insensitivity in the
justice system, the law requires the FGR to formulate special policies for the
419. Article 46 provides that a feminicide is "aggravated" if committed under any of the following
circumstances: 1) by a government official or employee; 2) by two or more persons; 3) in the
presence of the victim's family; 4) against a victim who was under eighteen, was a senior, or suffered
physical or mental incapacity; or 5) by a perpetrator who took advantage of a superior position
arising from confidence, friendship, or a relationship arising from school or work. Id. art. 46.
420. Id art. 48.
421. Id. arts. 49, 51.
422. Id art. 50.
423. This includes transmission of images or messages that contain hatred or contempt toward women;
ridiculing or otherwise degrading women in places ofwork or education or at community gatherings;
and impeding or limiting women's participation in educational or work settings. Id. art. 55.
424. Id. art. 53.
425. Id. art. 54.
426. Id. art. 52.
427. Id. art. 47.
428. Id. art. 58.
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prosecution of crimes of violence against women.4 2 9 These protocols are to
include measures to protect and support the victim 4 3 0 and to assure her privacy
by prohibiting the use of information regarding her prior sexual history.431 To
date the FGR has only very partially complied with article 56's requirement hat
it issue protocols on the range of gender crimes included in the law. The FGR
has published but one set of protocols, the Protocolo de Actuaci6n para la
Investigaci6n del Feminicidio [Protocol for Performance in the Investigation of
Feminicide, or Feminicide Protocol], in 2012.432
A significant objective of the Feminicide Protocol is to assure that
prosecutors consider those factors that differentiate a feminicide from a
homicide.433 This was prompted by the concern that the gender dimension of
these killings was being ignored. Although the Feminicide Protocol has been
praised for its content and approach, its efficacy has been greatly limited because
a majority of prosecutors simply do not follow its procedures, though they affirm
429. Id. art. 56. The procedural rights are to be extended to immigrant victims of trafficking, who
additionally cannot be removed from El Salvador and have immunity from immigration law
sanctions and access to free immigration legal assistance. Id. art. 57.
430. Protective measures are to be issued; the assistance and protection of the police or other
governmental entities are to be provided; the victim is to receive medical attention and treatment;
and she is to be permitted to give her testimony under special conditions of protection and care,
including taking evidence in advance of the trial so that it can be submitted at the trial in lieu of her
in-person testimony (referred to as "anticipo de prueba"). Id. arts. 57(k), (1), (h), and (in).
431. Id. arts. 57(a), (d).
432. OFICINA DEL ALTO COMISIONADO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS &
FGR, PROTOCOLO DE ACTUACION PARA LA INVESTIGACION DEL FEMINICIDIO [OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & FGR, ACTION PROTOCOL FOR THE
INVESTIGATION OF FEMICIDE] (2012), http://www.oacnudh.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07
/Protocolo-feminicidios-20042012-FINAL-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S7D-APN5].
433. Id. at 7. Between 2013 and 2014, there was an increase in the number of killings classified by the
FGR as a feminicide; however, that number dropped in 2015. In 2013, the FGR classified 45.16
percent of violent deaths as feminicides; in 2014, 62.24 percent; and in 2015, 47.91 percent.
ISDEMU, supra note 242, at 9. Edgardo Amaya noted that the characterization of a killing as a
feminicide was a "complicated and delicate issue." The FGR makes the initial determination, but a
judge can subsequently recharacterize a feminicide as a homicide. The IML has a role because it
"identifies sexual violence, mutilation or other physical indicators of feminicide" when it does its
forensic exam. Some sources have commented that the chararacterization of a killing as a homicide
is seen as a "strategic" decision based on the belief that prosecuting a feminicide is more difficult.
CGRS/1HRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo Cdrcomo, Concertaci6n Feminista Prudencia
Ayala [Prudencia Ayala Feminist Coalition] at 2, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 17, 2013) (on file with
author). Sources have consistently noted the resistance of many judges to categorizing the killing of
a woman as a feminicide. See, e.g., CGRS/RHRC Interview with Emma J. Fabian Hernandez,
Diputada - FMLN [Assembly Member - FMLN], Comisi6n de la Mujer y la Igualdad de G6nero
[Commission for Women and Gender Equality] at 5, in San Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 18, 2013) (on file with
author).
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that they do.434 And as of 2015, many of them (41 percent) had still not received
training in the application of the Protocol.4 35
The categorization of a killing as a feminicide rather than as a homicide may
have more symbolic than practical significance. Regardless of how the
prosecutor classifies the case, he or she must still be able to marshal the evidence
to persuade the judges hearing the case that the killing is in fact a feminicide,
and they must be able to successfully prosecute it. A telling statistic is that
between January 2012, when the Integral Law went into effect, and June 2014,
628 women were reported killed, "of which only 34 cases arrived at the stage of
public [prosecution] with the classification of feminicide or aggravated
feminicide.'A36 We do not have the statistics as to how many cases that arrived
were resolved or whether they resulted in conviction or acquittal.
ii. Persistent Impunity
As discussed above, the lack of a reliable national system of statistics
precludes the ability to track a case from start to finish in order to evaluate levels
of impunity. However, there are some telling statistics that demonstrate that only
a very small percentage of denounced gender crimes are subsequently
investigated, prosecuted, and sentenced. For example, a 2015 study by the
IUDOP concluded that only 6.5 percent of all categories of crimes that were
prosecuted between 2009 and 2013 resulted in a sentence.437 The IUDOP study
was not specific to crimes of gender violence, but one can infer similarly high
levels of impunity for those crimes from ISDEMU's 2016 report.43 8 Although
ISDEMU was unable to track a particular case from start to finish, its 2016 report
included a chart with numbers of violent killings of women by year - from 2013
to 2015. In that time period, there were 688 cases brought to the FGR. During
434. ISDEMU, supra note 237. The methodology of the ISDEMU report included self-reporting (asking
the prosecutors if they followed certain procedures) as well as file review to determine whether the
files affirmed that prosecutors were following certain procedures. Id. at 9-10. In many cases a high
percentage of the prosecutors asserted that they had followed procedures while an equally high
percentage of the files demonstrated that those procedures had not, in fact, been followed. For
example, 69 percent of the prosecutors surveyed stated that as part of their investigation and
gathering of evidence, they took samples of bodily fluids and examined the genital areas of the
victims. However, such measures had not been taken in 85 percent of the files. Id. at 22 fig.8.
435. Id. at 23.
436. ISDEMU, supra note 243, at 7. ISDEMU has identified the following factors as contributing to the
relatively low number of cases prosecuted and sentenced as feminicides: gaps and irregularities
relating to treatment and investigation of evidence, the lack of use of prosecutorial challenges to
judicial decisions finding that a killing was not a feminicide, deficiencies in judges' evaluation of
evidence, the lack of a gender-sensitive focus by officials in setting sentences, the lack of effective
violence prevention mechanisms, and the absence of reparation mechanisms for victims and their
family members. Id. at 34-46.
437. IUDOP, supra note 11, at 53.
438. ISDEMU, supra note 232, at 34-46.
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that same time period a total of 556 cases (80 percent) were dismissed because
they were deemed to have insufficient evidence to move forward.439 Because
cases may pend from year to year, the 556 cases which were dismissed are not
necessarily a subset of the 688 cases brought between 2013 to 2015, but they still
give some idea of the high number of cases in which prosecution does not move
forward because of failures in the investigation and gathering of evidence,
resulting in impunity.
The limited data available regarding the prosecution of acts classified as
crimes under the Integral Law other than feminicide/aggravated feminicide also
demonstrate high levels of impunity. From January 2013 to June 2016, the FGR
registered 3,702 criminal cases arising under the Integral Law.4 4 0 The OJ
reported that prosecution in only 743 cases (approximately 20 percent) had been
initiated in the peace courts, with no indication of how had many proceeded past
that initial stage to the j uzgados de instrucci6n [courts of instruction] and then to
the tribunales de sentencia [sentencing courts] for trial and resolution. As
discussed above, cases can be - and often are - dismissed for insufficient
evidence, and that can occur at both the peace court and instruction court levels.
Therefore, to report that 20 percent of cases registered by the FGR were initiated
in peace courts is far less meaningful than to report how many of those cases
survived dismissal, proceeded to trial, and were resolved - a number that is not
available. Furthermore, 20 percent is a relatively low number, so even if all of
these cases went to trial and reached a verdict - which is certainly not the case -
the impunity rate would still be 80 percent.
As discussed above, intrafamilal violence is not classified as a crime in the
Integral Law or in the Penal Code. However, a discussion of the prosecution and
impunity rates for gender crimes would be incomplete without mention of the
justice system's handling of intrafamilial violence. Unsurprisingly, data
pertinent to outcomes in cases of intrafamilial violence are simply not available.
ISDEMU reported on numbers provided by the courts as to cases which entered
(ingresos) the system by the beginning of 2015 (10,104), the number of cases
which left (egresos) the peace courts (10,295), and the number which remain
pending (415).441 However, there is absolutely no information provided as to the
resolution of those cases that "left" the system - i.e., whether they were
dismissed or continued to trial and, if so, what the outcomes were. Individuals
and organizations in a position to speak credibly about outcomes share the firm
opinion that impunity for violence against women, including domestic violence,
439. These cases are subject to a process akin to dismissal: "definitive archiving" (archivo definitivo).
IUDOP, supra note 11, at 51. When a case it definitively archived, there is no possibility of
continuing with the investigation. Id.
440. ISDEMU, supra note 232, at 27 tbl.6.
441. Id. at 30.
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remains high.442 For example, the women's rights organization ORMUSA
reported that, out of 978 cases of violence against women in 2014, only 4 resulted
in a conviction.44 3
However, the overall weakness of the Salvadoran judicial system does not
fully explain the failure to respond effectively to intrafamilial and other forms of
violence against women. A broad range of sources attribute these high levels of
impunity to gender bias among personnel of key state institutions - the PNC, the
FGR, and the judiciary. Women who go to report violence continue to be blamed
by police or prosecutors for "provoking [the] assault" against them.44 4 Judges are
often considered to be the worst offenders.4 4 5 It was in an attempt to circumvent
systemic patriarchy that the original draft of the Integral Law included the
creation of specialized courts, with trained personnel, to hear crimes of violence
against women. The proposal for specialized courts was removed from the law
due to budgetary considerations.4 46 Their omission was considered by many as a
serious gap,4 4 7 an opinion only reinforced by the subsequent lack of appreciable
progress in the justice system. In February 2016, the Legislative Assembly
approved a decree to establish a limited number of specialized courts.448 The
Decree will be discussed in detail infra Part III.D.
3. The Law ofEquality
a. Scope of the Law
The Law of Equality begins by invoking the domestic and international
guarantees of gender equality, citing El Salvador's Constitution and various
442. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA -PART 2, supra note 351, § 4.4.4.
443. Id. Roberto Rodriguez Mel6ndez, a Salvadoran human rights expert, has commented that acts of
violence against women and children enjoy the highest levels of impunity. He noted that the
existence of special laws for women and children constitute an acknowledgement that those
populations have not been protected. CGRS/RH{RC Interview with Roberto Rodriguez Mel6ndez,
Director de la Escuela de Capacitaci6n Judicial [Director of the Judicial Training School],
Departamento de Ciencias Juridicas de la UCA [Legal Sciences Department of the UCA], in San
Sal., El Sal. (Oct. 2013) (on file with author).
444. Id.
445. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jos6 A. Franco Castillo (Oct. 9, 2012), supra note 231. Jos6 Alberto
Franco Castillo stated that judges have "defied the law by not implementing it correctly.... For
example, if a woman is attacked because her husband believes she was unfaithful, a lot of judges
think that attack is justified" (translated by author). Id. See also CGRS/RHRC Interview with Emma
J. Fabian Hernandez, Commission for Women and Gender Equality, supra note 433 ("Judges have
been resistant to apply the law [Ley Integral] especially feminicidio, which they classify as
homicide.") (translated by author).
446. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jos6 A. Franco Castillo (Oct. 9, 2012), supra note 231.
447. Id.
448. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA - PART 2, supra note 351, § 4.4.2.
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regional and international treaties and conventions.4 4 9  Its introductory
paragraphs proclaim the necessity of a "legal instrument that develops the
constitutional principles of equality."450 The passage of the Law of Equality was
seen as a major step forward because "[i]n 200 years the Legislative Assembly
ha[d] never enacted laws governing anti-discrimination."451 The law is divided
into seven sections (capitulos, or chapters) that set forth its overarching
objectives and guiding principles (Chapters I & II) and then address the law's
application in the spheres of education and political participation (Chapter III);
economic and labor rights (Chapter IV); health, social, and cultural rights
(Chapter V); and rural development (Chapter VI). The concluding chapter
(Chapter VII) assigns responsibility for the guarantee of equality to the PGR.
The law only applies to state institutions; it does not apply to acts of
discrimination committed by private actors,452 and some see this as a serious gap.
It defines the principles of equality,453 equity,4 54 and non-discrimination,4 55
stating that equality encompasses qual opportunity as well as equal treatment.4 56
As with the Integral Law, ISDEMU is designated as the lead state entity with the
responsibility to "promote and assist" in the implementation of the law,45 7
including advising state institutions on compliance.458 In addition, ISDEMU is
tasked with the development of a National Plan for Equality.459 Local
governments are also required to develop plans for equality.4 6 0
Similar to the Integral Law, the Law of Equality recognizes the importance
of maintaining relevant data. All state institutions are required to disaggregate
relevant data by gender.4 6' The DIGESTYC is directed to incorporate the
449. LIE, supra note 18, parts I, II.
450. Id. part VI.
451. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Alba E. Cortez de Alvarenga (Oct. 2012), Legislative Assembly, supra
note 327. In a 2016 interview, Cortez de Alvarenga underscored the lack of experience or precedent
of any kind in cases involving discrimination or hate crimes. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Alba E.
Cortez de Alvarenga (Nov. 2016), supra note 223. Jeanette Tobar de Cortez, Coordinator of the
Gender Unit of the PGR, states that there is a clear causal connection between discrimination and
violence, stating that "[a]ll violence against women starts with discrimination." CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Jeanette Tobar de Cortez, supra note 376.
452. LIE, supra note 18, art. 3 (stating in relevant part that "[S]tate entities and organizations . . . are
obliged to what the law provides . . . ."). Id.
453. Id. art. 6(1).
454. Id art. 6(2).
455. Id. art. 6(3).
456. Id. arts. 6(l)(d), (e).
457. Id. art. 7.
458. Id art. ll(b).
459. Id art. 8.
460. Id art. 12.
461. Id art. 14.
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variable of sex into its national system of statistics,462 and ISDEMU, together
with the DIGESTYC, is to administer the national system.463
Each of the chapters addressing particular societal ambits (e.g., education,
labor, etc.) articulate ambitious principles and criteria relevant to the
achievement of equality in their respective areas.464 In the areas of education and
economic and labor rights, the goals are equal access and opportunity. In the
health arena, the focus is on access to information as well as equality in the
receipt of services,465 including those regarding sexual and reproductive
health.46 6 The paragraphs on social and cultural rights call for, inter alia, the
recognition of the value of domestic work, the establishment of special programs
to support women in economically vulnerable situations,4 67 and facilitation of
access to housing.46 8 The state is to develop programs for trafficking victims in
order to eliminate discrimination, stigmatization, or punishment.4 69 The section
Women in Rural Development states that women are also to be assured a role in
decision-making in rural development projects.470
Although ISDEMU is the lead agency for the Law of Equality, the law
assigns to the PGR the responsibility for the "defense and guarantee" of women's
rights through a separate office to be created within the PGR.47 1 The law directs
the PGR to carry out its role as guarantor and defender of rights through a wide
range of activities - from proposing reforms, to receiving and responding to
complaints, to publishing an annual progress report regarding compliance with
the law. 4 72
Finally, the law addresses the punishment of those who violate the rights it
sets forth. Each governmental institution is given six months to come up with
internal norms regarding sanctions.4 7 3 No guidance is given regarding the
sanctions themselves, which leaves a substantial margin of discretion to each
governmental institution.
462. Id.
463. LIE, supra note 18, art. 14.
464. For example, the chapter on education includes four guiding principles (art. 16) and 13 separate
criteria (art. 17), with additional criteria applying to higher education (art. 18) and professional,
vocational, artistic, and sports training (art. 19). Id. arts. 16-19.
465. Id. art. 26.
466. Id. art. 26(c). As discussed supra note 350, abortion is criminalized, prosecuted, and harshly
punished; the Law of Equality does nothing to change that.
467. LIE, supra note 18, arts. 27-29.
468. Id art. 33.
469. Id art. 31.
470. Id arts. 36-37.
471. Id art. 38.
472. Id art. 39.
473. Id art. 41.
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b. Status of Implementation of Key Provisions
i. Budgeting
As with the Integral Law, the Law of Equality cannot allocate resources for
its implementation, although it does urge the appropriation of necessary funds.474
ISDEMU is the only entity specifically named as a recipient of funding; article
13 states that the budgetary allocation should take into account the resources
ISDEMU needs to implement the law.475 The Law of Equality creates new
governmental bodies (such as a special office within the PGR), but in apparent
recognition that these new offices can operate only to the degree they are funded,
it states that they will operate "in conformance with the resources that are
approved in the next general national budget."476 Although there have been funds
allocated to various state entities, governmental and NGO sources report that
funding has not been sufficient given the substantial new responsibilities
assigned by the law.4 77
ii. Statistics - The Creation of New Systems for Tracking
Gender Data
The collection of gender-disaggregated ata, whether on violence or other
relevant factors, is critical to measuring progress towards women's rights. Under
the Law of Equality, ISDEMU, working with DIGESTYC, a specialized office
within the Ministry of the Economy, is assigned the responsibility of creating a
system that will enable the comprehensive monitoring of gender conditions.4 7 8
There are several tiers to this system. The top tier is the Gerencia de Estadisticas
de G6nero [Office of Gender Statistics]; the second tier is the Sistema de
Estadisticas y Monitoreo para la Igualdad (SEMI) [the System of Statistics and
Monitoring for Equality), whose creation is the responsibility of ISDEMU. A
key component of SEMI is the Sistema Nacional de Estadisticas e Indicadores
de Gdnero (SNEIG) [National System of Statistics and Indicators of Gender],
which is to collect data in seven areas.479
474. The law declares that the "State should incorporate in its budget the necessary resources." Id art.
13.
475. Id.
476. Id. art. 40.
477. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Nov. 2016), supra note 267; CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Jeanette Tobar de Cortez, supra note 376.
478. LIE, supra note 18, art. 14.
479. Elena Marisol G6mez Luna, the director of the Gender Unit in the Ministry of Economy, stated that
data pertinent to women would be collected on these seven issues: economic autonomy, inclusive
education, social care and protection, environmental risk, integral health, living a life free of
violence, and political participation of women. According to G6mez Luna, the inclusion of violence
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The creation of the required framework, and publication of statistical
information, has been slow. The Office of Gender Statistics was established only
in 2016 - nearly five years after the Law of Equality went into effect. The delay
was attributed to lack of resources as well as lack of political will. 4 8 0 It was not
until March 2017 that a report was published addressing the areas required by
article 14 of the Law of Equality.481' Although this publication is a clear step
forward, the absence of data on violence against women is notable.
iii. Incorporation of the Law of Equality into Governmental
Agency Norms
The Law of Equality is intended to bring all governmental offices into
compliance with its bedrock principles of equality and non-discrimination. Each
state institution is to develop internal norms harmonizing its policies and
practices with the law.482 Violations of these internal norms are to be subject to
administrative sanctions but are not punishable as crimes.483
In the immediate aftermath of the law's adoption, three government
institutions - the Legislative Assembly, the OJ, and the PGR - adopted internal
norms aimed towards harmonization. However, these are most likely the only
institutions4 84 that have done so, according to reliable sources.485 The lack of
transparency around institutional compliance with the law is underscored by the
is not duplicative of the National System on Violence Against Women required by the Integral Law;
it is intended to incorporate the National System's data into SNEIG. CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Elena M. G6mez Luna, Ministry of the Economy, supra note 270.
480. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz (Nov. 2016), supra note 224.
481. ISDEMU Lanza Compendio de Estadisuicas e Indicadores de Gdnero 2009-2014 [ISDEMU




482. LIE, supra note 18, art. 41. Some commentators lamented the fact that the law "left it to each
institution to assume responsibility for developing intemal regulations," and although the PGR was
tasked with coordinating this process, it wasn't given sufficient funding. CGRS/RHRC Interview
with Ima Rocio Guirola (Oct. 11, 2012), supra note 337. The requirement that each agency develop
its own norms - rather than having one set of norms - has made the implementation of this aspect
of the law quite difficult. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Tobar de Cortez, supra note 376.
483. LIE, supra note 18, art. 41. One commentator noted that whether violations of the Law of Equality
were to be punishable as crimes or only subject to administrative sanctions was a matter of extended
discussion during the law's drafting. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo CArcomo
(Oct. 8, 2012), supra note 246, at 3.
484. Although it may not be representative, the Ministry of the Economy provides an example of foot-
dragging in relation to the development of internal norms. It was not until 2014 that the Ministry
created a Gender Unit tasked with harmonization, and it was not until 2015 that the Gender Unit
was given a budget to begin operation. It is an extremely small unit, consisting ofjust one attorney
and her secretary. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Alba E. Cortez de Alvarenga (Oct. 2012), supra
note 327.
485. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 2013), supra note 375.
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fact that the PGR, which has a special role in relation to these norms,4 86 was
unable to provide information as to which institutions had developed them. The
PGR was attempting to obtain this information by carrying out an
"investigation," but it did not plan to publicize its findings because of the
sensitivity of the issue.487 The absence of internal norms is not the only barrier
to women obtaining redress when government institutions violate rights under
the Law of Equality; an additional obstacle is that a legal framework for the
adjudication of administrative sanctions has not yet been developed.488 The
absence of norms and the lack of procedures explain why, to date, there has been
not a single sanction levied against government officials for failure to comply
with the Law of Equality.
D. Decree 286 for the Creation of Specialized Courts for a Life Free of
Violence and Discrimination Against Women
1. Origin of the Specialized Courts
There is near unanimity that the principal obstacle to justice for women is
the deep-seated patriarchy that pervades all levels of the system. Initial drafts of
the Integral Law in 2010 included the creation of specialized courts with
jurisdiction over crimes of violence against women,48 9 which was an attempt to
take cases out of the traditional system. However, the provision for specialized
courts did not survive; it was removed from the final version of the Integral Law
because of resistance to its cost.4 90
Six years later, in February 2016, the Legislative Assembly approved Decree
286, providing for the establishment of specialized courts.4 91 However, as
discussed below, the jurisdiction of these courts is limited, excluding the two
most frequently committed acts of violence: intrafamilial and sexual violence. In
addition, the specialized courts are actually a hybrid of regular and specialized
courts, with all cases still being initiated in regular peace courts. If and when
cases move forward from the peace courts to the specialized courts, there will
also be geographic challenges because the specialized courts are located in only
486. Once norms have been adopted, complaints that governmental institutions have not imposed
sanctions for their violation can be brought to the PGR. The role of the PGR in those cases is
determine if non-compliance by a governmental official constitutes a failure to carry professional
obligations within the meaning of the Ley de Servidor Publico [Law of Public Servants] (El Sal.).
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo CArcomo (Oct. 8, 2012), supra note 246.
487. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Tobar de Cortez, supra note 376.
488. Id.
489. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Nov. 2016), supra note 267.
490. Id.
491. Decree 286, supra note 21.
78 [Vol. 30:3
2018] El Salvador -A Peace Worse than War 79
three departments and so are not easily accessible to women throughout the
country.
Although some in-country experts see the creation of the specialized courts
as a positive step, there are many who express deep reservations given these
significant limitations in their jurisdiction and structure.4 9 2 Other critics of the
newly created courts go even further, seeing them as diverting focus from the
need to strengthen El Salvador's justice system as a whole.493
2. Jurisdiction and Structure of the Specialized Courts
The specialized courts will have jurisdiction over the eleven crimes
established in the Integral Law,494 failures to comply with protective orders, and
a handful of crimes in the Penal Code, including labor discrimination.4 95 They
will not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving intrafamilial and sexual
violence, which are indisputably the two most prevalent forms of violence
against women.4 96 (As noted earlier, intrafamilial violence does not even exist
per se as a "crime" under Salvadoran law.) The reaction of in-country experts to
the exclusion of these crimes from the specialized courts' jurisdiction was
consistent: they agreed that it was "absurd" to exclude them.49 7 When asked why
the Legislative Assembly chose to exclude them, the experts explained that the
volume of intrafamilial and sexual violence cases would cause the specialized
courts to be "saturated" and to "collapse."" The exclusion of these cases
492. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Nov. 2016), supra note 267; CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz (Nov. 2016), supra note 224; CGRS/RHRC Interview with
Ima Rocio Guirola, Coordinadora de Relaciones Piblicas [Public Relations Coordinator],
CEMUJER, in San Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 17, 2016) (on file with author). Ima Rocio Guirola was
particularly critical of the decision not to give the specialized courts jurisdiction over all crimes of
gender-based violence. Id.
493. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Amdrica J. Romualdo Ci.rcomo (Nov. 2016), supra note 354;
CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 2013), supra note 375.
494. LEIV, supra note 17, arts. 45-55. The crimes are as follows: (1) feminicide (art. 45), (2) aggravated
feminicide (art. 46), (3) preventing access to justice (art. 47), (4) inducing or assisting suicide (art.
48), (5) inducing sexual or erotic acts (art. 49), (6) illegal diffusion of personal information (art. 50),
(7) diffusion ofpornography (art. 51) (8) assisting an individual's non-compliance with the payment
of economic assistance (art. 52), (9) theft of assets (art. 53), (10) theft of assets resulting from family
economic activity (art. 54), and (11) expressions of violence towards women (art. 55).
495. Article 246 of the Penal Code prohibits labor discrimination on the basis of "sex, pregnancy, origin,
civil status, race, social or physical condition, religious or political beliefs, membership or lack of
membership in a labor union, or relationship with other workers" at the place of employment. The
specialized courts will also have jurisdiction to oversee any other "administrative or judicial"
measures which arise from the Integral Law or the Law of Equality - which one commentator
observed is quite vague in that administrative and judicial measures under the two laws have yet to
be established. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Xochitl Bendeck, ISDEMU, in San Sal., El Sal. (Nov.
2016) (on file with author).
496. The prevalence of these forms of violence is discussed supra at Parts II.C.2-3.
497. CGRS/RIRC Interview with Ima Rocio Guirola (Nov. 17, 2016), supra note 492.
498. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Nov. 2016), supra note 267.
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severely undercuts the contribution that the specialized courts can make towards
improving women's access to justice.
As described supra note 396, once the FGR initiates a prosecution, the case
follows a procedural path that starts at a peace court, continues to a court of
instruction, and proceeds to a public trial at a sentencing court, after which the
decision may be challenged in higher tribunals. Ideally, a system of specialized
courts addressing violence and discrimination against women would involve the
establishment of specialized courts at each of these three levels - peace,
instruction, and sentencing - as well as at the appellate level. However, Decree
286 does not do this; rather, all cases subject to the jurisdiction of the specialized
courts will have to pass through a regular peace court before proceeding on to
the specialized courts of instruction, sentencing, and appeal.
This structure has been roundly criticized for its potential to undermine the
specialized court system;4 9 9 lack of sensitivity and professionalism of peace
judges will continue to serve as a strong disincentive for women pursuing their
cases, and the peace courts' high volume of cases will cause a bottleneck.soo In
the instances where a case successfully moves from a peace court to the
specialized system, there are obstacles to pursuing the case due to the limited
number and location of the specialized courts of instruction and sentencing
courts. In the entire country, there are only three courts of instruction and three
sentencing courts and each covers multiple departments.50 1 Women, especially
those in rural areas and of limited resources, will find it very difficult to attend
court proceedings if a significant amount of travel is involved. It should be noted
499. Id.; CGRS/RHRC Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz (Nov. 2016), supra note 224.
500. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Nov. 2016), supra note 267. Sources
repeatedly commented that among governmental actors, judges are the most resistant to accepting
gender equality and taking gender violence seriously. For example, Jeanette Tobar de Cortez of the
Gender Unit of the PGR stated that although there is resistance within the PGR and "throughout the
country," the "courts especially have a machista attitude," and women judges are not immune to
having the "same attitude" as their male counterparts. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Tobar
de Cortez, supra note 376. See also supra note 327 and accompanying text. Lorena Morales of the
FGR noted that "[]udges and magistrates have not taken to the law well." CGRS/RHRC Interview
with Lorena Morales, supra note 239.
Xochitl Bendeck, a representative of ISDEMU, provided the following example which
demonstrated these pernicious attitudes. A married 42-year-old professor had sexually abused his
underage student and she became pregnant. The professor was charged with statutory rape, but
during the trial the judge suggested that the man leave his wife and marry the young girl, since he
was the father of her child. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Xochitl Bendeck, supra note 495.
501. The locations of the courts of instruction and the courts of sentencing, and their coverage, are as
follows: (a) San Salvador, with coverage of cases from the departments of San Salvador, La
Libertad, Chalatenango, La Paz, Cabafias, Cuscatlan, and San Vicente; (b) Santa Ana, with coverage
of cases from Santa Ana, Ahuachapin, and Sonsonate; and (c) San Miguel, with cases over Usulutin,
San Miguel, La Uni6n and MorazAn. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA - PART 2, supra
note 351, § 4.4.2.
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that the original proposal for specialized courts placed one in each of the
country's fourteen departments.502
The Legislative Assembly's decisions to incorporate the peace courts into
the specialized system and to limit the number and location of the specialized
courts reflect resource allocation, and many interpret it as demonstrative of a lack
of commitment to creating a fully integrated and accessible specialized system.
The government's failure to meet Decree 286's deadline for opening the first set
of courts reinforces this skepticism about the government's commitment. Decree
286 stated that the special courts of instruction, sentencing, and appeal that are
to be in San Salvador would begin functioning on June 1, 2016, and the
remaining courts no later than June 1, 2017. As of December 2016, the courts
slated to begin operation in El Salvador on June 1, 2016 had yet to be opened.503
3. Are Specialized Courts the Solution?
There is broad agreement that there are serious deficiencies in the
Salvadoran justice system, especially in cases of gender violence, where cultural
norms and deep bias pose especially great obstacles. However, there is less of a
consensus as to whether the creation of specialized courts is the best solution.
Jeanette Aguilar, of the IUDOP, suggests that rather than create specialized
systems, "we need to strengthen the existing courts," and observes that "we
always create special courts when the regular system does not function." 5 04
Aguilar also points out that the creation of the specialized courts adds to the
existing confused, patchwork system - with peace courts having jurisdiction over
sexual violence crimes, family courts over intrafamilal violence, and specialized
courts over the enumerated crimes in the Integral Law and Penal Code - with no
connection among these tribunals. America Romualdo Circomo, a legal expert
on gender violence, is unequivocal in her opposition to the creation of specialized
courts, which she contends "remove the r sponsibility of the regular penal court
judges" to dispense justice in cases involving women.50 5
Some opposition to the specialized courts is more ambivalent. M6lida
Guevara of Oxfam observed that "in an ideal world" you would be able to train
personnel in the regular courts rather than have to create specialized courts.5 0 6
But in light of the overwhelming deficiencies in the functioning of the regular
502. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Nov. 2016), supra note 267.
503. See, e.g., CGRS/RHRC Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz (Nov. 2016), supra note 224.
504. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Jeanette Aguilar, supra note 224. Aguilar gave the example of the
specialized courts for cases involving the environment, which still lacked "resources and capacity"
two years after their creation, and the specialized courts for organized crime, which "cannot handle
all the cases that come in." Id.
505. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Am6rica J. Romualdo Circomo (Nov. 2016), supra note 354.
506. CGRS/RHRC Interview with M61ida Guevara (Nov. 2016), supra note 177.
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system, it is "very necessary" to have specialized courts with trained
personnel.50 7 Vilma Vaquerano of ORMUSA supports the specialized courts but
echoes the concern that they may create the perception that violence against
women is "only the responsibility" of the specialized courts, which could result
in even more minimal efforts to improve the responsiveness of the regular
courts.os Representatives from the Procuraduria para la Defensa de los Derechos
Humanos (PDDH) [Office of the Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights,
or Human Rights Ombudsman Office] expressed qualified support for the courts
but voiced concern about the lack of procedure to guide the progress of cases. A
PDDH source noted that peace judges are likely to be obstacles to cases that
should pass to the specialized courts because they will be making the threshold
determination of whether an act meets the criteria of one of the crimes
enumerated in Decree 286. He posited that violence against women is so normal
to these judges that they will not see acts brought before them as punishable
gender crimes that should be remitted to the specialized courts.509
CONCLUSION
Historical and contemporary factors have given rise to the extremely high
levels of violence that persist in El Salvador today. Many of the Salvadorans
interviewed for this article referred to a "culture of violence" going back to the
brutal Spanish Conquest and continuing into more recent history, including the
1932 Matanza and the atrocities of the country's 12-year civil war. Gender
violence exists within this broader context. However, as almost every Salvadoran
source noted, violence against women is even more deeply rooted than other
expressions of societal violence as the result of patriarchal norms that tolerate
and affirm the most extreme forms of domination and abuse of women.
Over the past two decades, women's rights activists have advocated for, and
sometimes been the architects of, new laws to address the dire situation of gender
violence. As discussed above, the first significant law, the 1996 LVI, was narrow
in scope and aimed at prevention, not punishment. The next legal development,
the amendment of Penal Code article 200, purported to do what the LVI had not
- criminalize intrafamilial violence - but it did not in fact do so.f' 0 It was so
507. Id.
508. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Vilma Vaquerano Cruz (Nov. 2016), supra note 224.
509. One PDDH source noted that control over and domination of women is not only normalized among
judges, it is perceived as an expression of love: "Judges say . . . that if a man will not let a woman
go out of the house, or work ... it's because [he] loves her ... he is looking after her." CGRS/RHRC
Interview with Ricardo J. G6mez Guerrero, Procurador Adjunto [Deputy Procurator], PDDH, in San
Sal., El Sal. (Nov. 2016) (on file with author).
510. As discussed supra § 3(B)(2)(b), article 200 of the Penal Code did not create a new crime of
intrafamilial violence, although on its face it appeared to do so.
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poorly drafted that it was interpreted as putting the additional obstacle of
exhaustion of LVI processes in the way of potential prosecution of abusers.5 11
For its part, the LVI failed to prevent or reduce violence because the prevailing
cultural norms resulted in the failure of government officials to carry out their
responsibilities under the law.512
The 2010 Integral Law and 2011 Law of Equality represent a much more
ambitious initiative and demonstrate the understanding that women's rights
activists developed about the need not only to punish gender violence but to
address its roots by eradicating gender inequality and entrenched discriminatory
practices. Seen in that light, the Law of Equality, which calls for equality and
non-discrimination across sectors such as education, health, labor, and
governance, is the natural complement to the Integral Law, with its principal
focus on ending violence and impunity for such acts. Taken together, the two
laws express a belief that law can change culture.513
The need to transform the culture was repeatedly affirmed by in-country
sources interviewed for this article. Many of them spoke about the importance
of education in reaching children and in helping to bring about a generational
shift in attitudes. As they noted, and as the Law of Equality reflects, reforms are
necessary not only in the educational sphere but across public institutions
because "[i]nstitutions are the foundation of society[,] and if those institutions
don't change, then society won't change[,] even if we spend millions of
dollars."5 14
These sources were not under the illusion that change would come about as
a consequence of the enactment of new laws. They spoke of the need for a
"bottom up and top down" approach - recognizing that "[s]ocietal change has to
come from both the popular society demanding the change and ... from
government authorities [carrying out their roles]."51 5 Unfortunately, as this
article has detailed, due to an overwhelming lack of political will, the
government has not carried out its role in implementing the two laws' key
provisions. The Integral Law's mandate to create a national statistical system on
511. See supra notes 344-346 and accompanying text.
512. Multiple sources commented on the LVI's failure. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
513. This need to transform the culture was repeatedly affirmed by in-country sources who talked about
the importance of a generational shift in attitudes. See, e.g., CGRS/RHRC Interview with Maria
Teresa Delgado de Mejia, supra note 93. Delgado de Mejia gave the example of 1994 changes to El
Salvador's Civil Code, addressing the rights of "illegitimate" children. Id. Prior to the 1994
revisions, children born out of wedlock could be denied the right to any support whatsoever, and
they could be prohibited from taking the last name of their father. The law eliminated those
distinctions and children born out of wedlock were to have the same rights as those born within a
marriage, which ultimately led to greater social acceptance.
514. CGRS/RHRC Interview with M6lida Guevara (Oct. 17, 2013), supra note 155.
515. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Oct. 21, 2010), supra note 240.
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violence against women has been flouted.516 The government has not created the
promised shelter program17 or provided money for a Special Fund intended to
make resources available to women in need.1 One of the central requirements
of the Law of Equality, that state agencies adopt internal norms to assure equality
and non-discrimination, has been largely ignored.519 And, to date, no government
employee has been sanctioned for failure to comply with any aspect of these
laws. 5 20 The lack of governmental political will has been exacerbated by a desire
to hide the reality of these shortcomings, which is perhaps demonstrated nowhere
more clearly than in the government's stifling of reports detailing deficiencies in
its justice system.
Levels of violence, including the killings of women, have continued to rise,
while impunity has remained a constant. Criticism of the persistent impunity for
gender violence resulted in El Salvador's most recent legal development: the
enactment of Decree 286, which created specialized courts. However, the
exclusion of the most commonly committed gender crimes - intrafamilial
violence and sexual violence - from the specialized courts' jurisdiction, and the
courts' hybrid structure, which requires that cases still be initiated in the peace
courts, do not inspire optimism for positive outcomes.
Notwithstanding these considerable obstacles, the Salvadorans interviewed
for this article, who have long struggled for access to justice and gender equality,
maintain the hope and the belief that change is possible. In the course of multiple
interviews over a six-year period (2010 to 2016), Salvadoran sources have
expressed deep frustration and disappointment but have not articulated
resignation or defeat.
It is not difficult to understand why surrendering to the status quo is not an
option for Salvadorans where the status quo is rising violence, prevailing
impunity, and gross inequalities. And they recognize that the legal framework -
imperfect as it might be - provides a vehicle for improvement. In multiple
interviews, Salvadoran sources repeatedly recommended the following as
baseline improvements necessary to address the inadequacies in the legal
framework discussed in this article:
* government allocation of sufficient funds to fully implement the
country's laws addressing gender-based violence and gender
equality
516. See supra notes 379-395 and accompanying text.
517. See supra notes 407-411 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 412-414 and accompanying text.
519. Only the Legislative Assembly, the OJ, and the PGR have adopted internal norms. See supra notes
482-488 and accompanying text.
520. CGRS/RHRC Interview with Aracely Bautista Bayona (Nov. 2016), supra note 267.
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* creation of a social service network, including an adequate system
of shelters distributed throughout the country, to provide safety for
girls and women fleeing violence
* creation of a comprehensive national statistical system on violence
against women, providing a reliable method to evaluate trends and
assess the efficacy of government policies
* collection and analysis of data from the key actors in the justice
system (police, prosecutors, judges) to evaluate-access to justice and
to identify gaps and barriers in the system
* adoption of a system to evaluate and sanction (and dismiss where
appropriate) individuals in the justice system who fail to carry out
their obligations under the law
These recommendations primarily address the functioning of El Salvador's
justice system, which has been the focus of this article. However, as numerous
Salvadorans stressed, other fundamental changes must also take place if gender
equality is to become a reality, including better access to education, paths to
economic self-sufficiency, and increased reproductive health services and
choice.
The Salvadorans who I interviewed for this article have provided
information, insights, and perspectives that are simply not available in written
reports or studies. Although they come from a range of backgrounds -
governmental and non-governmental; legal professionals as well as grassroots
activists - they all acknowledge the complex causes of societal violence. As
discussed throughout this article, they also have specific critiques and
prescriptions for what must be done in order to see any real progress. Discussions
of the country's crisis, as well as of the international community's response, must
start by listening to the voices of the Salvadorans who, despite the seemingly
intractable situation of violence and impunity in which they live, have refused to
abandon the struggle for justice and equality. They are inspiring in their courage
and resilience. By quoting extensively from these sources, this article has sought
to amplify their voices.
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APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS
AMS: Asociaci6n para la Autodeterminaci6n y Desarrollo de Mujeres
Salvadorefias [Association for Self-Determination and
Development of Salvadoran Women]
ARENA: Alianza Republicana Nacionalista [Nationalist Republican
Alliance]
BPR: Bloque Popular Revolucionario [Popular Revolutionary Block]
CDM: Centro de Derechos de la Mujer [Center for Women's Rights]
CEDAW: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women
CEPAL: La Comisi6n Econ6mica para Amdrica Latina y el Caribe
[United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean]
ECLAC: La Comisi6n Econ6mica para Amdrica Latina y el Caribe
[United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean]
CEMUJER: Instituto de Estudios de la Mujer "Norma Virginia Guirola de
Herrera" [Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera Institute for
Women's Studies]
CGRS: Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, University of California
Hastings College of the Law
CNJ: Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura [National Judiciary Council]
CONNA: Consejo Nacional de la Niflez y de la Adolescencia [National
Council for Childhood and Adolescence]
CSJ: Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice]
DIGESTYC: Direcci6n General de Estadisticas y Censos [General Directorate
on Statistics and Census]
ERP: Ejdrcito Revolucionario del Pueblo [People's Revolutionary
Army]
FAPU: Frente de Acci6n Popular Unificada [United Popular Action
Front]
FECCAS: Federaci6n Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadorefios [Christian
Federation of Salvadoran Peasants]
FGR: Fiscalia General de la RepAblica [Office of the Prosecutor
General of the Republic]
FPL: Fuerzas Populares de Liberaci6n Farabundo Marti [Popular
Liberation Front]
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FMLN: Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n Nacional [Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front]
FUSADES: Fundaci6n Salvadorefia para el Desarrollo Econ6mico y Social
[Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development]
GPM: Grupo Parlamentario de Mujeres [Parliamentary Group of
Women]
IDHUCA: Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad
Centroainericana "Jos6 Sime6n Cafias" [Institute of Human
Rights, Jos6 Sime6n Caflas Central American University]
IML: Instituto de Medicina Legal [Institute of Legal Medicine]
ISDEMU: Instituto Salvadoreflo para el Desarrollo de la Mujer [Salvadoran
Institute for the Development of the Woman]
ISNA: Instituto Salvadoreflo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Niflez y la
Adolescencia [Salvadoran Institute for the Comprehensive
Development of Childhood and Adolescence]
IUDOP: Instituto Universitario de Opini6n Phblica [University Institute
of Public Opinion]
LEIV: Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las
Mujeres [Special Integral Law for a Life Free of Violence
against Women]
LIE: Ley de Igualdad, Equidad y Erradicaci6n de la Discriminaci6n
contra las Mujeres [Law of Equality, Equity, and the Eradication
of Discrimination against Women]
LVI: Ley contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar [Law against Intrafamilial
Violence]
MJSP: Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pablica [Ministry of Justice
and Public Security]
OJ: Organo Judicial [Judiciary]
ORMUSA: Organizaci6n de Mujeres Salvadoreflas por la Paz [Organization
of Salvadoran Women for Peace]
PC: Partido Comunista [Communist Party]
PCN: Partido de Conciliaci6n Nacional [Party of National
Reconciliation]
PCS: Partido Comunista Salvadoreflo [Salvadoran Communist Party]
PDC: Partido Dem6crata Cristiano [Christian Democratic Party]
PDDH: Procuraduria para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos [Office
of the Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights, or Human
Rights Ombudsman's Office]
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PGR: Procuraduria General de la Rep6blica [Office of the Procurator
General of the Republic]
PNC: Policia Nacional Civil [National Civil Police]
PRTC: Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos
[Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers]
PSD: Partido Social Democrata [Social Democratic Party]
RHRC: Refugee and Human Rights Clinic, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law
RLVI: Reformas en la Ley contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar [Reforms
in the Law against Intrafamilial Violence]
RN: Resistencia Nacional [National Resistance]
SEMI: Sistema de Estadisticas y Monitoreo para la Igualdad [System of
Indicators and Monitoring for Equality]
SNEIG: Sistema Nacional de Estadisticas e Indicadores de Gdnero
[National System of Statistics and Indicators of Gender]
STC: Comisi6n T6cnica Especializada [Special Technical
Commission]
UCA: Universidad Centroamericana "Jos6 Sime6n Caflas" [Jos6
Sime6n Cafias Central American University]
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
UTEC: Universidad Tecnol6gica de El Salvador [Technological
University of El Salvador]
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APPENDIX B: EL SALVADOR INTERVIEW LIST5 2 1
April 2010
Amdrica Joaquina Romualdo CArcomo, Coordinadora de Programas [Program
Coordinator], Asociaci6n Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida ("Las Dignas")
[Women's Association for Dignity and Life] (Apr. 28, 2010).
Ana Madaly Sdnchez, Coordinadora [Coordinator], Area de la Violencia de
Politica Nacional de la Mujer, Instituto Salvadoreffo para el Desarrollo de la
Mujer (ISDEMU) [National Women's Policy on Violence, Salvadoran Institute
for the Development of the Woman] (Apr. 28, 2010).
Aracely Bautista Bayona, Consultora Legal [Legal Consultant], Comisi6n de
Familia, la Mujer, y la Nifiez de la Asamblea Legislativa [Commission on
Family, Women, and Children of the Legislative Assembly] (Apr. 27, 2010).
Benjamin Cuellar, Director [Director], and Roxana Marroquin, Coordinadora
para Defensa de Nifios y Adolescentes [Coordinator for Defense of Children and
Adolescents], Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad
Centroamericana "Jos6 Sime6n Cafias" (IDHUCA) [Institute of Human Rights,
Jos6 Sime6n Cafias Central American University] (Apr. 27, 2010).
Carlos Ernesto M6ndez Rivera, Director [Director], Instituto de Medicinal Legal
de Santa Tecla [Institute of Legal Medicine of Santa Tecla] (Apr. 29, 2010).
Glenda Vaquerano Cruz, Jefa de la Unidad de la Realidad Nacional [Chief of the
Unit of National Reality], Procuraduria para la Defensa de los Derechos
Humanos (PDDH) [Office of the Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights,
or Human Rights Ombudsman's Office] (Apr. 28, 2010).
Jos6 Alberto Franco Castillo, Coordinador de Derecho de Familia y G6nero
[Family Law and Gender Coordinator], Escuela de Capacitaci6n del Consejo
Nacional de la Judicatura (CNJ) [School of Judicial Training of the National
Judiciary Council] (Apr. 29, 2010).
Maria Margarita Velado, Presidenta [President], Comisi6n de Justicia y
Derechos Humanos, Asamblea Legislativa [Commission for Justice and Human
Rights, Legislative Assembly] (Apr. 28, 2010).
M6lida Guevara, Coordinadora del Programa de la Justicia del Gdnero
[Coordinator of the Gender Justice Program], Oxfam (Apr. 29, 2010).
521. All interviews took place in person unless otherwise indicated.
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Mirna Antonieta Perla Jimenez, Juez [Justice], Sala de lo Civil de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia (CSJ) [Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice] (Apr.
29, 2010).
Nidia Hidalgo Celarid, Coordinadora de la Oficina de Gdnero [Coordinator of
the Gender Office], Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (UNDP)
[United Nations Development Program] (Apr. 29, 2010).
Salvador Eduardo Men6ndez Leal, Procurador Adjunto para la Defensa de los
Derechos Humanos [Deputy Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights], and
Raquel Caballero de Guevara, Procuradora Adjunta para la Defensa de Mujeres
y la Familia [Deputy Procurator for the Defense of Women and the Family],
Procuraduria para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) [Office of the
Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights, or Human Rights Ombudsman's
Office] (Apr. 27, 2010).
Sandra Edibel Guevara, Directora Ejecutiva [Executive Director], Asociaci6n y
Movimiento de Mujeres M61ida Anaya Montes ("Las M61idas") [M61ida Anaya
Montes Women's Movement] (Apr. 30, 2010).
Sidney Blanco Reyes, Juez, Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia (CSJ) [Justice, Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice]
(Apr. 30, 2010).
Silvia Ivette Juarez Barrios, Abogada [Attorney], Organizaci6n de Mujeres
Salvadoreflas por la Paz (ORMUSA) [Organization of Salvadoran Women for
Peace] (Apr. 30, 2010).
Yanira Argueta, Directora Ejecutiva [Executive Director], Asociaci6n para la
Autodeterminaci6n y Desarrollo de Mujeres Salvadorefias (AMS) [Association
for Self-Determination and Development of Salvadoran Women] (Apr. 28,
2010).
October 2010
Am6rica Joaquina Romualdo Circomo, Coordinadora de Programas [Program
Coordinator], Asociaci6n Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida (Las Dignas)
[Women's Association for Dignity and Life] (Oct. 18, 20, 2010).
Aracely Bautista Bayona, Consajera Legal [Legal Advisor], Comisi6n de
Familia, la Mujer, y la Nifiez de la Asamblea Legislativa [Commission on
Family, Women, and Children of the Legislative Assembly] (Oct. 21, 2010).
Blanca Nidia Alas de Lopez, Coordinadora Nacional de Centros de Atenci6n
Psicosocial [National Coordinator of Psychological Attention], Corte Suprema
de Justicia (CSJ) [Supreme Court of Justice] (Oct. 19, 2010).
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Doris Montenegro, Presidenta [President], and Ima Rocio Guirola, Instituto de
Estudios de la Mujer "Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera" (CEMUJER) [Norma
Virginia Guirola de Herrera Institute for Women's Studies] (Oct. 19, 2010).
Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, Asesor [Consultant], Ministerio de Justicia y
Seguridad Piblica (MJSP) [Ministry of Justice and Public Security] (Oct. 22,
2010).
Mario Francisco Mena M6ndez, Jefe de la Divisi6n de Admisi6n, Evaluaci6n y
Diagnostico [Head of the Division of Admission, Evaluation, and Diagnostics],
Instituto Salvadoreflo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Nifiez y la Adolescencia
(ISNA), Salvadoran Institute for the Comprehensive Development of Childhood
and Adolescence] (Oct. 20, 2010).
Milena Calder6n de Escal6n, Diputada - ARENA [Assembly Member -
ARENA], Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] (Oct. 21, 2010).
Silvia Ivette Juarez Barrios, Abogada [Attorney], Organizaci6n de Mujeres
Salvadoreflas por la Paz (ORMUSA) [Organization of Salvadoran Women for
Peace] (Oct. 19, 2010).
Vilma Guadalupe Portillo, Coordinadora del Proyecto Regional sobre Violencia
Sexual [Coordinator of the Regional Project on Sexual Violence], Fondo de
Poblaci6n de las Naciones Unidas (UNFPA) [United Nations Population Fund]
(Oct. 21, 2010).
Zaira Navas, Inspectora General [Inspector General], Policia Nacional Civil
(PNC) [National Civil Police] (Oct. 21, 2010).
October 2012
Alba Evelyn Cortez de Alvarenga, Jefa de la Unidad de Gdnero [Head of the
Gender Unit], Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] (Oct. 12, 2012).
Amdrica Joaquina Romualdo CArcomo, Coordinadora de Programas [Program
Coordinator], Asociaci6n Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida (Las Dignas)
[Women's Association for Dignity and Life] (Oct. 8, 2012).
Aracely Bautista Bayona, Consajera Legal [Legal Advisor], Comisi6n de
Familia, la Mujer, y la Nifiez de la Asamblea Legislativa [Commission on
Family, Women, and Children of the Legislative Assembly] (Oct. 8, 2012).
Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, Asesor de Despacho [Dispatch Advisor],
Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pfblica (MJSP) [Ministry of Justice and
Public Security] (Oct. 10, 2012).
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Emely Flores and Ruth Polanco, Instituto Salvadoreflo para el Desarrollo de la
Mujer (ISDEMU) [Salvadoran Institute for the Development of the Woman]
(Oct. 8, 2012).
Ima Rocio Guirola, Coordinadora de Relaciones Pdblicas [Public Relations
Coordinator], Instituto de Estudios de la Mujer "Norma Virginia Guirola de
Herrera" (CEMUJER) [Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera Institute for
Women's Studies] (Oct. 11, 2012).
Jeanette Tobar de Cortez, Coordinadora [Coordinator], and Vanessa Lara,
Asistente Legal [Legal Assistant], Unidad de G6nero de la Procuraduria General
de la Repablica (PGR) [Gender Unit of the Office of the Procurator General of
the Republic] (Oct. 11, 2012).
Jos6 Alberto Franco Castillo, Coordinador de Derecho de Familia y Gdnero
[Family Law and Gender Coordinator], Escuela de Capacitaci6n del Consejo
Nacional de la Judicatura (CNJ) [School of Judicial Training of the National
Judiciary Council] (Oct. 9, 2012).
Julio Quinteros and Carlos Amaya, Unidad T6cnica Ejecutiva del Sector de
Justicia [Technical Executive Unit of the Judicial Sector] (Oct. 10, 2012).
Rosicela Rivas de Perdomo, Coordinadora de la Unidad de Victimas de
Violencia Intrafamiliar, Abuso Sexual, y Maltrato Infantil [Coordinator of the
Unit of Victims of Intrafamilial Violence, Sexual Abuse and Infant
Mistreatment], and Claudia Maria Rebollo Perez, Asistente Juridico [Judicial
Assistant], Centro de Atenci6n de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [Attention Center
of the Supreme Court of Justice] (Oct. 11, 2012).
M61ida Guevara, Coordinadora del Programa de la Justicia del G6nero
[Coordinator of the Gender Justice Program], Oxfam (Oct. 9, 2012).
Miguel Velasquez-Velasquez, Jefe Tdcnico de Estadisticas [Technical Head of
Statistics], Instituto de Medicina Legal (IML) [Institute of Legal Medicine] (Oct.
10, 2012).
Nery Diaz, Diputada [Assembly Member], Carmen Elena Calderon de Escalon,
Diputada [Assembly Member], and Lorena Pena Mendoza, Diputada [Assembly
Member], Grupo Parliamentario de Mujeres (GPM) [Parliamentary Group of
Women] (Oct. 11, 2012).
Vilma Vaquerano Cruz, Directora de Comunicaciones [Director of
Communications], Organizaci6n de Mujeres Salvadorefias por la Paz
(ORMUSA) [Organization of Salvadoran Women for Peace] (Oct. 11, 2012).
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October 2013
Adolfo Vidal, Gerente de Apoyo del Programa/Presidente de la Junta Directiva
[Program Support Manager/President of Board of Directors], Consejo Nacional
de la Nifiez y de la Adolescencia (CONNA) [National Council for Childhood
and Adolescence] (Oct. 15, 2013).
Alma Cruz, Diputada [Assembly Member], Comisi6n de la Familia, la Niflez,
Adolescentes, Adultos Mayores y Personas con Descapacidades [Commission
for Family, Childhood, Adolescents, Seniors, and Disabled Persons] (Oct. 18,
2013).
Am6rica Joaquina Romualdo Circomo, Concertaci6n Feminista Prudencia
Ayala [Prudencia Ayala Feminist Coalition] (Oct. 17, 2013).
Aracely Bautista Bayona, Consajera Legal [Legal Advisor], Comisi6n de
Familia, la Mujer, y la Nifiez de la Asamblea Legislativa [Commission on
Family, Women, and Children of the Legislative Assembly] (Oct. 13, 2013).
Blanca Figueroa, Jefa de la Unidad de Juvenil y Familia [Chief of the Unit for
Children and Family], Policia Nacional Civil (PNC) [National Civil Police] (Oct.
17, 2013).
Claudia Hermannsdorfer, Abogada [Attorney], Centro de Derechos de la Mujer
(CDM) [Center for Women's Rights] (Oct. 18, 2013).
Emma Julia Fabian Hernandez, Diputada - FMLN [Assembly Member -
FMLN], Patricia Iraheta, Asesora [Consultant], and Maria Luz, Asistente
[Assistant], Comisi6n de la Mujer y la Igualdad de Gdnero [Commission for
Women and Gender Equality] (Oct. 18, 2013).
Luis Salazar, Director Ejecutivo [Executive Director], and Mario Francisco
Mena Mdndez, Jefe de la Divisi6n de Admisi6n, Evaluaci6n y Diagnostico [Head
of the Division of Admission, Evaluation, and Diagnostics], Instituto
Salvadoreflo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Nifiez y la Adolescencia (ISNA)
[Salvadoran Institute for the Comprehensive Development of Childhood and
Adolescence] (Oct. 16, 2013).
Maria De Fortin, Juez [Justice], Ruth Martinez Agreda, Juez Especializada de
Niflos y Adolescentes [Specialized Justice of Children and Adolescents], and
Claudia Maria Rebollo Perez, Abogada [Attorney], Corte Suprema de Justicia
(CSJ) [Supreme Court of Justice] (Oct. 18, 2013).
Maria Teresa Delgado de Mejia, Especialista en Protecci6n Infantil [Child
Protection Specialist], Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia (UNICEF)
[United Nations Children's Fund] (Oct. 17, 2013).
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Marlon Montoya, Asesor de Protecci6n Nacional [Consultant for National
Protection], Visi6n Mundial [World Vision] (Oct. 16, 2013).
M6lida Guevara, Coordinadora del Programa de la Justicia del G6nero
[Coordinator of the Gender Justice Program], Oxfam (Oct. 17, 2013).
Nori Flores and Cecilia Viviana Bonilla, Unidad de Menores y Mujeres [Unit for
Minors and Women], Fiscalia de la Repilblica (FGR) [Office of the Prosecutor
General of the Republic] (Oct. 14, 2013).
Ondina Castillo, Coordinadora de G6nero [Gender Coordinator], Fondo de
Poblaci6n de las Naciones Unidas (UNFPA) [United Nations Population Fund]
(Oct. 16, 2013).
Roberto Rodriguez Meldndez, Director de la Escuela de Capacitaci6n Judicial
[Director of the Judicial Training School], Departamento de Ciencias Juridicas
de la Universidad Centroamericana "Jos6 Sime6n Caflas" (UCA) [Legal
Sciences Department, Jos6 Sime6n Cafias Central American University] (Oct.
14-15, 2013).
Zaira Navas, Directora Ejecutiva [Executive Director], Consejo Nacional de la
Nifiez y de la Adolescencia (CONNA) [National Council for Childhood and
Adolescence] (Oct. 15, 2013).
Summer 2014522
Roberto Rodriguez Mel6ndez, Director de la Escuela de Capacitaci6n Judicial
[Director of the Judicial Training School], Departamento de Ciencias Juridicas
de la Universidad Centroamericana "Jos6 Sime6n Caflas" (UCA) [Legal
Sciences Department, Jos6 Sime6n Cafias Central American University] (May 2,
2014).
Vilma Vaquerano Cruz, Directora de Comunicaciones [Director of
Communications], Organizaci6n de Mujeres Salvadoreflas por la Paz
(ORMUSA) [Organization of Salvadoran Women for Peace] (July 31, 2014).
November 2016
Alba Evelyn Cortez de Alvarenga, Jefa de la Unidad de Gdnero [Head of the
Gender Unit], Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] (Nov. 15, 2016).
Amdrica Joaquina Romualdo Circomo, Concertaci6n Feminista Prudencia
Ayala [Prudencia Ayala Feminist Coalition] (Nov. 15, 2016).
522. Interviews in the summer of 2014 took place by telephone.
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Aracely Bautista Bayona, Consajera Legal [Legal Advisor], Comit6 Directivo
del Grupo Parlamentario de Mujeres (GPM) [Executive Committee of the
Parliamentary Group of Women] (Nov. 15, 2016).
Elena Marisol G6mez Luna, Directora de la Unidad de G6nero [Director of the
Gender Unit], Ministerio de la Economia [Ministry of the Economy] (Nov. 16,
2016).
Ima Rocio Guirola, Coordinadora de Relaciones Pblicas [Public Relations
Coordinator], Instituto de Estudios de la Mujer "Norma Virginia Guirola de
Herrera" (CEMUJER) [Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera Institute for
Women's Studies] (Nov. 17, 2016).
Jeanette Aguilar, Directora [Director], and Laura Andrade, Investigadora
[Researcher], Instituto Universitario de Opini6n Pblica (IUDOP) de la
Universidad Centroamericana Jos6 Sime6n Caflas (UCA) [University Institute
of Public Opinion, Jos6 Sime6n Caflas Central American University] (Nov. 16,
2016).
Jeanette Tobar de Cortez, Coordinadora [Coordinator], Unidad de Gdnero de la
Procuraduria General de la Repfiblica (PGR) [Coordinator, Gender Unit of the
Office of the Procurator General of the Republic] (Nov. 15, 2016).
Lorena Morales, Directora de la Unidad de Atenci6n Especializada para las
Mujeres [Director of the Unit of Specialized Attention for Women], Fiscalia
General de la Repblica (FGR) [Office of the Prosecutor General of the
Republic] (Nov. 28, 2016).
Maria Antonieta Josa de Parada, Presidenta [President], Consejo Nacional de la
Judicatura (CNJ) [National Board of the Judiciary] (Nov. 17, 2016).
M61ida Guevara, Coordinadora del Programa de la Justicia del G6nero
[Coordinator of the Gender Justice Program], Oxfam (Nov. 16, 2016).
Ondina Castillo, Coordinador de Gdnero [Gender Coordinator], and Maria
LaFuente Funes, Oficial de Alianzas [Officer of Alliances], Fondo de Poblaci6n
de las Naciones Unidas (UNFPA) [United Nations Population Fund] (Nov. 17.
2016).
Ricardo Jos6 G6mez Guerrero, Procurador Adjunto [Deputy Procurator],
Procuraduria para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) [ Office of the
Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights, or Human Rights Ombudsman's
Office] (Nov. 17, 2016).
Roberto Rodriguez Meldndez, Subjefe de Partido de la Iniciativa Regional de
Derechos Humanos y Democracia para Centroam6rica [Deputy Chief of Party
for the Regional Human Rights and Democracy Initiative for Central America],
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Departamento de Ciencias Juridicas de la Universidad Centroamericana "Jos6
Sime6n Cafias" (UCA) [Legal Sciences Department, Jos6 Sime6n Caflas Central
American University] (Nov. 15, 18, 2016).
Roxana Delgado, Economista de la Unidad de Andlisis Presupuestaria de la
Asamblea Legislativa [Economist with the Budgetary Analysis Unit of the
Legislative Assembly] (Nov. 18, 2016).
Vilma Vaquerano Cruz, Directora de Comunicaciones [Director of
Communications], Organizaci6n de Mujeres Salvadorefias por la Paz
(ORMUSA) [Organization of Salvadoran Women for Peace] (Nov. 15, 2016).
Xochitl Bendeck and Lizeth Marlene Ayala Rodriguez, Instituto Salvadoreffo
para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ISDEMU) [Salvadoran Institute for the
Development of the Woman] (Nov. 14, 2016).
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APPENDIX C: DATA AND STATISTICS SYSTEMS IN EL SALVADOR
Ministerio de Economfa 523
[Ministry of Economy]
I
Viceministra de Comercio e Industria
[Vice Minister of Trade and Industry]
Direcci6n General de Estadistica y Censos
(DIGESTYC) 524
[General Directorate of Statistics and Census]
Gerencia de Estadisticas de G~nero
[Office of Gender Statistics]
Sistema de Estadisticas y Monitoreo para la
Igualdad (SEMI) 525
[System of Statistics and Monitoring for Equality]
Sistema Nacional de Estadisticas e Indicadores
de G~nero (SNEIG)52
[National System of Statistics and Indicators of
Gender]
Seven Themes of SNEIG:
1. Demografia [Demography]
2. Participaci6n Politica de las Mujeres
[Political Participation of Women]
3. Salud Integral [Integral Health]
4. Educaci6n Incluyente [Inclusive Education]
5. Autonomia Econ6mica [Economic
Autonomy]
6. Cuidado y Protecci6n Social [Care and
Social Protection]





523. This is not a complete chart of the Ministry of Economy; this chart includes the entities involved in
the keeping of statistics. The structure and function of these entities are further discussed supra Part
III.C.
524. This is discussed in more detail supra Part III.C.2.a.
525. The creation of SEMI is the responsibility of the ISDEMU. Article 14 of the Law of Equality
requires the creation of this overarching gender data system. See supra Part III.C.2.a.ii.b.
526. The SNEIG is to be developed by DIGESTYC and ISDEMU. See supra Part III.C.3.b.ii.
527. This will be contained in the Sub-System of Statistics and Information on Violence Against Women
as required by Article 30 of the Integral Law. See supra Part III.C.2.a.ii.B.
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